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ABSTRACT 
Process plants that produce chemical products through pre-designed processes are 
fundamental in the Chemical Engineering industry. The safety of hazardous processing plants 
is of paramount importance as an accident could cause major damage to property and/or 
injury to people. HAZID is a computer system that helps designers and operators of process 
plants to identify potential design and operation problems given a process plant design. 
However, there are issues that need to be addressed before such a system will be accepted for 
common use.  
 
This research project considers how to improve the usability and acceptability of such a 
system by developing tools to test the developed models in order for the users to gain 
confidence in HAZID’s output as HAZID is a model based system with a library of 
equipment models. The research also investigates the development of computer-aided safety 
applications and how they can be integrated together to extend HAZID to support different 
kinds of safety-related reasoning tasks. 
 
Three computer-aided tools and one reasoning system have been developed from this project. 
The first is called “Model Test Bed”, which is to test the correctness of models that have been 
built. The second is called “Safe Isolation Tool”, which is to define isolation boundary and 
identify potential hazards for isolation work. The third is an Instrument Checker, which lists 
all the instruments and their connections with process items in a process plant for the 
engineers to consider whether the instrument and its loop provide safeguards to the equipment 
during the hazard identification procedure. The fourth is a cause-effect analysis system that 
can automatically generate cause-effect tables for the control engineers to consider the safety 
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design of the control of a plant as the table shows process events and corresponding process 
responses designed by the control engineer. 
 
The thesis provides a full description of the above four tools and how they are integrated into 
the HAZID system to perform control safety analysis and hazard identification in process 
plants. 
 
KEYWORDS 
 
Knowledge representation; Testing; Process system engineering; Process control engineering; 
Maintenance safety; Safe isolation; Cause-effect analysis; Safety analysis function evaluation 
chart; Hazard identification; Hazard and operability study.  
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PREFACE 
This thesis represents the research conducted between 2005 and 2009 to fulfil the 
requirements of an Engineering Doctorate (EngD) at the Centre for Innovative and 
Collaborative Engineering (CICE), Loughborough University, UK. The research was 
undertaken within an industrial context and was sponsored by the Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), UK and Hazid Technologies Ltd., an engineering 
software company, and an Overseas Research Student Scholarship (ORS). 
 
The essence of the Engineering Doctorate program is to produce doctoral graduates that can 
drive innovation in the engineering industry with the highest level of technical, managerial 
and business competence. It gives the student a chance to work in a real industry environment 
and solve the real industry problems and offers a combination of research and commercial 
skills. It helps the development of innovative thinking, while tackling real industrial problems. 
 
The EngD is examined on the basis of a thesis of about 18,000-22,000 words, supported by 
publications or technical reports. This thesis is supported by a journal paper and three 
conference papers produced as part of the research. These papers are attached as appendices 
to the thesis. The papers are an integral part of, and should be read when referenced in 
conjunction with, the thesis. 
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USED ACRONYMS / ABBREVIATIONS  
CAEX   Computer-Aided Engineering eXchange 
CSV       Comma-Separated Values  
DBB       Double Block and Bleed 
HAZOP  HAZard and OPerability study 
ISO        International Standardization Organization  
OPC       Off –Page-Connector  
PCE        Process Control Engineering  
P&IDs    Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams 
PRV       Pressure Relief Valve 
SAFE     Safety Analysis Function Evaluation chart  
SAX       Simple API for XML parser 
SBB        Single Block and Bleed  
SPPS      Smart Plant Process Safety 
XML     eXtensible Markup Language 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This Engineering Doctorate project investigated and explored model verification, hazard 
identification for safe isolation, instrumentation identification and control design analysis. It 
developed and implemented three computer-aided tools and one automatic reasoning system. 
They are integrated with an existing knowledge-based system, HAZID, which is a product of 
the sponsor company.  
 
The project collaboration is between Hazid Technologies Ltd. and the Computer Science 
Department, Loughborough University.  
 
This introduction begins with the project aim follows by a brief description of the industrial 
sponsor, Hazid Technologies Ltd. A project overview and the structure of the thesis are then 
described. 
1.1 AIM 
Process plant safety is always a top priority in the process industry worldwide. Carrying out 
comprehensive hazard identification at both design and operation stages is essential. HAZard 
and OPerability (HAZOP) study is a method that is widely used for identifying hazard and 
operability problems. However, it is well known that HAZOP meetings are time-consuming, 
labour-intensive and expensive. These negative features make it a suitable candidate for 
computer support. 
 
HAZID is a knowledge-based system that helps to identify potential design and operation 
problems given a process plant design. It does this by automating the traditional HAZOP 
study to make the HAZOP meetings more effective and shorter.  
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However, there are issues that need to be addressed before such a system will be accepted for 
common use.  
 
The aim of this project is to improve the usability and acceptability of HAZID system by 
developing new tools for the existing system to make it more useful and more powerful. 
 
The project considers: 
• Developing a tool that can test the developed models in order for the users to gain 
confidence in HAZID’s output as HAZID is a model based system with library of 
equipment models.  
• Extending the use of electronic P&IDs for control safety analysis. 
• Developing computer-aided safety applications that can extend the HAZID system to 
support different kinds of safety-related reasoning tasks. 
 
These form the project’s main contributions to knowledge. This thesis represents an attempt 
to develop and apply new computer-aided tools to model verification, process control safety 
analysis and maintenance-related hazard identification. 
1.2 HAZID TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 
Established in 2001 as an attempt to extend and commercialize a computer-aided tool for 
process plants originally developed at Loughborough University, Hazid Technologies Ltd. has 
grown to be an advanced technology company that leads the HAZOP automation technology 
worldwide. The organizational culture in Hazid Technologies Ltd. is future oriented, task 
focused and cooperation emphasized.  It sets a high target and gives people freedom to 
explore the ways to achieve it. The working environment is relaxing yet commitment to work 
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is required and respected. People are encouraged to build good and simple relationships and 
co-operate within a team. 
 
The product of the company, HAZID, is a state-of-the-art knowledge-based system to provide 
facilities for automating the HAZOP process, a widely used hazard identification method 
throughout the process industry. It helps to improve speed, consistency, accuracy and 
completeness of HAZOP studies while reducing time consumed on comprehensive manual 
study.  
 
HAZID system can be used by many different process industry sectors, e.g. oil, gas, 
petrochemical, chemical, nuclear, pharmaceuticals, power, and similar manufacturing 
operations etc. Its users can be  process engineers, control engineers, process plant operators, 
plant managers, safety professionals, industrial consultants, insurers and regulators who have 
the responsibility to assess potential hazards for process plants.  The mission statement of 
Hazid Technologies Ltd. is “Make HAZID the dominant technique for process safety 
analysis”. The company’s sales slogan is “Engineered for safety”. 
 
The company’s collaboration with Intergraph Corporation in the US has given the company 
access to many potential customers. Intergraph is a leading global provider of Spatial 
Information Management (SIM) software. Intergraph’s SmartPlant P&ID, which is an 
intelligent CAD system, has been integrated with the HAZID system as its main input. 
HAZID system is being marketed worldwide as Smart Plant Process Safety (SPPS) by the 
Intergraph Process & Marine division. 
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In order to keep a leading place in the HAZOP automation, the company is developing new 
products to further enhance its usability and acceptability, including the four tools developed 
in this research project, which are the main topics of this thesis. 
1.3 PROJECT OVERVIEW  
This research project consists of four “mini” projects.  The first project is to develop an 
integrated tool with the existing Model Builder (MBuilder) in HAZID to test the correctness 
of the models built. The second project is to develop a tool to help with hazard identification 
for isolation work. The third project is to identify the instrument loop and its connection with 
the process items for the engineers to consider whether the instrument and its loop provide 
safeguards to the equipment. The fourth project is to develop a rule-based system to automate 
the generation of the cause-effect table for control engineers to consider the design of the 
control of a process plant. 
 
As a result of these four “mini” projects, four computer-aided tools are developed and 
integrated with HAZID to make it more useful and powerful. The first is called “Model Test 
Bed”, which is to test the correctness of models built. The second is called “Safe Isolation 
Tool”, which is to define isolation boundary and identify potential hazards for islation work. 
The third is an Instrument Checker, which lists all the instruments and their connections with 
process items in a process plant. The fourth is a cause-effect analysis system that 
automatically generates cause-effect tables for process plants. All tools have been tested and 
results have been verified by the process engineers in the sponsor company. 
 
Figure 1.1 shows the four tools and how they are related to each other. “Model Test Bed” 
serves to test the models built in the HAZID which will then call HAZOP analysis to perform 
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the HAZOP results. Output of “Instrument Checker” is used to check the safeguards in the 
HAZID and also serves as input to the cause-effect analysis system. The isolation tool can be 
used in conjunction with the cause-effect analysis system to produce control safety analysis 
for the isolation boundary before actual isolation process is carried out. 
 
Figure 1.1 Project Overview 
 
All the above tools make use of electronic Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) that 
are increasingly being made available by CAD systems, thus extending intelligent CAD 
applications in the area of process safety. A P&ID is a Piping and Instrumentation diagram 
that illustrates a process plant in terms of its flow direction, equipment items and signal 
connection as well as control methods etc. Currently, HAZID takes input from SmartPlant 
P&ID. In principle it can take input from any intelligent CAD systems. 
 
The four tools are developed using C++, Php, Oracle database and SQL. CLIPS inference 
engine as a general purpose rule engine (Giarratano & Riley 1994) is used for the cause-effect 
analysis system. 
SmartPlant 
P&IDs 
Model Test Bed HAZID 
Instrument Checker 
Cause-Effect 
System 
Isolation Tool import 
import 
import 
call 
input 
input 
call 
Import HAZID unit models 
Conjunction 
Conjunction 
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1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter 2 describes the conventional HAZOP technique. Computer-aided HAZOP 
automation is discussed. The HAZID system is introduced. A brief comparison with other 
HAZOP automation tools is given.  
 
Chapter 3 reviews the current modelling technology and introduces in detail the modelling 
verification tool “Model Test Bed”. 
 
Chapter 4 gives details about how the three safety-related computer-aided tools are developed 
and how they are related to one another. 
 
The final chapter describes the contributions made by this thesis. Limitations of the work are 
considered and possibilities for future work are discussed. 
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2 HAZOP 
Within the process industry, attention has been paid to hazard identification from the early 
stage of design throughout the whole life cycle of the plant with the aim of protecting workers, 
the public and the environment. Many techniques have been used for the hazard identification 
process, such as “What if”, “Interaction matrix”, “Zonal analysis”, “Checklists”, “Fault 
Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA)”, “Event Tree Analysis (ETA)”, “HAZOP” etc (Redmill, 
et al., 1999). Among them, HAZOP has been widely recognized as the best and most rigorous 
hazard identification method throughout the world. It applies a procedure called "guideword-
consequence tracing" on each equipment item in a plant to comprehensively check what 
fault(s) occurring in the item would cause a deviation from its normal operating conditions, 
such as an increase in pressure or a decrease in temperature and deduce the consequence(s) of 
each deviation. 
2.1 THE BASIC METHODOLOGY 
The basic process of a conventional HAZOP study starts with the P&ID of a process plant. 
Once the P&ID has been defined, the following steps apply. 
1. Divide the whole plant into sections with nodes that connect them. 
2. Give a full description to the first section. 
3. Give a specific design intention to the first section. 
4. Generate the first deviation. 
5. Identify the cause(s) of that deviation (the cause of this deviation might be another 
deviation, so the root cause(s) need to be identified). 
6. Evaluate the consequence(s) (the consequence of this deviation might be another deviation, 
so the final consequence(s) need to be identified). 
7.  Consider safeguards (protection). 
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8.  Give recommendations for actions. 
9.  Generate the HAZOP report. 
10. Repeat 4-9 for the next deviation generated until all the meaningful deviations have been 
considered. 
11. Repeat 2-10 for the next section identified until all the sections have been analysed. 
12. Finalise the HAZOP report. 
 
According to Crawley et al. (2000), there are two ways of generating deviations, “parameter-
first” or “guideword-first”. Parameter is a variable that describes an attribute of an item, such 
as “Flow”, ”Pressure”, ”Temperature” and ”Level” of a vessel. A guideword is a qualitative 
description of the value change of a variable, such as “More”, “Less”, “No” and “Reverse”. A 
parameter can be combined with a guideword to form a particular and meaningful deviation, 
such as “More flow” and “Less pressure”. The “parameter-first” approach considers in turn all 
causes of a particular deviation for a parameter and a guideword combination. When that is 
completed, the same parameter is considered with another guideword to see if a meaningful 
deviation can be generated. This continues until all the guidewords have been tried. Then it 
moves on to another parameter and repeats this generating process again until all the 
parameters have been considered. The “guideword-first” approach is similar but begins with a 
guideword. 
 
Step 4, 5, 6 establish the fault propagation path from the root cause to the final consequence. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the manual HAZOP process from step 2 to step 10 as a flow chart for 
analysing a complete section. More description of the HAZOP study technique can be found 
in Crawley et al. (2000) and Kletz (1999). 
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Figure 2.1 Manual HAZOP process-flow diagram for the HAZOP analysis of a section or stage of an 
operation-the parameter first approach (taken from Crawley et al. (2000)) 
 
 
Specify the section or stage to be examined 
Describe and discuss the step/operation; determine the design 
envelop; develop and record the design intention 
From the description and the design intention select a parameter 
Combine this parameter with a guideword  
to develop a meaningful deviation  
Seek a possible cause of the deviation and 
identify the consequence   
Evaluate the safeguards and decide if they 
are adequate or if a change or further study is 
needed. Record.   
Have all causes of this 
deviation been considered?   
Yes   
Does any other guideword combine with this 
parameter to give a meaningful deviation? 
No   
Are there further parameters to consider? 
No   
Examination of the step/stage is complete 
Yes   
Yes   
No   
Computer-aided applications in process plant safety 
 
10 
2.2 HAZOP SUPPORT TOOLS 
From the process illustrated in figure 2.1, it is obvious that a great deal of effort has to be put 
into the repetitive work of generating deviations, identifying fault paths and analysing one 
section of the plant to another. Therefore, a computer-aided system could be of great help. 
 
In response to the demand of computer-aid, HAZOP support tools have been developed and 
made commercially available. These HAZOP support tools make the traditional HAZOP 
analysis easier, although they do not perform automated HAZOP analysis. Two examples are 
HAZOP+ 2008 and HAZOP Manager 6.0. 
 
HAZOP+ 2008 developed by Isograph Ltd. provides specifically designed data sheets for 
HAZOP study. Users can choose the plant sections, edit their deviations, causes and 
consequences on the data sheets. It offers an editable study grid for the users to easily 
structure and to record their HAZOP analysis results (Isograph, 2009). 
 
HAZOP manager 6.0 developed by Lihou technical & software service is another HAZOP 
support tool. Similarly, it focus on supporting the HAZOP meeting results recording, giving 
easy access to historical information such as  previously identified problems, producing 
formatted HAZOP reports etc. (Lihou technical & software service, 2009). 
 
This kind of HAZOP tools only provides basic support for HAZOP analysis. The knowledge-
based approach which can produce HAZOP analysis automatically will be discussed next.   
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2.3 AUTOMATED HAZOP  
In automated HAZOP system, all the steps in figure 2.1, except the first two, are hidden from 
the user and automatically done by the computer thus removing some of the repetitive work. 
All the user needs to provide is the plant input and review the output. Based on the results, the 
user might like to modify the P&ID and re-run the system, and then compare the new results 
with the previous set.  
 
Before introducing the HAZID system in detail, this section considers several HAZOP 
automation systems that are built for research purpose. They are surveyed here because they 
all use qualitative modelling and reasoning in its automation process just as HAZOP study is 
a qualitative analysis method. The similarities and differences between HAZID system and 
these other systems can be seen. 
 
CHECKOP (McCoy et al., 2006) is a prototype system developed by Loughborough 
University in 2003 for checking operating procedures for batch plants. Instead of signed-
directed graphs (SDG), modelling in CHECKOP is based on states. CHECKOP models 
include not only tangible equipment information as that in HAZID models but also dynamic 
information such as state changes, operation, event sequence, time and assumptions 
associated with each step of an operation. CHECKOP applies guidewords systematically to an 
operating procedure to look at variations in the operating instructions of the plant. For 
example, CHECKOP infers what will be the consequence if a certain instruction is not 
executed by the application of guideword “No”.   
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In 2008, CHECKOP was extended and improved based on collaboration between 
Loughborough University and Hazid technologies Ltd. as a result of another EngD project. 
The details can be obtained in Palmer (2008). 
 
Hazard Support Tool (HAST) is a knowledge-based system to support HAZOP automation in 
Palermo University (Bartolozzi et al., 2000). It was originally developed for HAZOP analysis 
of continuous plant but later extended to carry out automatic HAZOP analysis of batch and 
semi-continuous plant.  
 
Like CHECKOP, HAST has a knowledge base that contains qualitative models of equipment 
units of process plants. The models in the library include models designed for performing 
HAZOP analysis for batch plants. A plant is split into very elementary units such as valves, 
pumps and procedure phases. HAST models are classified as “cause model”, “HAZOP 
model”, and “consequence model”. A model is a collection of mini-fault trees, which are used 
to trace a root cause.  
 
For batch plant, HAST analyses different models of the same equipment item existing for 
each phase. A phase in this tool is a period when an action has to be carried out or a specific 
objective has to be reached. A predetermined stage or a certain value for a variable must be 
reached at the end of each phase (Bartolozzi et al., 2000). There are common phase models 
and specific phase models. Each model inherits features from its parent model. A taxonomy 
editor is used to implement this inheritance feature. Model information excludes any 
intermediate mini trees that are only necessary to propagate the deviation. HAST provides a 
facility to automatically insert available monitoring and protection devices by retrieving their 
information from the database to include in the HAZOP result. 
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HAZOPExpert is another expert system designed to automate HAZOP analysis, developed 
in Purdue University. The HAZOPExpert architecture is described in Vaidhyanathan and 
Venkatasubramanian (1995). It is important to review this system because it helps develop an 
understanding of how people design and build up models used by the inference engine and 
what is behind that engine.  
 
HAZOPExpert is similar to HAZID, although it uses a so called HDG model (HAZOP-
Digraph Model) instead of SDG to model the equipment units and their process variables and 
their behaviours. The plant state is assumed to be steady state like that in HAZID. Both SDG 
and HDG are extended to cover the nodes of abnormal cause and the nodes of adverse 
consequences. Both are defined for each process unit model of a plant. 
 
Both HDG and SDG are used to propagate process variable deviations and to find abnormal 
cause and adverse consequences. They all have conditional arcs in which conditions are 
attached to some SDG or HDG arcs to deal with conditional propagation causal relationships. 
For example, the increasing flow rate at the inlet port of a tank will result in the increase of 
temperature of the fluid in the tank only if the temperature of the fluid at the inlet port is 
higher than the temperature of the fluid in the tank. On the other hand, the increasing flow rate 
at inlet port of a tank will result in the decrease of temperature of the fluid in the tank only if 
the temperature of the fluid at the inlet port is lower than the temperature of the fluid in the 
tank. 
 
HAZOPExpert models are stored in a library organized in a class hierarchy using an object-
oriented framework. Models represent two kinds of information: one is the generic knowledge 
represented by generic cause and effect models, the other is the process specific knowledge 
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relating to a specific chemical plant, such as the normal physical state of the material, and 
whether the material is corrosive, flammable, volatile or toxic. HAZID models also represent 
these two kinds of knowledge but in a different way. The HAZID SDG model represents 
generic knowledge of an equipment item and the fault, deviation propagation information 
within and outside of the model unit. The process specific knowledge like the properties of 
material is supplied (in HAZID) by external software through Fluid Model System (FMS), 
which is a system that performs fault path validation by using predicates and functions 
(McCoy et al., 1999 c).  
 
HAZOPExpert has a process-materials-cause procedure attached to HDG arcs to identify root 
causes of faults like “Leak in the tank” or “tank rupture” or “breakage due to presence of a 
corrosive process material”. HAZID performs this in another way. It applies the Run Time 
Condition (RTC) queries attached to SDG arcs, faults and consequences to check on the 
properties of the process materials using predictions and functions defined in the Fluid Model 
System as described in McCoy et al. (1999 c). 
 
HAZOPExpert has a graphical representation of models since it uses the real-time expert 
system shell G2 to do the reasoning work. The graphic tool is provided by this shell. 
 
The above are HAZOP automation systems built for research purpose. The next section 
focuses on HAZID, which was originally built for research purpose then developed into a 
commercial system. 
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2.4 HAZID 
As mentioned before, HAZID, a knowledge-based system which automates the process of 
HAZOP studies is currently the most advanced commercially available auto HAZOP tool. 
The development of HAZID is given in Rushton et al. (1998) and McCoy et al. (1999a, 1999b, 
1999c).  
 
HAZID takes the information from P&IDs as input. It builds a plant model based on the 
P&ID plant description and a library of equipment models.  Deviations are applied to all the 
equipment items in the plant model. Then it deduces the cause consequence path based on a 
Signed Direct Graph (SDG) of the plant built from the models. SDG is a network of nodes 
connected by arcs. Nodes are variables such as “flow”, “temperature” or “pressure” in system. 
Arcs are influences between nodes, of one variable on another. Sign identifies the type of 
influence attached to an arc, negative or positive. For example, “more flow” will result in 
“less pressure” if the sign attached to the arc is negative or “more temperature” will result in 
“more flow” if the sign attached to the arc is positive etc. The variable “signal” can only have 
“no” as its keyword to form a deviation “no signal”. Details about SDG are described in 
Chung (1993). 
 
Figure 2.2 is the workflow of HAZID. Dashed area A is where the knowledge base is created 
and formulated. Dashed area B1 is where P&IDs are imported from the database and sections 
being selected and analysed as well as results being presented in HMeeting, a presentation 
tool developed in PHP. Dashed area B2 is where the modified P&IDs are again imported from 
the database and again sections being selected and analysed, and new results being presented 
in HMeeting. Dashed area C is where the results from B1 and B2 are compared so that the 
effects of the design change can be easily seen.   
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From the above description, it is clear that the main function of the HAZID is to automate the 
HAZOP analysis and produce the results. However, it lacks the facility to verify the 
correctness of the knowledge base. For example, the models in the library may not behave as 
the developer intended if not tested before being used. Also, safety issues related to 
maintenance work are not considered. Furthermore, there is no support for the design of safe 
process control. 
  
As mentioned in chapter1, the research project reported in this thesis has built four tools that 
integrate with HAZID to enhance its usability and acceptability by addressing the above 
identified problems. Chapter 3 and 4 give full details. 
2.5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the basic HAZOP methodology is described, showing that its repetitious 
nature could be automated using state-of-the-art computer-aided technology. Computer 
support tools for HAZOP are commercially available. However, they are not knowledge-
based system that can automate the HAZOP analysis process. 
 
Several HAZOP automation tools for research purposes have been reviewed, CHECKOP, 
HAST and HAZOPExpert. A common feature of the above systems is that they are all 
knowledge-based systems, and they all require models to represent equipment units and 
simulate their behaviour using qualitative reasoning approach since conventional HAZOP 
analysis is performed qualitatively. Two of these systems are extended to deal with batch 
plants. 
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HAZID is currently the most advanced and only commercialised HAZOP automation tool. It 
has been introduced in terms of its workflow, modelling, reasoning methods, showing the 
need to verify the knowledge base and extend the system to support other safety-related 
applications. 
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3 MODELLING IN COMPUTER-AIDED HAZOP STUDY  
 
3.1 MODELLING TECHNOLOGY  
When a computer system is used to perform a task, the system must have all the necessary 
information to carry out that task and organize the information in an effective way that helps 
carry out the task successfully in terms of accuracy, speed and completeness etc. 
 
Modelling is one of many ways to meet the above requirements. A comprehensive review of 
modelling techniques was produced as a coursework for the EngD program. It is included in 
this thesis as appendix E. This chapter provides only a short description version and 
introduces a novel tool that helps with the verification of models. 
3.1.1 THE MODELLING GOAL 
Although modelling is about knowledge representation and organization, the objective of 
modelling for various tasks could be very different. When the task is to help identify hazards 
in the process industry, the modelling goal should be able to describe the consequences of all 
possible causes and deviations and be able to provide the effect of preventive actions for each 
entry of a given HAZOP result table (Nemeth et al., 2005). 
 
The first question is what makes a good model? Features that make a good model include: 
• Accuracy. A good model should be able to represent the information as accurately as 
possible. 
• Completeness. A good model should capture the information as completely as 
possible.  For example, the functionality must be considered at the model design stage, 
in both normal and abnormal states (Bartolozzi  et al., 2000). In other words, a good 
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model should be able to simulate all the behaviour of the object to be modelled. For 
example, when modelling fault path propagation in a process plant, the model should 
contain the information of propagating deviations with both directions from upstream 
to downstream and from downstream to upstream. 
• Conciseness. A good model should not contain information that is irrelevant to fulfil 
the application objective (Palmer & Chung, 1997). As a result, the size of a good 
model could be kept as small as possible.  
• Generality. A good model must have high levels of flexibility and generality that can 
be applied on any objects to be modelled with different configurations. For example, 
in the case of automating HAZOP study, a good model must be able to represent a 
plant item of a certain class with different states. 
• Reusability. A good model should be as independent as possible from plant specific 
details so that it can be used widely in different plants.   
• Simplicity. A good model should be as simple as possible.   
• Ease. The maintenance of a good model should be as easy as possible. 
• Balance. A good balance among expressive power of the model, complexity of 
building models, and computational cost of driving simulations must be properly 
maintained (McCoy et al., 2006). 
In terms of using and managing the model, computer-aided modelling systems must have 
facilities to validate the models built (Palmer & Chung, 2000).  
 
In a nutshell, a good model should make the modelling effort as minimal as possible for fast 
and easy deployment of any application (Venkatasubramanian, et al., 2003a). 
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3.1.2 QUALITATIVE MODELLING AND QUANTITATIVE MODELLING 
Current modelling methodology can be broadly classified as qualitative and quantitative.  
 
Qualitative modelling is a non-numerical description of a physical system. In Palmer and 
Chung (1997), qualitative models are defined as abstract representations of a plant that are 
able to simulate behaviour of the plant by emphasizing a causal explanation. The  SDG-based 
modelling and state-based modelling used in HAZID and CHECKOP are examples of 
qualitative modelling. 
 
Quantitative modelling, on the other hand, could be defined as a numerical description of a 
physical system. Models of this kind includes “Black-box models”, “First-principles models”, 
and “Frequency response models”. “Black-box models” includes general input-output models 
and state-space models (Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003 a). 
 
However, the modelling technology used in an application does not have to be either 
qualitative or quantitative. A qualitative modelling approach could be slightly or partly 
quantitative when the precise values of some variables are demanded for some good reason. 
For example, when operation is being modelled, an action that is taken “too early” or “too 
late” will be the deviation of action time. But in some applications how early is “too early” 
and how late is “too late” may need to be defined. On the other hand, it is possible to have 
qualitative modelling to be added into some part of a quantitative modelling whenever 
necessary. In the quantitative modelling review by Venkatasubramanian et al. (2003a), a 
method of computing residual is used to capture the failure in a system. It examines what the 
expected behaviour should be and what the real-time value or actual behaviour is. The value 
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of residual is obtained by the discrepancy between these two values. When the value of 
residual is zero, it means no failure happens in the system. But if serious failure happens or 
the underlying system is changed or the real-time system is completely or partly modified 
without updating the modelling system, the value of residual will reach a very critical level. A 
qualitative value of “too high” can indicate the critical difference and a value of “Yes” or 
“No” can indicate if there is a difference.  
 
When designing models, which modelling approach is used depends on the objectives of the 
system the models are designed for. In the example above, if the modelling objective is to tell 
if there is fault and the extent of the problem then a numerical value of residual is needed. On 
the other hand, if the modelling objective is to tell whether a change has occurred then an 
indication of an increase of the residual or decrease of the residual is sufficient. 
 
Qualitative models use qualitative functions to express the relationship between inputs and 
outputs of each unit of a physical process. Quantitative models, on the other hand, use 
mathematical functions to express the relationships between inputs and outputs of a system to 
describe a physical process (Venkatasubramanian, et al., 2003a). 
 
Emphasis in a qualitative system is how to obtain comprehensible models that are able to 
intuitively explain the system behaviour just as the mental model of a human expert is capable 
of (Bratko & Šuc, 2003). Advantages of qualitative modelling can be briefly summarised as: 
 The behaviours of qualitative models can be induced even if no mathematical models are 
available since qualitative models do not require precise numerical values of process 
variables (Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003b). 
 The format of a qualitative model can either be a qualitative causal model or an 
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abstraction hierarchy (Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003b). 
 Explanations for physical behaviour in a qualitative model are more causal and intuitive, 
therefore providing better insight into the working mechanism of the physical object 
being modelled (Bratko & Šuc, 2003). 
 The highly abstract level of qualitative models makes it possible to represent more than 
one behaviour at a given variable value because it does not require a precise value, 
“more” or “less” or “none” is usually sufficient. On the other hand, quantitative models 
represent only one behaviour at a given variable value because it requires a precise 
numerical value (McCoy, et al., 1999a). 
 Qualitative modelling can detect subtle qualitative dependences and trace their effect. For 
example, more temperature is more no matter how much more it is, and it will be 
regarded as a deviation which may propagate to cause a significant consequence. 
Quantitative modelling in this case may ignore the change of the temperature when the 
change is very small and consider it as noise (Bratko & Šuc, 2003). It is also easier to 
check if the model can perform the desired behaviour qualitatively rather than 
quantitatively (Schaich et al., 2001). 
 
However, the main problems with qualitative models are that:  
 they may contain ambiguities; 
 they may cause the generation of spurious solutions. 
These disadvantages may be overcome by combining qualitative and quantitative modelling, 
where qualitative modelling is the main modelling method and quantitative modelling is 
applied where necessary. 
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3.1.3 MODEL REPRESENTATION IN HAZOP AUTOMATION 
A model represents two kinds of information: description of the object being modelled and 
representation of the behaviour of the object being modelled. Some modelling approaches 
represent the behaviour by using parameters, variables, key words etc. (Nemeth et al., 2005).   
 
The development of qualitative model representation for HAZOP analysis has gone through 
from representing continuous plants, which assumes that each equipment item is kept in a 
steady state all the time, to representing batch plant operation, which includes not only the 
dynamic change of states over time, but also the event or action sequence, time and operator’s 
action. 
 
First, in order to represent the information accurately and completely, a model has to be based 
on a fundamental understanding of the physical system to be modelled. Then this 
understanding will be expressed in different ways according to the modelling approach used 
(Venkatasubramanian, et al., 2003b). 
 
In the HAZID system, model information is represented in various slots for each equipment 
type. There are inPort slots, outPort slots, unitPort slots that describe internal ports 
information and comp_connection slots that describe flow information.  
 
The behaviour of models in HAZID is done through fault propagation. There are many ways 
to describe fault propagation, such as functional equations, program rules, logical expressions, 
truth tables, fault trees, event trees, and reliability block diagrams, influence graphs, SDGs 
and bond graphs (Palmer & Chung, 2000).  
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Fault path propagation in HAZID is described using four types of SDG arcs. They are 
 “Deviation” to “Deviation” 
 “Fault” to “Deviation” 
 “Deviation” to “Consequence” 
 “Fault” to “Consequence” 
 These arcs represent the plant behaviour in a qualitative way. 
 
As mentioned in section 2.3, in Hazard Support Tool (HAST) (Bartolozzi et al., 2000) the 
behaviour of an equipment unit is represented using three types of models: cause model, 
HAZOP model and consequence model. Among them, “cause model” represents the root 
cause of fault, “HAZOP model” represents the fault propagation, and “consequence model” 
represents the effect of the root cause. The connection between consequence model and the 
cause model is the deviation with the effect of the consequence.  
 
However, knowledge representation ambiguities can happen in a qualitative model built using 
SDGs. When qualitative models are combined to form a system, the result may contain 
multiple paths that lead to ambiguities (Palmer & Chung, 2000). 
 
Venkatasubramanian et al. (2003b) states that ambiguities of knowledge representation can 
only be completely eliminated by the use of actual quantitative values. However, obtaining 
actual quantitative values for the purpose of solving ambiguities would largely reduce the 
advantage of using qualitative reasoning. Some researchers have proposed various ways to 
solve this problem. 
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One way to eliminate ambiguities is by choosing the shortest path when and only when the 
shortest path does have a correct influence (Palmer & Chung, 2000). Another way is by 
adding constraint representation (McCoy et al., 2006). In the Equipment Model Builder (EMB) 
tool presented in Palmer and Chung (2000), a modular method is used to remove ambiguities 
in qualitative SDG models. It identifies the header/divider combinations and the recycle loops, 
then specifies a module for each of them, then substitutes the module for each of them into the 
plant description. 
3.1.4 HOW ARE MODELS ORGANIZED? 
As mentioned before, knowledge organization is an important part of modelling. A good 
modelling structure can help the system to reason effectively and easily. 
 
In the HAZID, a Unit Model Library (UML) is built and models in the library are organized 
in a hierarchical way that supports the inheritance of features between models. Each model 
has one and only one parent model and it inherits all the features of its parent model but can 
have its own unique feature(s) that distinguish it from its sibling model(s). A model may be a 
parent model for other model(s). When a new model is created, it will be added into this 
library as a child of an existing model. The structure of the library is like a family tree. In this 
way the size of the library can be kept as small as possible and features of each model kept 
clear. A brief description of the hierarchical structure of HAZID models is given in paper 1, 
“A model test bed to verify the correctness of safety-related behavioural knowledge in a 
system for automated hazard identification”, An et al. (2007), in appendix A. A detailed 
description of UML organization is given by McCoy et al. (1999b). 
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3.2 MODEL TEST BED 
3.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
A seven step modelling procedure is proposed by Nemeth et al. (2005): 
“(1) Model goal-set definition (modelling problem specification). 
(2) Model conceptualization (identifying controlling factors). 
(3) Modelling data: needs and sources. 
(4) Model building and model analysis. 
(5) Model verification. 
(6) Model solution. 
(7) Model calibration and validation.” 
These seven steps suggest that it would be very helpful if we could have computer tools 
designed for model definition, model construction and model verification. Most research in 
modelling technology combines model definition, model building and model verification into 
a single tool. However, HAZID’s model builder does not perform the model verification 
function and no model verification tool is available in general. In this chapter, a model test 
bed which is developed for model verification for HAZID is described. 
 
The model test bed is integrated with MBuilder, HAZID’s model builder, to test the 
correctness of models built in the Unit Model Library. It allows the behaviour of the model 
under test to be compared to its expected behaviour, as specified by a domain expert. This 
section establishes the significance of such a testing tool by comparing it with the manual 
approach. The tool’s methodology, architecture and data structure are described. The 
presentation of test results is also discussed by exploring different result formats so that the 
user can consider the model from different points of view.  
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The existing MBuilder only helps engineers create models. However, a model might have 
wrong or missing behaviour or some extra behaviour that is not expected by its builder. An 
extra behaviour, which may be right or wrong, is one that is not considered by the process 
engineer when constructing the model but is revealed by HAZID. Therefore, it is important to 
identify all the above to ensure that a model behaves exactly as intended by its builder. 
3.2.2 MODEL TESTING METHODOLOGY 
3.2.2.1 Unit Models and Model Library 
In this HAZOP emulation system, a plant is represented as a network consisting of a series of 
interconnected units. Each type of unit is described as a model built using the SDG 
representation and is stored in a library named Unit Model Library (UML). A plant 
description file is derived from a given P&ID. For example, figure 3.1 shows that “test_unit” 
is an instance of the “'centrifugal pump'” unit model. 
//“test_unit” is an instance of the “'centrifugal pump'” unit model 
instance('test_unit' isa 'centrifugal pump', [     
  inPorts info [        //there are three in ports for this model,  
   'ignoreIn', // one is called 'ignoreIn', 
   'in' ,          // one is  called 'in', 
   'sealIn'      // one is called 'sealIn'. 
  ],   
  outPorts info [            //there are four out ports for this model, 
   'ignoreOut',    //one is called 'ignoreOut', 
   'out' ,              //one is called 'out', 
   'drainOut' ,     //one is called 'drainOut', 
   'ventOut' ,      //one is called 'ventOut', 
   'sealOut'        //one is called 'sealOut'. 
  ], 
  unitPorts info [       //there is no internal port for this model 
  ], 
  propLinks info [   //fault path propagation information 
      % faults 
                                    //fault 'loss of drive' will cause ‘less pressure’ at port ‘out’, 
   arc([fault,['loss of drive',use_is_not_standby]],-1,['out', 'pressure']), 
                                    //fault 'loss of drive' will cause ‘more pressure’ at port ‘in’, 
   arc([fault,['loss of drive',use_is_not_standby]],1,['in', 'pressure']), 
                                    //fault ‘composition’ at port ‘in’ will cause ‘composition’ at port ‘out’. 
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   arc(['in', 'composition'],1,['out', 'composition']), 
   % propagation 
                                    //deviation 'noFlow' at port 'in' will cause 'noFlow' at port 'out', 
   arc(['in', 'noFlow'],2,['out', 'noFlow']), 
                                     //deviation 'noFlow' at port 'out' will cause 'noFlow' at port 'in', 
   arc(['out', 'noFlow'],2,['in', 'noFlow']), 
                                     //deviation 'more/less temperature' at port 'in' will cause 'more/less 
//temperature' at port 'out', 
   arc(['in', 'temp'],1,['out', 'temp']), 
                                     //deviation 'more contamination' at port 'in' will cause 'more 
//contamination ' at port 'out', 
   arc(['in', 'contamination'],2,['out', 'contamination']), 
                                    //deviation 'more solid' at port 'in' will cause 'more solid' at port 'out'. 
   arc(['in', 'solid'],2,['out', 'solid'])    
     ] 
    ] 
). 
 
This model states that the “test_unit” is a centrifugal pump, it has 3 in ports as listed in the 
slot “inPorts info”, and has 5 out ports as listed in the slot “outPorts info”. It does not have 
any internal port as none is listed in the slot “unitPorts info”. The “propLinks info” slot stores 
a list of arcs that define the mini-SDG related to a centrifugal pump. “-1”,“1” and “2” are 
influences. The sign “-1” indicates a reversed influence. It means that a higher input will 
result in a lower output and vice versa. The sign “1” indicates a direct influence. It means that 
a higher input will result in a higher output and similarly a lower input will result in a lower 
output. The sign “2” means that a higher input will result in a higher output but does not 
indicate an effect of lower input. For example,“ arc(['in', 'solid'], 2, ['out', 'solid'])” means an 
increase of solid at the in port “in” will cause an increase of solid at the out port “out”, but a 
decrease of solid at the in port does not mean that there is going to be a decrease of solid at 
the out port. 
 
As mentioned in section 3.1.4, models for unit classes are organized into a hierarchical 
structure in which a child model inherits all the characters of the parent model but it can have 
its own characteristics that distinguish itself from other sibling models. For instance, in table 
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3.1, “loss of drive” in the “Rotary pump” model will cause “revFlow” at port “out”, this is 
inherited by both child models “centrifugal pump” and “double seal centrifugal pump”. On 
the other hand “leaks to seal” is a cause of “morePressure” only through the child model 
“double seal centrifugal pump” not through “centrifugal pump”. In addition, each child model 
unit may have its child unit as well.   
 
Figure 3.1 Part of the Unit Model Library (UML) 
 
Parent model Child models  
Rotary pump Centrifugal pump Double seal 
centrifugal pump 
Inherited arc  “loss of drive” causes “revFlow” at port “out” 
 
Specific arc for 
seal centrifugal 
pump 
  “leaks to seal” 
causes 
“morePressure” at 
port “seal1out” 
 
Table 3.1 An example of inheritance in the Unit Model Library (UML) 
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The use of inheritance to build the unit model library keeps the unit model as simple as 
possible, avoids duplication, and eases the task to build new models, as only the specific 
feature(s) needs to be defined for any child models.  
 
The unit model structure is described in detail by McCoy et al. (1999b).  The unit-based 
approach is widely used, for example, by Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian (1995). 
Another model based approach applying qualitative physics in process safety is described by 
Catino and Ungar (1995). 
 
3.2.2.2 The Use Case Analysis 
The user of the model test bed will be a trained user of the MBuilder, with the knowledge of 
constructing unit models and is responsible for developing models for HAZID for their 
organization. This user may be an experienced process engineer. During model development 
the user will test individual models in order to ensure that the model under construction does 
not have any unintended behaviour or does not lack any intended behaviour. The intended 
behaviour of each model needs to be stated explicitly in order to verify the actual behaviour of 
a test. The user may test a model after making a change to it so that there will be a result 
report to show any differences between the expected and the actual results. The user may then 
either go back to make further modifications to rectify any problems in the model or sign off 
the model as acceptable. The user may apply different conditions when testing a model and 
the expected differences in the results will need to be stated. The user may test more than one 
model at a time, so a summary report for all tested models and an individual report for each 
model will need to be generated. 
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3.2.2.3 The Interface 
Since the model test bed is designed to be used by engineers responsible for developing 
HAZID models, the interface for initiating tests is closely integrated with MBuilder. A facility 
for selecting which model is to be tested is shown in figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 Interface to select a single model to be tested 
 
For a single model to be tested, a dialog box is provided (as shown in figure 3.3) to allow the 
user to set up the test and give any relevant description with time and date provided as default 
information. The applicable conditions are drawn from those defined on the “Link 
Conditions” elsewhere in MBuilder. These conditions are operating conditions that define 
which options are available to customize the unit model by using attributes. For example, 
when testing the model “centrifugal pump”, there are condition options (such as “drive is 
variable_speed”, “lubricant is process_fluid”, “seal is cooled”, “seal is none” etc., as shown in 
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figure 3.3) that could be selected by the user, The model test bed will combine these selected 
conditions and apply them to the HAZOP analysis. 
 
Figure 3.3 Interface to apply link conditions to a model to be tested  
 
To test multiple models, the user selects an option from the “Tools” menu in MBuilder. For 
both single and multiple model tests, a feedback is provided to show the progress of a single 
or a batched test as shown in figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4 Progress display during model testing 
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A message to inform the user that the results are available for viewing in HAZID’s HMeeting 
tool will appear when the test is finished. 
 
3.2.2.4 Function and Data 
To start the new analysis on the model, the application will call HAZOP analysis 
automatically.  
 
To test the model, the application will call HAZOP automatically to analyse all of the defined 
deviations for each model. For example, to test the model ‘centrifugal pump’, the application 
will examine all deviations automatically although only 7 deviations are relevant to this 
model (See appendix F for a full list of the deviations). All that means, it will test a fault 
caused within the model, which could result in deviations in any upstream or downstream port. 
 
The model test bed follows the same way that other HAZID applications use to open/connect 
to a database. The results of the test are stored in an ORACLE database with a series of tables. 
These results will later be compared to the intended results for the given model and will be 
available for later review, audit or comparison. 
 
Multiple tests on the same model are also recorded with the time and the results are generated 
so that it is possible to refer to earlier results as well as the most recently generated ones. 
 
3.2.2.5 Connect to OPC (Off-Page-Connector) 
An OPC is a small unit model that shows continuation of a process plant drawing onto 
another page. Sometimes it is called sheet connector. Each time when a model is tested, a test 
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plant file is created automatically and stored as a temporary file in the user’s temporary 
directory. The test plant consists of a single instance of the model to be tested, with each of its 
external ports connected to an OPC instance.  
 
For each “inPort”, the application will add an OPC, and connect to the port automatically. In 
the example of “centrifugal pump” in figure 3.1, each “inPort” will be connected to an OPC. 
 
For each “outPort”, the application will also add an OPC, and connect it to the port 
automatically, In the example of “centrifugal pump”, each “outPort” will be connected to an 
OPC. 
 
In this way, the model under test is connected to deviations caused by faults in the OPCs and 
link any deviations caused by faults in the test model to consequences in the OPCs. 
 
3.2.2.6 Single Model Test and Multiple Model Test 
As mentioned earlier, the user can test one single model or more than one model in a batch 
run. As demonstrated in figure 3.5, a single model test means to test one model in a test run 
using one test case. A multiple test means testing more than one model in a test run using one 
model test case, in other words, by using the test case to generate a plant file for each model. 
The test results are shown as “Fault Comparison”, “Consequence Comparison”, “Fault Path 
Propagation” and “Deviation Oriented” tables. A detailed discussion of these four types of 
comparisons is in section 3.2.3. 
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Figure 3.5 Architecture of the model test bed 
 
3.2.2.7 The Fault Path and Deviation 
A fault path is an acyclic path that links the fault and the variable under consideration within a 
given SDG. Deviations consist of keywords such as “More”, “Less”, “No” and “Reverse”, 
and parameters such as “Flow”, “Pressure”, “Temperature” and “Level”. A fault path that 
propagates through a unit model under test will fall into one of the four types shown in figure 
3.6, where “F”, “D” and “C” stand for “Fault”, “Deviation” and “Consequence” respectively. 
In case A, the fault happens in an OPC and causes a series of deviations that lead to a 
consequence in the test unit. In case B, the fault happens within the test unit while the 
consequence happens in some OPC. In case C, both the fault and consequence happen within 
the test unit. In case D, both the fault and consequence happen outside of the test unit and 
only deviations propagate through the test unit. To complete the test, all these four types are 
considered in the model test bed and the appropriate results generated. 
Model Test Run 
Model Test  
Model Test Case 
Test Single Model Test Multiple Models 
Model Test Result 
Deviation Oriented 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1…n 
1 
Fault path propagation Fault and Consequence 
Comparison 
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Figure 3.6 Four types of fault paths propagating through a test unit model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPC 
F---D---D---D 
 
 
Test Unit 
D---D---D---D-- 
OPC 
D---D---D---C 
Test Unit 
 
F---D---D---D---C 
C: 
 
Test Unit 
F---D---D---D---D 
 
 
OPC 
D—D—D—D---C 
B: 
 
OPC 
F---D---D---D 
 
 
Test Unit 
D---D---D---D---C 
A: 
 
D: 
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3.2.3 MODEL TEST RESULT 
The results of model testing are presented in four different tables showing the different kinds 
of comparisons with expected results. Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 are the test results generated 
for the “centrifugal pump” model. 
 
3.2.3.1 Expected Results 
The results show how the actual behaviour of the model differs from the expected behaviour, 
as specified by the engineer. 
 
3.2.3.2 Comparing Deviations Caused by Fault(s) 
Table 3.2, shows “Faults” that give rise to “Deviations” which propagate to the OPCs and 
therefore elsewhere in the plant. The expected results are compared with the test bed 
generated results. The outcome of each deviation and fault pair can be “MATCH”, 
“MISSING”, or “EXTRA”. A “MATCH” means that the expected result is found in the test 
result. “MISSING” means that the expected result is not found in the test result. “EXTRA” 
means that a test result is not found in the expected result. 
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Expected 
Description 
Expected 
Port 
Expected 
Keyword 
Actual 
Description 
Actual  
Port 
Actual  
Keyword 
Status 
loss of drive out revFlow Loss of drive Out  revflow MATCH 
loss of drive in morePressure    MISSING 
loss of drive out lessFlow    MISSING 
loss of drive out lessPressure    MISSING 
switched on 
in error 
in lessPressure    MISSING 
switched on 
in error 
out morePressure    MISSING 
switched on 
in error 
out moreTemp    MISSING 
   contamination 
from sheet 
connector  
in contamination EXTRA 
   lessComposition 
from sheet 
connector 
in lessComposition EXTRA 
   lessPressure 
from sheet 
connector and 
less flow 
in lessPressure EXTRA 
                 
Table 3.2 Fault comparison table 
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3.2.3.3 Comparing Consequence(s) Caused by Deviations 
Table 3.3 shows part of a table of consequences caused by deviations. It shows how 
“Deviations” in the OPCs can cause “Consequences” in the unit model under test. This is 
compared with the expected deviations and consequences, Again the outcome of a 
comparison can be either “MATCH”, “MISSING” or “EXTRA”. 
Expected 
Description  
Expected 
Port 
Expected 
Keyword 
Actual 
Description 
Actual  
Port 
Actual 
Keyword 
Status 
possible 
pump or 
seal damage 
out revFlow Possible 
pump or 
seal damage 
out revFlow MATCH 
cavitation in moreGas    MISSING 
cavitation in moreVapour    MISSING 
churning out noFlow    MISSING 
dry running in noFlow    MISSING 
   cavitation out moreGas EXTRA 
   cavitation out moreTemp EXTRA 
   cavitation out moreVapour EXTRA 
   churning in noFlow EXTRA 
 
Table 3.3 Consequence comparison table 
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3.2.3.4 Fault Path Propagation 
Table 3.4 demonstrates how a specific fault propagates through a test unit model and reaches 
its consequence. All deviation(s) along the path are also shown. 
 Fault      
Item  Descriptor  Probability Condition   
test_unit loss of drive 0 “use_is_not_standby”   
      
Deviations      
Item Port Keyword    
test_unit out revFlow    
test_unit in revFlow    
inopc_in out revFlow    
      
Conseque 
-nce 
     
Item  Descriptor Hazard Operability Rank Condition 
inopc_in Reverse flow  
and  
contamination 
to inlet 
sheet 
connector 
FALSE FALSE 5 not(fault_is_this(“reverseflow 
 at inlet sheet  
connector”))||”fault_unit_is_ 
not_this_one”) 
 
Table 3.4 Path propagation display 
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3.2.3.5 Deviation Propagation 
The deviation propagation is demonstrated as a “Deviation Oriented” table. It checks for 
deviations that happen in each port and identifies their effects on all other ports within a test 
unit model and gives faults that cause that deviation on that port as well as consequence(s) 
that can be caused by it.  
 
Table 3.5 shows part of the deviation propagation table of the “centrifugal pump” model. The 
whole table shows all the deviation effects propagating through each port of the test unit. For 
example, when fault “loss of drive” causes “reverse flow FR” at port “in”, it causes “reverse 
flow FR” at port “out”, and causes consequence “possible pump or seal damage”. “0” means 
there is no effect caused by the deviation “reverse flow FR” in port “drainOut” , “ventOut”, 
“IgnoreIn” and “IgnoreOut”. “F0” means “No Flow”; “C+” means “More Composition”; 
“Cont+” means “More Contamination”. Please see appendix F for a full list of deviations. 
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        Effects on other ports Consequence Path_id Deviation Affected 
port 
Fault 
drainOut IgnoreIn IgnoreOut in out ventOut  
0000000000-
0000006888 
C+ in propagated from 
connection 
0 0 0 C+ C+ 0 propagated 
from unit 
0000000000-
0000006890 
C- in propagated from 
connection 
0 0 0 C- C- 0 propagated 
from unit 
0000000000-
0000006892 
Cont+ in propagated from 
connection 
0 0 0 Cont+ Cont+ 0 propagated 
from unit 
0000000000-
0000006792 
F0 in propagated from 
connection 
0 0 0 F0 F0 0 dry running, 
propagated 
from unit 
0000000000-
0000006806 
F0 in propagated from 
connection 
0 0 0 F0 F0 0 churning, 
propagated 
from unit 
0000000000-
0000006800 
FR out propagated from 
connection 
0 0 0 FR FR 0 possible pump 
or seal 
damage, 
propagated 
from unit 
0000000000-
0000006804 
FR in loss of drive 0 0 0 FR FR 0 possible pump 
or seal 
damage, 
propagated 
from unit 
 
Table 3.5 Deviation oriented table 
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3.2.3.6 Sign off Status 
A facility is provided for recording the test status of each model in chronological order. The 
user can sign off a model as acceptable after reviewing the test results or record that the 
results are not yet acceptable. This is shown in figure 3.7. 
 
Figure 3.7 Sign off status 
 
3.2.4 CONCLUSIONS   
The correctness of a model built by the process engineer is critical to the result of the HAZOP 
study, because errors in a model may result in incorrect fault, consequence, deviations as well 
as propagations in the HAZOP result, therefore distracting HAZOP study members’ attention 
from really critical hazards. A model test bed is developed to allow engineers to verify model 
correctness according to their expected behaviour. 
 
Figure 3.8 gives the overall workflow of the model testing process. After a new model is built 
or an old model is modified, a model test file with all the necessary connections to OPCs is 
created. Then HAZID is called to do a HAZOP analysis automatically to achieve the test 
result. The test result is then automatically compared and displayed with the expected results 
using the HMeeting tool. If all the results are as expected by its builder (that means there is 
NO ‘missing’ or ‘wrong’ or ‘extra and wrong’ behaviours in a model under test), then the 
process ends. Otherwise, the engineer will go back to modify the model and test it again until 
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the model under test would behave exactly as intended (that means there are only ‘matching’ 
or ‘extra but right’ behaviours in a model under test). In addition, the engineer can choose to 
test one model at a time or to test multiple models at one go. Different kinds of comparisons 
are done and shown in different table formats. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Workflow of the model test bed 
Start 
MBuilder 
New model or modified model 
Model test bed 
Model test file 
Plant file as model is 
connected to the Off –
Page-Connector  
HAZID engine 
Test result 
HMeeting 
Test result 
display  
Correct 
behaviour of the 
model 
End when 
all 
behaviour
s come 
this way 
Yes 
Yes ‘Missing’, 
’wrong’ or ‘Extra 
and wrong’? 
‘Matching’ or 
‘Extra but right’? 
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3.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed modelling in computer-aided HAZOP study. The qualities that make a 
good model are “accuracy”, “completeness”, “conciseness”, “generality”, 
“independence”, ”simplicity”, “flexibility”. Differences between qualitative modelling and 
quantitative modelling are also discussed and the advantage and disadvantage of qualitative 
modelling are highlighted, therefore, justifying why qualitative reasoning is widely used. This 
chapter also discussed model information representation and organization, particularly 
presenting some ways that researchers had used to solve ambiguities. A model test bed 
developed as part of this project is illustrated in detail.   
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4 SAFETY-RELATED APPLICATIONS 
This chapter introduces and describes in full detail three safety-related computer-aided 
applications: “Safe Isolation Tool”, “Instrument Checker” and “Auto Cause-Effect System”. 
It details how the three safety-related computer-aided tools are developed and how they are 
related to one another. Section 4.1 illustrates the “Safe Isolation Tool”. Section 4.2 explains 
the “Instrument Checker” and “Auto Cause-Effect System”. Section 4.3 describes how cause-
effect analysis can be utilised in hazard identification for safe isolation when combined with 
the safe isolation tool. 
4.1 ISOLATION FOR SAFE MAINTENANCE 
 
4.1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The safety of hazardous processing plants is of paramount importance as an accident could 
cause major damage to property and/or injury to people. Well-maintained equipment in the 
process plant can give smooth running of the plant and increase the plant productivity and 
lifetime.   
 
However, the maintenance work of process plant is often dangerous as it requires appropriate 
isolation of the equipment items being maintained because the maintenance task is a set of 
intrusive activities that could introduce the risk of releasing hazardous substances. 
Impropriate isolation for maintenance work could result in significant consequences. Any 
release of hazardous material can cause damage to the whole plant or even take human life. 
For example, a pool, jet or flash fire, or a vapour-cloud explosion could become the 
consequences should a flammable substance be released during the maintenance process. 
Furthermore, long range and greater hazardous threats to people and the environment could 
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become the consequences should the released material be toxic (Health and Safety Executive, 
2006).  
 
Unsafe isolation in process plant could not only cause release of dangerous materials, but also 
lead to pipe-work failure and deviations from normal operations, etc (Hale, et al., 1998).  
 
It is reported that 30% of accidents are maintenance-related and 50% of them release harmful 
substances (Wallace & Merritt, 2003). Therefore, a comprehensive identification of potential 
hazards caused by maintenance work is necessary before carrying out the actual maintenance 
work. 
 
This section describes a computer-aided tool that considers the safety issues for isolation 
process of maintenance work in the process plant. It is integrated in the HAZID system. 
Currently, no other commercial tool available for this purpose in the market can be found. 
Section 4.1.1 gives the objectives of the tool and a brief analysis of safe isolation, then section 
4.1.2 explains the methodology for identifying the isolation boundary and how the algorithm 
is tested.  Section 4.1.3 illustrates how HAZOP analysis is applied to identify hazards after the 
boundary is identified and selected, then section 4.1.4 gives the overall workflow of the tool. 
The whole section ends with a summary of the overall methodology. 
 
4.1.1.1 Objectives 
Objectives of the tool are to define an isolation boundary and to identify potential hazards 
related to the isolation task. The isolation tool will help to mitigate the likelihood of harmful 
release by automatically identifying the isolation boundary and examining the hazards that 
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might occur due to the isolation activity before the maintenance work commences. It can be 
used as a preventive and mitigative risk reduction tool. Furthermore, this tool has to ensure 
the isolation boundary is complete (e.g., no valve that must be closed is missing) and correct 
(eg. no valve that need not  be closed is included). 
 
4.1.1.2 Analysis of Safe Isolation 
According to the Health and Safety Executive (2006), process isolation stages consist of 
“Hazard identification”, “Risk assessment and selection of isolation scheme”, “Planning and 
preparing of equipment”, “installation of isolation”, “Draining, venting, purging and flushing”, 
“Testing and monitoring effectiveness of the isolation”, “Carrying out the intrusive activity”, 
“Reinstatement of plant”. Also, final isolation methods include “Positive isolation”, which is 
a complete separation of the to be isolated items from other parts of the plant; “Proved 
isolation”, which is the “valved isolation” where the effectiveness of valve closures will be 
confirmed before the maintenance work; “Non-proved isolation”, which is also the “valved 
isolation” where the effectiveness of valve closures will NOT be confirmed before the 
maintenance work. 
 
Currently this isolation tool helps with the first stage which is the “Hazard identification” and 
helps with the “valved isolation” with either proved or non-proved isolation. The 
confirmation of valve closures is not within the scope of this tool. Also, it does not deal with 
isolation for maintaining instruments. 
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Results of the isolation tool can be used to support: 
• Maintaining sufficient understanding of potential hazards associated with isolation by 
providing records on hazard analysis with different isolation procedures in which the 
closing order of the isolable valves is different. 
• Establishing integrity of isolation arrangements of the whole process plant. 
• Designing rigid isolation procedures. 
• Controlling the isolation activities. 
• Developing and maintaining a “library” of standard isolation schemes.  
• Reinstatement of the plant by providing an isolation record. 
• Linking to chemical industry maintenance database. 
4.1.2 IDENTIFYING THE ISOLATION BOUNDARY 
An isolation boundary is a collection of isolation points. When equipment items are to be 
maintained in a process plant, a process engineer will analyse the P&ID of that plant, and 
identify the valves that must be closed in order to isolate the equipment items so that they are 
safe to work on. For example, consider figure 4.1 in page 52, if the centrifugal pump “P-
0101A” is to be isolated, then 5 valves, “V015”, “V002”, “V014”, “V013” and “V001”, will 
need to be closed to isolate the pump. This process of identification and the analysis of the 
potential hazards caused by closing these valves are automated by the tool and is the subject 
of the rest of section 4.1. 
4.1.2.1 The Plant File 
As mentioned in chapter 3, the plant file, which is a text file generated from the P&ID, 
describes the equipment items in the plant, which includes their connections, flow directions 
and other attributes. The plant file is used as input into the isolation tool.  
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All isolable valves are specified at the design stage and should be indicated and the position 
of manually operated valves should be effectively secured in the P&IDs. This is reflected in 
the attribute “canBeIsolationValve” of each valve where the value of it must be “yes” or “no” 
in the plant file. 
 
4.1.2.2 The Tracing Procedure 
The procedure for identifying the isolation boundary is to trace upstream and downstream 
from the equipment items to be isolated to find the valves which must be closed. During 
tracing, the tool will look only for the first valve that is isolable in each line branching out 
from the equipment items.  
 
When a Pressure Relief Valve (PRV) is met, the algorithm will compare the direction of the 
tracing and the opening direction of the PRV, if they are in the same direction, then the 
tracing procedure will carry on and the PRV will be identified as within the boundary but 
must be isolated, otherwise, the PRV will be identified as on the boundary and the tracing 
procedure at this branching line ends at this point. 
 
When searching from the equipment items to be isolated, if the propagation passes through an 
OPC onto another P&ID then it will continue on the next P&ID until an isolable valve is 
found.  If there is no continuation from that OPC, the OPC will be treated as being on the 
boundary and the user will be warned that an isolation point has not been found for that 
particular branch. The OPC ID and the pipe connected to it will be identified in the warning. 
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When multiple items are to be isolated, the same procedure will be applied to all the items. 
The valves that need to be closed for all the items will be combined together and any 
duplicates will be removed. 
 
4.1.2.3 Testing 
Two plants, a hydrocarbon separation unit (Lawley, 1974) and Benzene plant (Wells & 
Seagrave, 1976), are used to test the algorithm. The algorithm correctly identifies the isolation 
boundaries when given different equipment items as input for the two plants and this is 
verified by the process engineers in the sponsor company. In order to help the user visualise a 
boundary, the isolation tool automatically highlights the valves to be closed on the Smart 
Plant P&ID system. Figure 4.1 shows the output for isolating pump “P-0101A” for the 
hydrocarbon separation unit. All the isolable valves are highlighted in red. The item to be 
isolated, “P-0101A”, is highlighted in bright blue (the valves filled with black colour are 
valves that have already been closed). Please refer to appendix G for notation explanation. 
 
Figure 4.1 The highlighted isolation boundary for isolating centrifugal pump “P-0101A” 
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A more sophisticated example is to isolate the liquid-liquid-gas separator in the hydrocarbon 
separation unit plant. Figure 4.2 shows a table of equipment items on the boundary with their 
current status and related notes. The tool also displays a table with all the items within the 
boundary. Figure 4.3 shows these items highlighted in Smart Plant P&ID. This example 
shows that several different types of equipment items are on the boundary. The first type is 
the “must be closed” valve, such as “V028”, “V025”,”V021”, “V022” and “V007”, which are 
highlighted in Smart Plant P&ID drawing in red.  The second type is “Pressure Relief Valve 
(PRV)”, such as “PRV002PRV”, “PRV001PRV”. The third type is the “Off-Page-Connector 
(OPC)”. The second and third types are highlighted in Smart Plant P&ID drawing in purple. 
The items to be isolated are highlighted in bright blue.  
 
Figure 4.2 Items on the isolation boundary for isolating separator “T-0100” 
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Figure 4.3 The highlighted isolation boundary for isolating separator “T-0100” 
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4.1.3 IDENTIFYING HAZARDS AFTER THE ISOLATION BOUNDARY IS DEFINED 
Once the boundary is identified a HAZOP analysis will be carried out to identify the hazards 
related to the isolation procedure. The HAZID engine is called automatically for this purpose. 
 
After the items on the boundary are identified, the user is asked to review the items and 
specify the order in which they should be closed. Consider the example shown in figure 4.1. If 
the first item selected to be closed is “V001” then a HAZOP analysis is carried out by 
applying the deviation 'no flow' to “V001”. The isolation tool does this by invoking the 
HAZID engine to carry out an analysis to identify the hazards that might be introduced by this 
deviation. If hazards are identified then they are reported. If no hazard is identified then the 
tool will go on to consider the deviation 'no flow' for the second boundary item to be closed 
(e.g. “V002”) and with “V001” being closed. This process goes on until the closing of all the 
valves on the boundary has been considered. In this way, there will be many HAZOP results 
as the valves are being closed in sequence. The HAZOP analysis carried out in HAZID is 
produced quickly and the successive analysis occupy little user time. Table 4.1 illustrates this 
hazard identification process. Presentation of the results is shown in HMeeting, as mentioned, 
a tool to view HAZOP analysis results in HAZID. The presentation of the results highlights 
the differences of the results, so that the engineer can focus on the new hazards that might 
occur by closing another valve.  Please note, after the valves being closed and before the 
actual maintenance work (or works for any other purposes) commences, there is draining 
work needed to be carried out in order to complete the isolation process. For example, in 
figure 4.1, after valve ‘V001’, ‘V014’ and ‘V012’ being closed, valve ‘V013’ and ‘V015’ 
must be open to drain the flow that already present in the pipe and then close them to 
complete the isolation.  
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Conditions Actions Result 
“no flow” passing through V001 (this 
should be the original HAZOP result 
with only “no flow” being 
considered) 
Doing HAZOP analysis HAZOP result1 
“no flow” passing through V002 + 
V001 closed 
Doing HAZOP analysis HAZOP result2 
............................ ………………….. …………………. 
“no flow” passing through VN + VN-1 
closed + VN-2 closed …+V001 closed  
Doing HAZOP analysis HAZOP result n 
 
Table 4.1 The hazard identification process 
 
Analysis of HAZOP results when scenarios of wrong order are analysed 
Take the example of figure 4.1, after the isolation boundary is defined, five valves are 
identified that must be closed to isolate the pump “P-0101A”.  If the user chooses to close 
“V001” first, the HAZOP result will show no hazard occurred; but if the user chooses to close 
“V002” first, there will be “reverse flow” from down stream to upstream, the HAZOP result 
will show this deviation and its consequences. So the ideal closing sequence would be 
“V001”, “V014”, “V002”, and then open “V013” and “V015” to drain the pipe, then close 
both “V013” and “V015” in either sequence.  
 
4.1.4 THE OVERALL WORKFLOW 
Figure 4.4 shows the overall workflow of the Isolation tool. It starts with loading the original 
plant file as input, and then a list of frames is generated in which each frame describes the 
information of an equipment item. After allowing the user to specify the item to be isolated, 
the tool will run its algorithm to look for the items including valves, OPCs without 
continuations, and PRVs in the isolation boundary and then display them. Then it will move 
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onto the second stage which is to identify the hazards after the boundary is defined.  It starts 
by allowing the user to specify the sequence for closing the valves on the boundary. Then it 
generates a series of input files for the HAZID engine with each valve closed in each stage of 
the sequence as described in Table 4.1. The HAZID engine is then called to do a HAZOP 
analysis with only “no flow” being considered for each input file. The results are then 
automatically compared and any differences are highlighted to show any hazards related to 
closing any of the valves. 
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Figure 4.4 Workflow of the isolation tool  
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4.1.5 FURTHER WORK 
The isolation tool can be further developed to identify Double Block and Bleed (DBB) 
isolation or Double seals in a single valve body with a bleed in between or Single Block and 
Bleed (SBB) isolation. It should be able to highlight and be able to differentiate them in the 
P&ID drawing.  For example, using SBB as a final isolation for maintaining living plant that 
contains hazardous substance is considered to be highly risking. If in such situation a SBB is 
identified and highlighted, it would draw the engineer’s attention and might result in the 
modification of isolation design to achieve higher safety level. 
4.1.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Carrying out isolation safely is of paramount importance to avoid releasing hazardous 
material into the atmosphere and to prevent isolation related accidents. A thorough hazard 
analysis ahead of the actual work is more likely to give a successful and safe isolation 
implementation.  
 
Although process plant P&IDs are already available electronically for process engineers to 
identify potential hazards, no computer-aided tool was used to help with defining an isolation 
boundary for the isolation process and calling the hazard identification analysis automatically 
from the isolation safety point of view.  
 
This section describes a novel computer-aided tool to help with safe isolation for maintenance 
work or works for other purposes. In order to define the isolation boundary, the tool searches 
upstream and downstream of the item to be isolated to find the isolable valves which must be 
closed. After the boundary is defined, HAZOP analysis with deviation “no flow” is applied to 
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identify hazards that may occur when the valves are closed in a specified order. The results 
are displayed with differences of each HAZOP analysis being highlighted. 
4.2 AUTOMATED CAUSE-EFFECT ANALYSIS 
The design of the control of a process plant is important to ensure the safe running of the plant. 
Although P&IDs are available electronically to control engineers, many tasks associated with 
Process Control Engineering (PCE) are still carried out manually. One of these tasks is the 
cause-effect analysis of the control system. The result of the analysis is the cause-effect 
diagrams.  
 
As part of this research project, a computer-aided system has been developed to generate 
cause-effect diagrams automatically given a set of P&IDs. This helps to reduce the effort 
required with the labour intensive analysis of PCE information by the control engineers. It is 
achieved by encoding knowledge related to PCE in rules so that they can be applied 
automatically to a given set of P&IDs to produce the corresponding cause-effect diagrams. 
 
This section describes in detail the components of the system, the rules and the reasoning 
process. Distinctiveness of the cause-effect system is that it applies a general purpose rule 
engine and it is integrated with HAZID and its results cover all the instrumentation and their 
control of the entire plant. The cause-effect system takes the P&ID input from HAZID and 
displays the results in a format that comply with the ISO standard 10418 (International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), 2003). ISO 10418: 2003 is Petroleum and Natural 
Gas International standardization that describes the basic concepts related to the analysis and 
design of a process safety system. It provides objectives, requirements and guidelines for 
technique in analysis, design and testing of a process safety system. 
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The rest of this section is organized as follows. Section 4.2.1 gives the overall introduction, 
then section 4.2.2 introduces the Instrument Checker. Section 4.2.3 illustrates how the output 
from the Instrument Checker is transformed into the format required by the inference engine 
and section 4.2.4 demonstrates the reasoning rules and reasoning process. Following that, 
section 4.2.5 explains how the result table is generated in required format. Section 4.2.6 gives 
a comparison with a closely similar system reported in Drath et al. (2006), then section 4.3 
further evaluates the system by applying it to safety analysis of the isolation work. By the way 
of a summary, section 4.4 takes into account some possible future enhancements and section 
4.5 draws the conclusion. 
4.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Safety analysis in control design of a process plant is required to help with the identification 
of unfavourable outcomes that may present a safety risk and to help with the design of 
protective measures to avoid or to mitigate against such unfavourable events (ISO, 2003). 
 
Safety Analysis Function Evaluation chart (SAFE) is one of the established cause-effect 
analysis techniques stated in the ISO standard 10418 (ISO, 2003). It can be applied to achieve 
the above objectives and ensure that the procedures and devices provided for safeguarding the 
process components form an integrated system covering the entire process plant.  The SAFE 
chart is referred to as cause-effect table as it provides information about process events and 
process responses. 
 
Manual generation of a cause-effect table given a P&ID of a process plant is labour intensive, 
time consuming, repetitive and error-prone. With P&IDs available in electronic format there 
Computer-aided applications in process plant safety 
 
62 
is the potential of developing a computer-aided tool that can take the P&ID information as 
input and produce the cause-effect analysis result automatically. 
 
This section introduces a computer-aided cause-effect system that links the information of the 
process control loops with the cause-effect reasoning rules to produce process event and 
response results. It highlights the novelty of the cause-effect system and describes its 
components and the reasoning process. 
Features of the cause-effect system include: 
• Capture of process control information using an Instrument Checker. 
• Converting and manipulating of the description of the process control information. 
• Linkage of the description and cause-effect reasoning rules. 
• Generating of neutral XML inference results. 
• Parsing XML results and displaying it in required format. 
 
Two case studies are used to illustrate the working of the system. The first is a very small part 
of a P&ID of a much larger plant just to illustrate the working of the system. The second is 
the interlock system described in Drath et al. (2006). The system and results described by 
Drath et al. (2006) are compared with the current system. This section ends with a summary 
of the overall methodology. 
4.2.1.1 Objective 
The objective of the cause-effect system is to automate the generation of cause-effect tables 
from the P&ID input information hence reduce the labour intensive analysis effort required of 
the control engineers. 
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4.2.1.2 Related Work Review 
Several computer-aided tools of this kind have been developed, such as a knowledge-based 
system described in Drath et al. (2006) that illustrates the auto-generation of cause-effect table 
through a standardized plant description model called Computer-Aided Engineering 
eXchange (CAEX) and on rule-based algorithms. It uses the specification and implementation 
of interlocks as an example. “Interlocks are pieces of control code that ensure the safety of a 
plant” (Drath et al., 2006). A detailed comparison of that system with this one reported here is 
given in section 4.2.6. 
 
A prototype software described in Yim et al. (2006) provides a way to identify control loops 
and indicators and connectivity between instruments and process items by making queries to 
its Prolog inference engine. The plant representation in Yim et al. (2006) is achieved by 
writing the plant topology information in XML according to the CAEX schema. Thambirajah 
et al. (2009) further advances this representation by generating a process connectivity matrix 
from the CAEX&XML description that lends itself to automated, exhaustive searching for 
paths and links.   
 
The cause-effect system reported in this section uses an Instrument Checker to identify all the 
instruments and their links with related process items. Details of the Instrument Checker can 
be found in section 4.2.2.  Differences with that reported in Yim et al. (2006) are also given in 
there. 
There is other commercial tool that generates cause-effect diagram manually as a cause-effect 
configuration tool that provides an easy way of filling in the cause-effect table although it is 
not knowledge-based tool. 
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4.2.1.3 Components of Cause-Effect System 
The cause-effect system consists of an Instrument Checker, a general purpose knowledge-
based rule engine and an output tool that generates the cause-effect table that can be easily 
displayed in Microsoft Excel. Output from Instrument Checker is converted into input of the 
rule engine. Output from the rule engine is converted into a format that automatically 
generates the Excel cause-effect table in a format compliant with ISO10418 (ISO, 2003). 
Each component is an object-oriented design with a primary function.  
 
Two programming technologies were used to implement the cause-effect system:  C 
Language Integrated Production System (CLIPS) is used to execute the functions of the 
reasoning engine and C++ is used for all the remaining parts of the system. 
 
Designing the system in this way brings together the advantages of the two different types of 
programming language. The CLIPS exploits the rule-based nature of the linking information 
in the control loop and the C++ allows an efficient parser and graphical application and 
enables the neutral XML results to be displayed in the required format.  The workflow of the 
overall cause-effect system is shown in figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5 Workflow for cause-effect analysis 
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4.2.2 INSTRUMENT CHECKER 
Given a P&ID, the Instrument Checker identifies the instrument loops and their connections 
with the process items. The purpose is for the engineers to consider whether the instrument 
and its loops provide safeguards for deviations in the HAZOP procedure and also to prepare 
the data to be analysed by the inference engine in the cause-effect system.  Therefore the 
output of this tool is used as input by both HAZID and the cause-effect system. 
 
The checker first identifies all the instruments in the process plant. For each instrument, it 
traces the upstream and downstream connections of each branch line until a process item is 
found. Therefore, information about which process items are connected to which instruments 
is collected. Given a process item the Instrument Checker can list which instruments are 
connected to it, and given an instrument, it can also list which process items are connected to 
it. 
 
Consider the P&ID shown in figure 4.6, which is a very small part taken from a much larger 
plant. The tool identifies the following instruments: 
• Two high level alarms – “ZEH-59010” and “ZLH-59010”. 
• Two low level alarms – “ZEL-59010” and “ZLL-59010”. 
• One control valve – “FCV-59010”. 
The tool then traces upstream and downstream to find the process item(s) attached to these 
instruments. In this case they are all connected to the same pipe with tag “test1001PU34-PU”.  
 
Figure 4.7 shows the results. The loop number “59010” indicates that they are all in the same 
instrument loop. Figure 4.7 also shows the related deviations of each instruments (“L+” 
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means “high level”; “L-“ means “low level”; “L0” means “no level”) and the response, which 
can be either an indicator, an alarm or a control.  
 
Figure 4.8 shows all the instruments (“ZEH-59010”, “ZLH-59010”, “ZEL-59010”, “ZLL-
59010” and “FCV-59010”) are attached to the same process item (“test1001PU34-PU”). 
 
Compare to the prototype software reported in Yim et al. (2006), while this cause-effect 
system uses plant file to represent the plant, their system uses a CAEX XML file to describe it 
and get the result only when the user asks. The Instrument Checker displays all the 
connections and items in one go without being asked, users have an option to choose to show 
it or not.  An additional button can be added, for instance, at the “process item” list to allow 
the user to check the connectivity between two specified elements as well.  
 
In summary, the instrument checker reports the connectivity between instrumentation and 
process items as well as the control loops, i.e. it identifies how equipment items in a process 
plant are linked together physically and/or through electronic control signals. This 
information is used as input by the cause-effect analysis inference engine to draw the 
conclusions. 
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Figure 4.6 A simple instrument loop 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Instrument list  
 
 
Figure 4.8 Process item list 
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4.2.3 GENERATING INPUT FOR THE REASONING ENGINE 
In order to analyse the process events and the corresponding process responses, a rule-based 
system is built for this purpose. The rule-base captures the expert’s knowledge and carries out 
the inference to produce the result. CLIPS is chosen as the development tool as it supports 
rule-based, object-oriented and procedure programming methods (Giarratano & Riley 1994; 
Riley, 2008). 
 
A rule-based system in CLIPS consists of three basic components: a set of facts, a set of rules 
and the inference engine that controls the overall execution by matching the rules against the 
facts to infer new information (Giarratano & Riley 1994).  Therefore, the first step for 
building our expert system is to generate the CLIPS fact file. 
 
Bearing in mind that the output of Instrument Checker has already prepared all the necessary 
data of process items and their connections with the instruments, therefore it is easy to use 
that data in the reasoning process. However, information is still represented in different ways 
due to differing data representations used in the two languages. A C++ function is developed 
to convert data that represents the equipment items and their connectivity into a format that 
can be read by the CLIPS reasoning engine.  
 
According to Yim et al. (2006), a physical link (or path) is an equipment item like a pipe 
carrying a flow of mass or energy while a control link (or path) is a cable connecting an 
equipment item like a valve to a controller carrying an electronic signal. They are defined as 
“flow-connection” and “signal-connection” respectively in the system reported in this section. 
Among them, “flow-connection” is directional while “signal-connection” is bi-directional. 
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From the output of the Instrument Checker, the tool defines the CLIPS fact file according to 
these rules: 
 
The structure of each fact is: 
 
 
 
 
All the process items are classified as “equipment”, e.g.  
 
 
 
 
This means equipment “test1001PU34-PU” is a “1-in-2-out” pipe. 
 
All the instruments are classified according to its item name, e.g. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each control instrument is classified as “equipment controlDevice”, e.g. 
 
 
 
 
For all the pipes, the CLIPS fact file defines the “flow-connection”, e.g. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above flow-connection definitions indicate how pipe “test1001PU34-PU” is connected to 
other pipes and equipment items to deliver the flows. 
 
If there is flow connection from A to B, and there is flow connection from B to C, then the 
CLIPS asserts an “in-line” fact as follow: 
“(in-line A to C)” indicates that there is flow connection from A to C.  
(device high-level-alarm ZEH-59010);high level alarm  
(device high-level-alarm ZLH-59010);high level alarm  
(device low-level-alarm ZEL-59010);low level alarm 
(device low-level-alarm ZLL-59010);low level alarm 
(device cv-actuator NOTAG_Instrument_0_0.106_0.505);cv actuator 
([type],[tag],[item name]);[comment] 
(equipment pipe test1001PU34-PU 1-in-2-out); 1 in 2 out 
 
(equipment controlDevice FCV-59010 cv-body);cv body 
(flow-connection test1001PU34-PU out test1001PU34-P_4) 
(flow-connection test1001PU34-P_4 out NOTAG_PipingComp_0_0.222_0.469) 
(flow-connection NOTAG_PipingComp_0_0.222_0.469 out test1001PU34-P_2) 
(flow-connection test1001PU34-P_2 out NOTAG_PipingComp_0_0.214_0.469) 
 Safety-related applications  
 
  
71 
For all the signal lines, the CLIPS fact file defines the “signal-connection”, e.g. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the above signal-connection definition, it is shown that “ZEH-59010”, “ZLH-59010”, 
“ZEL-59010”, “ZLL-59010” and “FCV-59010” are connected by signal through a cv actuator 
“NOTAG_Instrument_0_0.106_0.505”.  
 
The template of each processItem-instruments-connection is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above example means instruments with the tags as “ZEH-59010”, “ZLH-59010”, “ZEL-
59010”, “ZLL-59010” and “FCV-59010” are connected to one process item with the tag as 
“test1001PU34-PU”. 
 
In a nutshell, all the equipment items and their connections are explicitly represented in the 
fact file and all the physical paths such as flow-connections between start and end point and 
control paths such as signal-connections are clearly identified. 
(signal-connection ZLH-59010   NOTAG_SignalRun_33) 
(signal-connection NOTAG_SignalRun_33   ZEH-59010) 
(signal-connection ZEH-59010   NOTAG_SignalRun_39) 
(signal-connection NOTAG_SignalRun_39   NOTAG_Instrument_0_0.106_0.505) 
 
(signal-connection ZLL-59010   NOTAG_SignalRun_24) 
(signal-connection NOTAG_SignalRun_24   ZEL-59010) 
(signal-connection ZEL-59010   NOTAG_SignalRun_43) 
(signal-connection NOTAG_SignalRun_43   NOTAG_Instrument_0_0.106_0.505) 
(signal-connection NOTAG_Instrument_0_0.106_0.505   FCV-59010) 
(deftemplate processItem-instruments-connection 
             (slot processComponent) 
  (multislot deviceIdent)) 
e.g. 
 
(processItem-instruments-connection  
  (processComponent test1001PU34-PU) 
  (deviceIdent ZEH-59010 ZLH-59010 ZEL-59010 ZLL-59010 FCV-59010)) 
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4.2.4 REASONING RULES AND REASONING PROCESS 
4.2.4.1 Developing the rules 
The reasoning rules are defined according to the ISO10418 (ISO, 2003). The principle of 
defining a rule is to make sure that it is as generic and as reusable as possible.  
Here is an example of a descriptive rule: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The equivalent rule in CLIPS format is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above rule in CLIPS means: 
The name of the rule is “levelVessel-highLevel-close-inputValve”; 
If there is a level sensor device which is either a level indicator or a high level alarm that is 
connected to a level vessel, which can be a “liquid-liquid-gas-separator” as a major equipment 
item, or a primary pipe, or any other container in other forms; 
AND 
If there is an input control device such as a control valve or a control pump; 
AND 
(defrule levelVessel-highLevel-close-inputValve   
   (device level-indicator | high-level-alarm ?HLA) 
   (equipment pipe | majorProcessItem  ?VESSEL-TAG ?VESSEL-NAME) 
   (equipment controlDevice | controlDevicePump ?INPUT-CONTROL-DEVICE-
TAG ?INPUT-CONTROL-DEVICE-NAME)   
   (or(signal-connection ?HLA ?VESSEL-TAG) 
      (signal-connection ?HLA ?INPUT-CONTROL-DEVICE-TAG)) 
   (in-line ?INPUT-CONTROL-DEVICE-TAG to ?VESSEL-TAG)    
=> 
(print-result-levelAlarmHigh ?VESSEL-TAG ?VESSEL-NAME ?HLA ?INPUT-
CONTROL-DEVICE-TAG ?INPUT-CONTROL-DEVICE-NAME) 
)   
IF there is a level sensor; 
AND there is a level vessel and it has (at least) one input; 
AND there is (at least) a control valve that is able to close the input of the level 
vessel; 
AND the level sensor can detect the level in the level vessel and raise an alarm; 
THEN close the control valve(s) if the level sensor raises a maximum alarm. 
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If the input control device is connected to the level vessel;   
AND 
(If there is signal connection between the level sensor and the input control device 
Or 
If there is signal connection between the level sensor and the level vessel); 
AND 
If the level sensor senses an overflow in the level vessel, then it will close the input control 
valve; 
then (shown as “=>”) 
call the function “print-result-levelAlarmHigh” to print the result. 
4.2.4.2 The Reasoning Process 
Rules become activated whenever all the patterns at the left hand of the rule are matched by 
the facts.  When a rule is fired, the action(s) specified at its right hand will be taken. 
 
Taking the example of the above rule, apply it to the simple instrument loop at figure 4.6. 
Here we have a primary pipe “test1001PU34-PU”, a high level alarm “ZEH-59010”, and a 
control valve “FCV-59010”. 
 
There is signal connection between the high level alarm and the control valve. We have 
connection rules to assert “(signal-connection ZEH-59010  FCV-59010)” since there are 
signal connection facts below. 
 
 
 
(signal-connection ZEH-59010   NOTAG_SignalRun_39) 
(signal-connection NOTAG_SignalRun_39   NOTAG_Instrument_0_0.106_0.505) 
(signal-connection NOTAG_Instrument_0_0.106_0.505   FCV-59010) 
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There is also flow connection from the control valve to the pipe “(flow-connection FCV-
59010 out test1001PU34-PU)” to indicate that this is an input control device,  
 
Remember that if all the patterns at the left hand side of a rule are satisfied by the facts 
provided in the CLIPS fact file, the rule will be triggered to perform the action(s) at its right 
hand side. 
 
Therefore, rule “levelVessel-highLevel-close-inputValve” becomes activated as all the 
patterns at the left hand side of the rule are matched by the facts. The results are written into 
the result file in the XML format as follows: 
 
 
 
The CLIPS output can be in any format. XML as a neutral scripting language is chosen 
because  
• it enables the easy sharing of data across different systems.  
• it can be easily understood by both humans and computers. 
• it can be readily generated from the CLIPS inference engine. 
 
 
<cause_effect> 
<cause_comment processItemTag='test1001PU34-PU'>Primary-Piping high level 
</cause_comment> 
<cause instrumentTag='ZEH-59010'>level alarm high</cause> 
<effect controlInstrumentTag='FCV-59010'>close input control device: cv-body 
</effect> 
</cause_effect> 
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4.2.5 GENERATING THE EXCEL CAUSE-EFFECT DIAGRAMS 
After calling the CLIPS engine, the tool generates the results in the XML format as described 
above. Once the XML results are gained, the Simple API for XML (SAX) parser in C++ 
function is called to parse the XML output and format the parsed data into a Comma-
Separated Values (CSV) text file, which is an implementation of delimited text file. Once the 
CSV text file is generated, the engineer can open it with Microsoft Excel, and the cause-effect 
result will be presented in the format specified in ISO10418 (ISO, 2003). 
 
4.2.5.1 Parsing the XML results 
The purpose of the parser is to read and deconstruct the XML output file containing the cause-
effect analysis results.  
 
Parsing the XML output means to read the XML document, to identify key words and 
symbols and to transform the information into a data structure which can be processed and 
manipulated to display. The SAX parser is applied and integrated into the cause-effect system 
for the above objectives.  
 
Functions provided by the SAX parser are listed as follows: 
• Return the list of cause-effects in the plant. 
• Return the list of cause-comment with the associated process item ID/Tag.  
• Return the list of causes with the associated instrument/device ID/Tag. 
• Return the list of corresponding effects with the associated control device ID/Tag. 
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4.2.5.2 Displaying Result Table 
Part of the result is shown in figure 4.9. The cause-effect table in Excel shows that process 
component “test1001PU34-PU” has four instrument devices (“ZEH-59010”, “ZLH-59010”, 
“ZEL-59010”, “ZLL-59010”) attached to it. If the high level alarm “ZEH-59010” or “ZLH-
59010”goes off, then the input control valve “FCV-59010” must be shut down. If the low 
level alarm “ZEL-59010” or “ZLL-59010” goes off, then the input control valve “FCV-
59010” must be open. The interconnecting cross marks are placed in the cells indicating the 
cause-effect link between the process component, sensor instrument and control device. The 
“Function Performed” column describes the action that must be taken on the control device. 
 
The automated cause-effect analysis significantly reduces the effort required from an engineer. 
The main task for them is to check the results and confirm whether the suggested actions are 
correct. 
 
Figure 4.9 Part of the cause-effect table in Excel 
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4.2.6 COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORK 
The knowledge-based system reported in Drath et al. (2006) is designed to implement the 
automatic generation of the cause-effect table using the specification and implementation of 
interlocks as an example. In order to make a comparison, we have produced and extended a 
P&ID from that example and applied our cause-effect analysis tool on it as shown in figure 
4.10. 
 
Figure 4.10   P&ID example extended from Drath et al. (2006) 
 
In this P&ID, “B-1340” and “B-1347” are two level vessels called “Blanketed Fixed Roof”; 
“V-001” and “V-002” are two input control valves of “B-1340”; “V-003” is an output control 
valve of “B-1340” and an input control valve of “B-1347”; “V-004” is an input control valve 
of “B-1347”; “V-005” is an output control valve of “B-1347”. “LIS-201” and “LIS-202” are 
the level sensors of “B-1340” and “B-1347” respectively. “P-001” and “P-002” are two 
generic centrifugal pumps.  
 
 
B-1340 
B-1347 
V-001 V-002 
V-003 V-004 
P-001 
P-002 
LIS-201 
LIS-202 
V-005 
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Cause and effect analysis rules that are applicable to this plant can be simply stated: 
IF 
the level in a vessel has reached its maximum 
THEN 
close its input device. 
 
IF 
the level in a vessel has reached its minimum 
THEN 
close its output device. 
 
IF 
a valve is closed 
THEN 
stop the in-line control pump to protect the pump. 
 
IF 
a pump is started 
THEN 
ensure the in-line valve is opened to protect the pump. 
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IF 
an error occurred with a level sensor for a vessel 
THEN 
close the input and output control valves for that vessel. 
 
The result of the analysis is shown in figure 4.11. Comparing with the result reported in Drath 
et al. (2006), the result reported here has two additional features: 
• The result table provides a comprehensive list of process components and their attached  
   devices. The user has the option of viewing only components that have cause-effect links 
   that apply to them. 
• The table provides more detailed classification of function performed. For example, “V- 
   003” is an output control valve for “B-1340” and an input control valve for “B-1347”.  
   Therefore, any cause-effect control that applies to “V-003” is appropriately linked to the  
   correct vessels. 
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Figure 4.11   Cause-effect table in Excel for example P&ID  
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4.3 APPLYING CAUSE-EFFECT ANALYSIS TO THE ITEM TO BE 
ISOLATED 
Section 4.1 and 4.2 have introduced the “Isolation Tool” and the cause-effect analysis system 
in detail. While the isolation boundary tool derives part of its information from the P&ID and 
is valuable for planning maintenance, the automatic generation of the cause-effect tables 
provides a valuable HAZOP aid to help assess safeguards when considering consequences 
and risks.  
 
The cause-effect table has a role to highlight sensors inside the isolated plant and to highlight 
controls outside the boundary and vice versa.  HAZID can then detect cause and consequence 
scenarios around the boundary. This section illustrates how the cause-effect analysis tool can 
be used to support the hazard identification before carrying out the isolation work. 
 
Take the sample plant shown in figure 4.6 in page 67, the aim is to isolate the pipe 
“test1001PU34-PU”. The isolation tool is used to identify the isolation boundary. Figure 4.12 
and figure 4.13 show the result. Figure 4.12 highlights 9 valves in red colour that must be 
closed in order to isolate this pipe. Figure 4.13 shows the items on the boundary including the 
OPCs without continuation and items within the isolation boundary.  
 
Figure 4.14 shows the cause-effect analysis for isolating pipe “test1001PU34-PU”. In this 
analysis table, “test1001PU34-PU_24”, “test1001PU34-PU_31”, “test1001PU34-PU_32”, 
“test1001PU34-PU_5” and “test1001PU34-PU_7” are different parts of pipe “test1001PU34-
PU”. If isolating the pipe causes any of the following alarms to go off then the control valve 
“FCV-59010” must be open: “ZEL-59010”, “ZLL-59010”, “FQ-59010”, “FAL-59010”, “FI-
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59010”, “PI-59010” or “PAL-59010”. On the other hand if the high level alarm “ZEH-59010” 
or “ZLH-59010” goes off then the input control valve FCV-59010 must be closed. 
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Figure 4.12   The highlighted isolation boundary for isolating a primary pipe  
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Figure 4.13   Items on and within the isolation boundary for isolating primary pipe  
                      “test1001PU34-PU” 
 
 
Figure 4.14   Cause-effect table for the item to be isolated 
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4.4 FURTHER ENHANCEMENT 
Limitations in the current system will need to be addressed by further development. One 
limitation is the lack of an interface that can call the CLIPS reasoning process directly from 
the C++ environment and the other is that the current rule-base is incomplete and for a new or 
modified plant more rules might have to be developed to adopt the new or updated situation 
of the plant. Therefore, an interface to link the C++ and CLIPS could be considered. Another 
limitation is that only a small rule-base has been developed. The current rule-base can be 
enhanced by considering more plants, adding more rules and generalising the rules to make 
them more reusable. Furthermore, there is a potential to expand the reasoning rules to carry 
out configuration checks for process plants. 
 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Carrying out safety analysis is important to prevent adverse consequences from happening 
and to be of assistance to the control design of protective methods in a process plant. Control 
and sensor devices and their working procedures can be presented in a SAFE chart to help 
with the analysis process. A SAFE chart is also called cause-effect table as it reflects 
information about process events and their corresponding safety guards. 
 
With the electronically available P&IDs, a computer tool for automatically generating cause-
effect tables is developed to reduce the effort required for the labour-intensive analysis 
process.  The cause-effect analysis tool is introduced in this chapter with details of its 
components, working principles and data processing methods. Two case studies are used to 
exemplify the working of the system. The highlights of the system are that it provides a 
comprehensive list of process components and their attached devices that covers all the plant 
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no matter whether there is a cause-effect applied to it or not and it offers two options in the 
result presentation as the user can choose to show only results with the cause-effect link or the 
complete results. 
The cause-effect analysis tool can be used in conjunction with isolation tool to identify 
control design on and within the isolation boundary, therefore, giving the engineer a better 
insight of the picture of the isolation area. 
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5 FINDINGS & IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter begins by highlighting the original contributions made by this thesis. Limitations 
of the work will be considered and possibilities of future work will be discussed. 
5.1 CONTRIBUTIONS 
As a result of this EngD project, the main contributions are the development of the three tools 
and one automatic reasoning system described above, how they can be integrated with an 
existing knowledge-based system, HAZID, and with one another. The “Model Test Bed”, 
“Instrument Checker” and “Isolation Tool” are novel tools in the process industry for plant 
safety.  The cause-effect system is a new automatic reasoning system to infer the process 
events and process responses in the control design. Drath et al. (2006) reported similar work 
and their results are compared with this new system. The new system provides more complete 
and detailed results covering the whole process plant under analysis. 
 
This thesis represents an initial attempt to improve the usability of an existing knowledge-
based system, HAZID, for HAZOP automation and integrate it with other novel safety-related 
tools. This research investigates, for the first time in the process safety area, extending the use 
of a well-developed hazard identification system, HAZID, together with a tool for the 
identification of isolation boundary. The research also explores, for the first time in the 
process safety area, applying a cause-effect analysis system in conjunction with the isolation 
tool to examine the safety of the control design within and on an identified isolation boundary. 
The research also represents an initial attempt at extending the application of P&IDs to 
isolation safety and control design of a process plant. 
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5.2 LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
WORK 
The main limitation of these four tools is the input. Currently, all of them take only 
SmartPlant P&IDs as input. The plant representation can be changed to be compatible with 
the CAEX scheme. As mentioned in section 4.2.1.2, CAEX stands for Computer-Aided 
Engineering eXchange. It is a neutral data transfer language for data exchange between 
different applications, for example from P&ID to Process Control Engineering (PCE) tool and 
vice versa. It is now available in XML format. When this is applied then HAZID and its 
accompanying tools can be used with other main P&ID packages and this would greatly 
increase the usability of the system.  
 
The isolation tool can only help with the “hazard identification” step in the isolation process 
defined in the Health and Safety Executive (2006). Further development can cover the other 
steps in the process, for example, it can be developed to cover the “Risk assessment and 
selection of isolation scheme”. 
 
The cause-effect system lacks an interface that can call the CLIPS reasoning process directly 
from the C++ environment and the other is that the current rule base is incomplete and more 
rules will need to be developed. 
 
The overall limitation of tools is the lack of experiment from the real customers, which is also 
a limitation of the HAZID system. This is because some process engineers prefer trusting the 
manual HAZOP results to the computer generated results. So the tools can only be used as an 
aid to HAZOP study, control safety analysis and isolation safety, they are by no means a full 
replacement of manual work. 
 Findings & Implications  
 
  
89 
Furthermore, it is suggested that the tools can be further developed to have some learning 
capabilities by analysing the previously generated results. For example, by analysing the 
HAZOP results from the isolation tool considering difference closing sequence of the valves 
on the boundary, it might be able to suggest which sequence is better for the next analysis.  
5.3 CONCLUSION 
This thesis addresses three tools and one reasoning system that have been developed and 
integrated into an existing knowledge-based system HAZID to improve its usability and 
acceptability, covering the issues of knowledge representation testing, process plant isolation 
safety, process control safety. 
 
To achieve the general and specific modelling goals, qualitative modelling dominates auto 
HAZOP analysis while quantitative modelling can be applied wherever necessary. Models 
built have to be verified and a Model Test Bed (MTB) is developed to reveal the qualitative 
behaviours of the model under test and to compare it with the intentional design, allowing 
further modification to gain confidence on the correctness of models built. 
 
Two safety-related applications have been illustrated in detail in this thesis. One is the 
isolation tool which relates to isolation safety. The other is a cause-effect system which relates 
to control design safety. They all take P&IDs as input and produce safety-related results. They 
can be used together to help with hazard identification in the isolation area. An instrument 
checker is embedded in the cause-effect system to provide input to the inference engine and 
also reveal an insight of the control loops of a process plant to the process control engineer. 
All above tools and system are tested and verified by the process engineers in the sponsor 
company. 
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The thesis represents, in the process safety area, the first attempt to use an isolation tool 
together with a well-developed auto HAZOP system for the hazard identification of isolation 
process and the first attempt to apply control safety analysis to isolation area, extending the 
use of P&IDs to isolation safety and control design of a process plant. 
 
Further development of the tools is discussed. A limitation in the input can lead to the use of 
CAEX scheme, allowing neutral data transfer between different P&ID package. The isolation 
tool can be further developed to cover risk assessment and selection of an isolation scheme. It 
can also obtain some learning capabilities by analysing the results previously gained. The rule 
base in the cause-effect system can be further enhanced by applying it to more plants, 
detecting more control patterns.   
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APPENDIX A PAPER 1 
A Test Bed for verifying the correctness of safety-related 
behavioural knowledge in equipment model for use in automated 
hazard identification 
 
An, H., McCoy, S.A., Chung, P.W.H., McDonald, J., and Madden, J., 2007, A model test bed  
to verify the correctness of safety-related behavioural knowledge in a system for automated 
hazard identification. Proceedings of the 17th Advances in Risk and Reliability Technology 
Symposium (AR2TS) (Ed L.Bartlett), Loughborough University, UK, 17-19 Apr, 2007, pp. 
204-218. 
 
Abstract: 
 
HAZID is a state-of-the-art software system used to identify hazards by emulating the 
conventional HAZOP study used in the Chemical Engineering domain. Unit models are used 
in the system to model the behaviour of various equipment items within a plant.    
 
The Model Test Bed is an effective tool integrated with the current Model Builder to test the 
correctness of models built in the Unit Model Library. It allows the behaviour of the model 
under test to be compared to its expected behaviour, as specified by a chemical engineer 
domain expert. This paper establishes the significance of such testing by comparing the 
manual model test with the auto test, and illustrates the solution in terms of the methodology 
used, the architecture of the tool and the data structure. The presentation of testing results is 
also discussed by exploring different formats to present the same results in order for a 
chemical engineer to consider the model from different points of view. Further improvements 
of the tool are discussed. 
 
Keyword: Process hazard identification, HAZOP, HAZID, Knowledge testing 
 
Introduction  
 
This paper describes a tool that considers the test of Unit Library Models in terms of 
correctness. It commences by introducing the HAZOP study, HAZID system and the Unit 
Library Models, then leading to the introduction of Model Test Bed. A number of 
development issues are addressed and different ways of result presentation are illustrated. 
Further developments are discussed. 
 
HAZOP and HAZID 
The HAZard and OPerability (HAZOP) study has been widely recognized as an effective 
hazard identification method throughout the process industry. It applies a procedure called 
“guideword-consequence tracing” on each equipment item in a plant to comprehensively 
check what faults occurring in the item would cause a deviation from its normal operating 
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conditions, such as an increase in pressure or a decrease in temperature as explained by 
Madden et al. (2005) [1]. 
 
However, because of this comprehensive nature, it is not easy to apply HAZOP in practice. 
First, it is time consuming, because it requires people from different disciplines to meet 
together in many meetings. Second, it demands rich and complex data to be recorded and then 
analyzed repeatedly. If all these practical difficulties could be overcome, HAZOP would be 
even more powerful than it is now. HAZID is a state-of-the-art knowledge-based system 
developed by Hazid Technology Ltd. and Loughborough University to provide facilities to 
automate the HAZOP process.  It is based on a Signed Direct Graph (SDG) theory that 
describes the qualitative change of variables. SDG is network of nodes connected by arcs. 
Nodes are variables such as “flow”, “temperature” or “pressure” in the system. Arcs are 
influences between nodes, of one variable on another. Sign identifies type of influences 
attached to an arc, negative or positive. For example, “more flow” will result in “less 
pressure” if the sign attached to the arc is negative or “more temperature” will result in “more 
flow” if the sign attached to the arc is positive etc. Details about SDG are described by Chung 
(1993) [2]. 
 
Unit Models and Model Library  
 
In this HAZOP emulation system, a plant is represented as a network consisted of a series of 
interconnected units and is placed into a library named Unit Model Library (UML). Each unit 
is described as a model built on the theory of SDG. For example, the “'centrifugal pump'” in 
figure 1 is one of the unit models. It is described as an instance in the plant file: 
 
instance('test_unit' isa 'centrifugal pump', [ 
  inports info [ 
   'ignoreIn', 
   'in' , 
   'sealIn'  
  ], 
  outports info [ 
   'ignoreOut', 
   'out' , 
   'drainOut' , 
   'ventOut' , 
   'sealOut'   
  ], 
  unitports info [ 
  ], 
  propLinks info [ 
      % faults 
   arc([fault,['loss of drive',use_is_not_standby]],-1,['out', 'pressure']), 
   arc([fault,['loss of drive',use_is_not_standby]],1,['in', 'pressure']), 
   arc(['in', 'composition'],1,['out', 'composition']), 
   % propagation 
   arc(['in', 'noFlow'],2,['out', 'noFlow']), 
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   arc(['out', 'noFlow'],2,['in', 'noFlow']), 
   arc(['in', 'temp'],1,['out', 'temp']), 
   arc(['in', 'contamination'],2,['out', 'contamination']), 
   arc(['in', 'solid'],2,['out', 'solid'])    
     ] 
    ] 
). 
 
This model says that the test_unit is a centrifugal pump, it has 3 inports as listed in the slot 
“inports info”, and has 5 outports as listed in the slot “outports info”. It does not have any 
internal port as none listed in the slot “unitPorts info”. The “propLinks info” slot stores a list 
of arcs that define the mini-SDG related to a centrifugal pump. “-1”,“1” and “2” are 
influences. Among them, “-1” is a reversed influence, it means “Higher input implies lower 
output and lower input implies higher output” ,“1” is a direct influence and it means “Higher 
input implies higher output and lower input implies lower output” while “2” only means 
“Higher input implies higher output”. For example,“ arc(['in', 'solid'],2,['out', 'solid'])” means a 
solid increase at the in port  “in” will cause a solid increase at the out port “out” but a solid 
decrease at the in port “in” does not mean that there is going to be a solid decrease at the out 
port “out”. 
              
The units described above are organized into a hierarchical structure in which the child model 
unit inherits all the characters of its parent model while contains its new characters that 
distinguish itself from other child unit models of its parents. For instance, in table 1, “loss of 
drive” in parent model “Rotary pump” will cause “revFlow” at port “out”, this is inherited by 
both child models “centrifugal pump” and “double seal centrifugal pump”, but “leaks to seal” 
is a cause of “morePressure” only through the child model “double seal centrifugal pump” not 
through “centrifugal pump”. In addition, each child model unit may have its child unit as well.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Part of the Unit Model Library (UML)  
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Parent model Child models  
Rotary pump Centrifugal pump Double seal 
centrifugal pump 
Inherited arc  “loss of drive” causes “revFlow” at port “out” 
 
Specific arc for 
seal centrifugal 
pump 
  “leaks to seal” 
causes 
“morePressure” at 
port “seal1out” 
 
 
     Table 1 an example of inheritance in Unit Model Library (UML) 
 
The use of inheritance to build the unit model library keeps the unit model as concise as 
possible and increases speed to build a new model, as only the unique feature(s) of it have to 
be defined.  
 
The unit model structure is described in detail by McCoy et al. (1999) [3].  The unit-based 
approach is widely used, for example, by Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian (1995) [4]. 
Other model based approach applying qualitative physics in process safety is described by 
Catino and Ungar (1995) [5]. 
 
Model Testing Methodology  
 
The correctness of a model built by the chemical engineer is critical to the result of HAZOP 
study, because errors in a model may result in incorrect faults, consequences, deviations as 
well as wrong propagations in the HAZOP result, therefore distracting HAZOP study 
members’ attention from really critical hazards. Definition of verifying process plant models 
is described by Claire and Chung, 2001[6]. A tool is demanded to be able to allow the 
chemical engineer to verify the model’s correctness and then come back to modify the model 
until it is the one in his /her own mind. 
 
Traditionally, this work are done manually by constructing a test drawing using the model to 
be tested,  adding the Off-Page-Connector(OPC) to each inlet and each outlet of the model, 
analyzing using HAZID.  
 
Manually generated test results are not presented in a format which allows the user to quickly 
check that they agree with his/her expectation. The user must browse through the HAZOP-
style results system to see the actual results, and must refer to the Model Builder software to 
see if the results are what were expected. Therefore, there is a need to present both actual and 
expected result of a test more effectively on screen. The interface developed to solve this 
problem is one of the subjects of the rest of this paper. 
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Automated Model Test Bed 
 
The Model Test Bed is an effective tool integrated with the current HAZID Model Builder 
(MBuilder) to test the correctness of models built in the Unit Model Library. It allows the 
behaviour of the model under test to be compared to its expected behaviour, as specified by 
the chemical engineer domain expert. 
 
The use case  
 
The user of the Model Test Bed will be a trained user of the MBuilder, with the knowledge of 
constructing unit models and is responsible for the development of the HAZID knowledge 
base for their organization. This user may also have experience as a process engineer. During 
development of models, the user will test individual model in order to ensure that the model 
he/she is building does not have any unintended behaviours or does not lack of any intended 
behaviours, which means the same model may be tested more than once. There must be a 
record of the intended behaviour of each model under test in order to verify the actual 
behaviour of the model during each test. The user may test a model after making a change to 
it, so that there will be a result report to show him/her any differences between the expected 
and the actual results, then he/she would either go back to make further modifications to 
rectify the model or sign off the model as acceptable. The user may apply different conditions 
when testing a model and the result may be different for each test case of the same model. 
Also, the user may sometimes test more than one model at one go, or perhaps the whole unit 
model library, so that there will be a summary report for all tested models and an individual 
report for each model. 
 
The interface  
 
To test the model in MBuilder which already includes GUI, the unit model testing application 
includes graphical user interface(s) and facilities for recording test results. Also, since the 
Model Test Bed is designed to be used by the engineer in charge of developing new models, 
the interface for initiating tests on individual models is closely integrated with the Model 
Builder. A facility for selecting which model is going to be tested is shown in figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Interface to select a single model to be tested 
 
For a single model to be tested, a dialog is provided (as shown in figure 3) to allow the user to 
set up the test and give a description with current system time and date as the default 
description, so that each test case is easily identified.  The applicable conditions are drawn 
from those defined on the “Link Conditions” (explained later at “operating conditions”) 
elsewhere in the MBuilder.  
 
 
Figure 3. Interface to apply link conditions to a model to be tested 
Select conditions 
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To test multiple models, the user selects an option from the “Tools” menu in the MBuilder. 
 
For both single and multiple model tests, a feedback is provided to show the progress of a 
single or a batched test as shown by figure 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Progress display during model testing 
 
 
A dialog to inform the user that the results are available in model test page of HMeeting (this 
is the PHP script online interface to view results) appears when the test is finished. 
 
Function and data 
 
To start the new analysis on the model, the application will call ‘HAZID’ automatically.  
 
To complete the test, the application tests each of the defined deviations on each model. For 
example, to test the model ‘centrifugal pump’, the application will exam all the deviations 
automatically although it ends up that only 7 deviations are relevant to this model. The 
application is able to test the deviation in reverse direction, eg: from model to upstream port 
such as a “pump drive fails” causes “reverse flow” at its out port, then “reverse flow” at its in 
port and “reverse flow” at the out port of an OPC , eventually “causes reverse flow and 
contamination” at inlet sheet connector as its consequence. All that means, it will test fault 
caused within the model, which could result in deviations in any upstream or downstream port. 
 
Model Test Bed follows the same “Method” that other HAZID applications use to 
open/connect to a database. The results of the analysis of test plants are stored safely into 
ORACLE database with a series of tables –these results will later be compared to the intended 
results for the given model and will be available for later review, audit or comparison. 
 
Multiple tests on the same model are also recorded intact, and indexed on their time of 
production (among other factors), so that it is possible to refer to earlier results as well as the 
most recently generated ones. 
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Connect to OPC (Off-Page-Connector) 
 
Each time a model is tested, a test plant file is created automatically and stored as a temporary 
file in user’s temporary directory. The test plant consists of a single instance of the model to 
be tested, with each of its external ports connected to an OPC instance.  
 
For each “import”, the application will add an OPC, and connect to the port automatically. In 
the example of “centrifugal pump” in figure 1, each in port will be connected to its OPC. 
 
For each “outPort”, the application will add an OPC, and connect to the port automatically, In 
the example of “centrifugal pump”, each out port will be connected to its OPC. 
 
By this way, the model under test is connected to deviations caused by faults in the OPCs and 
links any deviations caused by faults in the test model to consequences in the OPCs. 
 
Single Model Test and Multiple Model Test  
 
As mentioned early, the user can test one single model or more than one model in a batch run. 
As demonstrated in figure 5, a single model test means to test one model at a model test run, 
to have one model to be tested at one model test case. A multiple test means to test more than 
one model at a model test run, to have at least two models to be tested at one model test case. 
Either of them will have four forms of test result presentation, which are “Fault Comparison”, 
“Consequence Comparison”, “Fault Path Propagation” and “Deviation oriented” , these four 
formats of result presentation will be discussed later. 
 
 
 
    Figure 5. Architecture of Model Test Bed 
 
Model Test Run 
Model Test  
Model Test Case 
Test Single Model Test Multiple Models 
Model Test Result 
Fault Consequence Comparison Deviation Oriented 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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Operating conditions 
 
The operating conditions define which options are available to customize the unit model by 
using attributes, for example, when testing the model “centrifugal pump”, there are 7 options 
that could be selected by the user, the model test bed will combine these selected conditions 
and apply them to the HAZID analysis to get the test result.   
 
The fault path and Deviation  
 
A fault path is an acyclic path within the Signed Direct Graph (SDG) between the fault and 
the variable under consideration, which the fault can cause deviations or consequences. 
Deviations consist of keywords such as “More”, “Less”, ”No”, ”Reverse” etc and parameters 
such as “Flow”, ”Pressure”, ”Temperature” ,”Level” etc. 
 
Any fault path propagating through a unit model under test will fall into one of the four types 
shown in figure 6. In case A, the fault happens in an OPC and causes a series of deviations 
that lead to a consequence in the test unit. In case B, the fault happens within the test unit 
while the consequence happens in some OPC. In case C, both the fault and consequence 
happen within the test unit. In case D, both the fault and consequence happen outside of the 
test unit and only deviations propagate through the test unit. To complete the test, all these 
four types are considered in the Model Test Bed and the test results show each of them 
whenever it happens. 
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        Figure 6. Four types of fault paths propagating through a test unit model 
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Model Test Result  
 
The results of model test are presented in four different formats so that the chemical engineer 
can consider the model from different points of view. Table 2, 3 , 4, 5 are different result 
presentations of  testing “centrifugal pump” model. 
 
Expected Results  
 
The test bed provides a display to show how the actual behaviour of the model differs from 
the intended behaviour, as specified by the engineer in the MBuilder. The expected results of 
the test runs on specified unit models are listed in the result table as a section listing the faults 
or consequences (“Expected Description”) in the model and the directly associated deviations 
(“Expected Keyword”).This is shown in left 3 columns of table 2 and 3. 
 
Deviation caused by Fault(s)  
 
As demonstrated in table 2, one section of the display shows a table of “Fault  Deviation” 
results, showing how initial faults can give rise to deviations which propagate to the OPCs 
and therefore elsewhere in the plant. This is compared with the expected faults and deviations, 
giving a status as “MATCH” if they are the same, “MISSING” if there is no actual fault found 
and “EXTRA” if an actual fault is found but it is not expected by the engineer. 
 
Deviation causes Consequence(s)  
 
As demonstrated in table 3, one section of the display shows a table of “Deviation  
Consequence” results, showing how deviations in the OPCs can cause consequences in the 
unit under test. This is compared with the expected deviations and consequences, giving a 
status as “MATCH” if they are the same, “MISSING” if there is no actual consequence found 
and “EXTRA” if there is actual consequence found but it is not expected by the engineer. 
 
Fault Path Propagation  
 
Table 4 demonstrates how a specific fault path propagates through a test unit model, its fault 
and consequence as well as deviation(s) along the path between the fault and consequence. 
 
Deviation Propagation  
 
The deviation propagation is demonstrated as a “Deviation Oriented” table. It checks 
deviations happened in each port and observes its effects on all other ports within a test unit 
model and gives fault that causes that deviation on that port as well as consequence(s) caused 
by it ultimately.  
 
Table 5 demonstrates part of the deviation propagation table of the “centrifugal pump” model. 
The whole table shows all the deviation effects propagating through each port of the test unit, 
from “more Composition C+” to “more Vapour V+”. For example, when fault “loss of drive” 
causes “reverse flow FR” at port “out”, it causes “reverse flow FR” at port “in”, and causes 
consequence “possible pump or seal damage”. “0” means there is no effect caused by the 
deviation “reverse flow FR” in port “drainOut”, “ignoreIn” and “ignoreOut” and “ventOut”.  
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Sign off status 
 
A facility has been provided for recording the test status of each model tested through time. 
User can sign off a model as acceptable after reviewing the test results or record that the 
results are not yet acceptable, this is a so called sign-off status that can be accompanied by a 
textual comment from the user. This is shown in figure 7. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Sign off status 
 
 
Further Improvement  
 
Although the current model test bed is sufficient to be used as a tool to verify the correctness 
of the models built by the engineer, further improvement can be made to enhance its usability 
and acceptability.  
 
• Run Time Conditions (RTC) 
 
Run Time Conditions (RTC) are tests based on fluid properties or details of the plant 
equipment, which are evaluated when HAZID is analysing the plant for hazards. For 
example, a consequence of “fire or explosion” may have an attached RTC to check that 
the fluid in the plant is flammable — if the RTC fails, this consequence will not be 
reported. 
 
The Model Test Bed should be able to test model with RTCs, so that users will know that 
the model performs correctly whether the RTC fails or succeeds.  
 
• Operating conditions for multiple Model Test 
      The operating conditions set mentioned early in the single model test will be considered at  
    Multiple Model Test.  
 
• Interface with external applications 
We have proven that exporting result to external application is feasible (eg. Excel). 
Further work will focus on building up an interface to implement this feature.   
 
• Graphic result display 
Displaying results graphically and animatedly will be explored as soon as possible as it 
will enhance the tool’s result interface greatly. 
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Summary  
 
This paper has given a description of the Model Test Bed, a tool used to verify the correctness 
of unit model built by the chemical engineer in HAZID. It briefly introduces HAZOP, HAZID 
and Unit Model Library to lead the significance of Model Test Bed. Then it illustrates the 
methodology used to build this tool and different ways of testing results presentation. Several 
figures and tables are used to help the illustration. Further developments are discussed and are 
now undertaking.  
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                                                 Fault Comparison Table 
 
Expected 
Descriptio
n 
Expected 
Port 
Expected 
Keyword 
Actual 
Description 
Actual 
Port 
Actual 
Keyword Status 
loss of 
drive  out  revFlow  loss of drive  out  revFlow  MATCH  
loss of 
drive  out  revFlow  loss of drive  out  revFlow  MATCH  
loss of 
drive  in  morePressure     
MISSING 
loss of 
drive  out  lessFlow     MISSING  
loss of 
drive  out  lessPressure     
MISSING 
switched on 
in error  in  lessPressure     MISSING  
switched on 
in error  in  lessPressure     MISSING  
switched on 
in error  out  morePressure     MISSING  
switched on 
in error  out  morePressure     MISSING  
switched on 
in error  out  moreTemp     MISSING  
switched on 
in error  out  moreTemp     MISSING  
   contamination from 
sheet connector  in  
contaminati
on  EXTRA  
   lessComposition 
from sheet 
connector  in  
lessCompos
ition  EXTRA  
   lessPressure from 
sheet connector and 
less flow  in  lessPressure  EXTRA  
   lessPressure from 
sheet connector and 
less flow  out  lessPressure  EXTRA  
  
                              Table 2 Fault comparison table 
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Consequence Comparison Table 
 
Expected 
Description 
Expected 
Port 
Expected 
Keyword 
Actual 
Description 
Actual  
Port 
Actual  
Keyword Status 
possible pump 
or seal 
damage  out  revFlow  
possible pump or 
seal damage  out  revFlow  MATCH  
possible pump 
or seal 
damage  out  revFlow  
possible pump or 
seal damage  out  revFlow  MATCH  
cavitation  in  moreGas     MISSING  
cavitation  in  moreVapour    MISSING  
churning  out  noFlow     MISSING  
dry running  in  noFlow     MISSING  
   cavitation  out  moreGas  EXTRA  
   cavitation  out  moreTemp  EXTRA  
   cavitation  out  moreVapour  EXTRA  
   churning  in  noFlow  EXTRA  
 
                                     Table 3 Consequence comparison table 
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                                                 Path Propagation Display 
 
 Fault      
Item  Descriptor  Probability Condition   
test_unit loss of drive 0 “use_is_not_standby”   
      
Deviations      
Item Port Keyword    
test_unit out revFlow    
test_unit in revFlow    
inopc_in out revFlow    
      
Conseque 
-nces 
     
Item  Descriptor Hazard Operability Ran Condition 
inopc_in Reverse flow  
and  
contamination 
to inlet 
sheet 
connector 
FALSE FALSE 5 not(fault_is_this(“re 
verseflow at inlet sheet  
connector”))||”fault_unit 
_is_not_this_one”) 
 
                            Table 4 Path Propagation Display 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
 Paper 1  
 
  
113 
                                                                                     UML Model Test Case Results_Dev Table 
Effects on other ports Consequence 
Path_id Deviation 
 
Affected 
_port Fault drainOut 
Ignore 
In 
Ignore 
Out in out 
Vent 
Out  
000000000
0-
000000688
8 C+ in 
propagated from 
connection 0 0 0 C+ C+ 0 propagated from unit 
000000000
0-
000000689
0 C- in 
propagated from 
connection 0 0 0 C- C- 0 propagated from unit 
000000000
0-
000000689
2 Cont+ in 
propagated from 
connection 0 0 0 Cont+ Cont+ 0 propagated from unit 
000000000
0-
000000679
2 F0 in 
propagated from 
connection 0 0 0 F0 F0 0 
dry running, propagated 
from unit 
000000000
0-
000000680
6 F0 out 
propagated from 
connection 0 0 0 F0 F0 0 
churning, propagated from 
unit 
000000000
0-
000000680
0 FR in 
propagated from 
connection 0 0 0 FR FR 0 
possible pump or seal 
damage, propagated from 
unit 
000000000
0-
000000680
4 FR out loss of drive 0 0 0 FR FR 0 
possible pump or seal 
damage, propagated from 
unit 
                          
Table 5. Deviation Oriented Table 
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APPENDIX B PAPER 2 
      A Computer Tool to Support Safe Isolation for Maintenance 
An, H., Chung, P.W.H., McDonald, J., and Madden, J., 2008. A Computer Tool to Support 
Safe Isolation for Maintenance. Proceedings of the 2nd World Conference on Safety of Oil 
and Gas Industry, Texas, USA, 28-29 Oct 2008, pp.406-415. 
 
Abstract 
 
Unsafe maintenance in process plant can cause release of dangerous materials, pipe-work 
failure and deviations from normal operations, etc (Hale, et al., 1998). It is reported that 30% 
of accidents are maintenance-related and 50% of them release harmful substances (Wallace & 
Merritt, 2003). Therefore, it is important that systematic hazard identification is carried out 
and precaution is taken before maintenance work commences.  
 
A computer-aided tool is developed as part of the HAZID system (a knowledge-based 
software system used to identify hazards by emulating conventional HAZOP study) to help 
the task of identifying hazards related to maintenance work. This tool focuses on safe 
isolation. It serves two functions. One is to suggest an isolation boundary for maintenance. 
Given specific equipment items to be maintained, the system will analyze the Process and 
Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) to identify the boundary that needs to be closed off for safe 
maintenance. The other function is to identify the potential hazards related to the isolation 
tasks. This paper describes in detail how this tool is developed and a case study is used to 
illustrate how it works.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The safety of hazardous processing plants is of paramount importance as an accident could 
cause major damage to properties and/or injury to people. Well-maintained equipment in the 
process plant can give smooth running of the plant and increase the plant productivity and life 
time. However, the maintenance work of process plant is often dangerous as it requires 
appropriate isolation of the equipment items being maintained. Any release of hazardous 
material can cause damage to the whole plant or even take human life. Therefore, a 
comprehensive identification of potential hazards caused by maintenance work is necessary 
before carrying out the actual maintenance work. 
 
This paper describes a computer-aided tool that considers the safety issues for maintenance 
work in the process plant. It serves two main functions, one is to define an isolation boundary, 
the other is to identify potential hazards related to the isolation task. The tool is newly 
developed and integrated with the HAZID system, a computer system that helps designers and 
operators of process plants to identify potential design and operation problems given a 
process plant design. 
 
The paper commences by describing the methodology for identifying the isolation boundary 
and how the algorithm is tested.  It then describes how HAZard and OPerability study 
(HAZOP) analysis is applied to identify hazards after the boundary is identified and selected. 
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The details of HAZOP study technique can be found at Crawley et al. (2000) and at Kletz 
(1999). The overall workflow of the tool is then given. The paper ends with a summary of the 
overall methodology. 
 
2. Identifying the isolation boundary 
When equipment items are to be maintained in a process plant, a process engineer will 
analyse the P&ID of that plant, and identify the valves that must be closed in order to isolate 
the equipment items so that they are safe to work on. For example, consider figure 1, if the 
centrifugal pump “P-0101A” is to be maintained, then 5 valves, “V015”, “V002”, “V014”, 
“V013” and “V001”, will need to be closed to isolate the pump. This process of identification 
and the analysis of the potential hazards caused by closing these valves are automated by a 
computer tool and is the subject of the rest of this paper.  
 
2.1 Introducing the plant file 
The plant file, which is a text file generated from the P&ID, describes the equipment items in 
the plant, which includes their connections, flow directions and other attributes. The plant file 
is used as input into the isolation tool. Each valve in the plant file has an attribute called 
“canBeIsolationValve”. This is used to indicate whether the valve can be in general used for 
isolation purpose. The value of the attribute is either “yes” or “no”.  
 
2.2 The tracing procedure 
The procedure for identifying the isolation boundary is to trace upstream and downstream 
from the equipment items to be maintained to find the valves which must be closed. During 
tracing, the tool will only look for the first valve that is isolable in each line branching out 
from the equipment items.  
 
When a Pressure Relief Valve (PRV) is met, the algorithm will compare the direction of the 
tracing and the opening direction of the PRV, if they are in the same direction, then the 
tracing procedure will carry on and the PRV will be identified as within the boundary but 
must be isolated, otherwise, the PRV will be identified as on the boundary and the tracing 
procedure at this branching line ends at this point. 
 
When searching from the equipment items to be maintained, if the propagation passes through 
a sheet connector onto another P&ID then it will continue on the next P&ID until an isolable 
valve is found.  If there is no continuation from the sheet connector, the sheet connector will 
be treated as being on the boundary and the user will be warned that an isolation point has not 
been found for that particular branch. The sheet connector ID or tag number and the pipe 
connected to the sheet connector will be identified in the warning. 
 
When multiple items are to be maintained, the same procedure will be applied to all the items. 
The valves that need to be isolated for all the items will be combined together and any 
duplicates are removed.  
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2.3 Testing 
 
Two plants, a hydrocarbon separation unit (Lawley, 1974) and Benzene (Wells and Seagrave, 
1976), are used to test the algorithm. The algorithm correctly identifies the isolation 
boundaries when given different maintenance items as input for the two plants. In order to 
help the user to visualize a boundary the isolation tool automatically highlights the valves to 
be closed on the Smart Plant P&ID CAD system. Figure 1 shows the output for isolating 
pump “P-0101A” for the hydrocarbon separation unit. All the isolable valves are highlighted 
in red. The item to be maintained, “P-0101A”, is highlighted in bright blue.  
 
 
 
   Figure 1. The highlighted isolation boundary for maintaining centrifugal pump “P-0101A” 
   
A more sophisticated example is to maintain the liquid-liquid-gas separator in the 
hydrocarbon separation unit plant. Figure 2 shows a table of equipment items on the boundary 
with their current status and related notes. The tool also displays a table with all the items 
within the boundary. Figure 3 shows these items highlighted in Smart Plant P&ID. This 
example shows that several different types of equipment items are on the boundary. The first 
type is the “must be closed” valve, such as “V028”, “V025”,”V021”, “V022”, “V007”, which 
are highlighted in Smart Plant P&ID drawing in red.  The second type is “Pressure Relief 
Valve (PRV)”, such as “PRV002PRV”, “PRV001PRV”. The third type is the “Off-Page-
Connector (OPC)”. The second and third types are highlighted in Smart Plant P&ID drawing 
in purple.  The items to be maintained are highlighted in bright blue. 
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Figure 2. Items on the isolation boundary for maintaining separator “T-0100” 
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Figure 3. The highlighted isolation boundary for maintaining separator “T-0100” 
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3. Identifying hazard after the isolation boundary is defined 
Once the boundary is identified a HAZOP analysis has to be carried out to identify the 
hazards related to the isolation procedure. HAZID, a knowledge-based system which 
automates the process of HAZOP studies, is used for this purpose. HAZID system is 
developed by Hazid Technologies Ltd. and is currently the most advanced commercially 
available knowledge-based HAZOP tool. (Hazid Technology. Ltd, 2007). The development of 
HAZID is given by Rushton et al. (1998) and by McCoy et al. (1999a, 1999b, 1999c). There 
are other HAZOP automation systems for research purpose that can be found at Bartolozzi et 
al. (2000) and at Vaidhyanathan and  Venkatasubramanian (1995). 
 
After the items on the boundary are identified, the user is asked to review the items and 
specify the order in which they should be closed. Consider the example shown in figure 1, if 
the first item selected to be closed is “V001” then a HAZOP analysis is carried out by 
applying the deviation 'no flow' to V001. This is done by the isolation tool by invoking 
HAZID to carry out an analysis to identify the hazards that might be introduced by this 
deviation. If hazards are identified then they are reported. If no hazard is identified then the 
tool will go on to consider the deviation 'no flow' for the second boundary item to be closed 
(e.g. “V002”) and with “V001” being closed. This process goes on until the closing of all the 
valves on the boundary have been considered. In this way, there will be many HAZOP results 
as the valves are being closed in sequence. The HAZOP analysis carried out in HAZID are 
produced quickly and the successive analysis occupy little user time. Table 1 illustrates this 
hazard identification process. Presentation of the results is shown in HMeeting, a tool to view 
HAZOP analysis results in HAZID. The presentation of the results will highlight the 
differences of the results, so that the engineer can focus on the hazards that might happen by 
closing a valve.  
 
 
Conditions Actions Result 
“no flow” passing through 
V001 (this should be the 
original HAZOP result 
with only “no flow” being 
considered) 
Doing HAZOP analysis HAZOP result 1 
“no flow” passing through 
V002 + V001 closed 
Doing HAZOP analysis HAZOP result 2 
“no flow” passing through 
V003 + V002 closed 
+V001 closed  
Doing HAZOP analysis HAZOP result 3 
............................ ………………….. …………………. 
“no flow” passing through 
VN + VN-1
 
closed + VN-2
 
closed …+V001 closed  
Doing HAZOP analysis HAZOP result N 
 
Table 1. The hazard identification process 
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4. The Overall Workflow 
Figure 4 shows the overall workflow of the isolation tool. It starts with loading the original 
plant file as input, and then a list of frames is generated in which each frame describes the 
information of an equipment item. After allowing the user to specify the item to be 
maintained, the tool will run its algorithm to look for the items including valves, OPCs 
without continuations, and PRVs in the isolation boundary and then display them. Then it will 
move onto the second stage which is to identify the hazards after the boundary is defined.  It 
starts by allowing the user to specify the sequence for closing the valves on the boundary. 
Then it generates a series of input files for HAZID with each valve is closed in each stage of 
the sequence as described in table1. HAZID is then called to do a HAZOP analysis with only 
“no flow” being considered for each input file. The results are then automatically compared 
and any differences are highlighted to show any hazards related to closing any of the valves.  
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              Figure 4. Working flow of the Isolation Tool 
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5. Further development 
Although the current tool is sufficient to carry out hazard identification before commencing 
the real maintenance tasks, further improvement is ongoing to enhance its usability and 
acceptability, for example, it is being considered to extend the current tool to do a 
maintenance analysis by keeping the history of maintenance activity, setting a time condition 
when multiple items are to be maintained, etc. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Carrying out maintenance safely is of paramount importance to avoid releasing hazardous 
material into the atmosphere and to prevent maintenance related accidents. A thorough hazard 
analysis ahead of the actual work is more likely to give a successful and safe maintenance 
implementation.  
 
Although process plant P&IDs are already available electronically for process engineers to 
identify potential hazards, no computer-aided tool was used to help with defining an isolation 
boundary for the maintenance work and calling the hazard identification analysis 
automatically from the maintenance safety point of view.  
 
This paper describes a novel computer-aided tool to help with safe isolation for maintenance 
work. In order to define the isolation boundary, the tool searches upstream and downstream of 
the item to be maintained to find the isolable valves which must be closed . After the 
boundary is defined, HAZOP analysis with deviation “no flow” is applied to identify hazards 
that may happen when the valves are closed in a specified order.  
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APPENDIX C PAPER 3 
Automated Cause-Effect Analysis for Process Plants 
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Abstract 
 
Cause-effect analysis for process plants is one of the tasks associated with Process Control Engineering (PCE). 
With the availability of electronic Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs), a computer-aided tool is 
developed to carry out the analysis automatically by encoding knowledge related to PCE in rules so that they can 
be applied to a given set of P&IDs to produce the corresponding cause-effect diagrams. This paper describes 
how this is achieved. A rule-based system and an instrument checker are developed. They are used to generate 
the results and the results are displayed in a format that complies with ISO 10418 (ISO, 2003). 
1. Introduction 
Safety Analysis Function Evaluation chart (SAFE), or cause-effect table, is one of the established cause and 
effect analysis techniques stated in ISO 10418 (ISO, 2003) that can be applied to identify unfavourable safety-
related outcome and the design of protective measures. A computer-aided tool that can produce the cause-
effect analysis result automatically is developed and integrated with Intergraph’s Engineering Enterprise Suite 
through Smart Plant Process Safety (SPPS). SPPS is a knowledge-based system that automates the process of 
HAZard and Operability study (HAZOP). It is developed by Hazid Technologies Ltd , UK. The cause-effect 
tool consists of an Instrument Checker, a general purpose knowledge-based rule engine and a tool that outputs 
the results for displaying using Microsoft Excel. The layout of the table complies with ISO 10418 (ISO, 2003).   
 
This paper describes the above components of the system. An example is used to illustrate the working of the 
system and a comparison between results of this tool and that of the tool described by Drath et al. (2006) is given. 
2. Instrument Checker 
Given a P&ID, the Instrument Checker is a tool that identifies the instrument loops and their connections with 
the process items. The output of this tool is used as input to the rule-based system. 
 
The tool first identifies all the instruments in the process plant. For each instrument, it traces the upstream and 
downstream connections of each branch line until a process item is found. Given a process item, a list of 
instruments that are connected to it is kept. Similarly, given an instrument, a list of process items that are 
connected to it is kept. 
 
Consider the P&ID shown in figure 1, which is a very small part taken from a much larger plant. The following 
instruments are identified: 
• two high level alarms – “ZEH-59010” and “ZLH-59010”; 
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• two low level alarms –  “ZEL-59010” and “ZLL-59010”; 
• one control valve – “FCV-59010”. 
 
 
Figure 1. A simple instrument loop 
Figure 2 shows the instruments, their connections with process items, related deviations and responses. Figure 3 
shows all the instruments in the loop are attached to the same process item “test1001PU34-PU”. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Instrument List 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Process Item List 
 
3. Rule-based System 
A rule-based system is built to analyse process events and the corresponding process responses. CLIPS (C 
Language Integrated Production System) is chosen as the development tool as it supports rule-based, object-
oriented and procedure programming methods (Riley, 2008). A rule-based system in CLIPS consists of three 
components: a set of facts, a set of rules and the inference engine that controls the overall execution by matching 
the rules against the facts to infer new information (Giarratano & Riley, 1994). 
 
3.1 Facts about process items, instruments and connectivity 
 
The output from the Instrument Check is converted into CLIPS facts as input for the rule-based system. Here are 
some example facts: 
 
(equipment pipe test1001PU34-PU 1-in-2-out) 
(device high-level-alarm ZEH-59010) 
(flow-connection FCV-59010 out test1001PU34-PU) 
(signal-connection ZEH-59010 FCV-59010) 
 
FCV-59010 
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The first fact states that “test1001PU34-PU” is a “1-in-2-out” pipe of the class “equipment”. The second fact 
states that “ZEH-59010” is a high level alarm of the class “device”. The third fact states that the out flow of 
“FCV-59010” is connected to “test1001PU34-PU”. The fourth fact states that there is a signal connection 
between the high level alarm “ZEH-59010” and the control valve “FCV-59010”. 
 
3.2 The reasoning rules 
 
The reasoning rules are extracted from ISO 10418 (ISO, 2003). The following is an example rule and the rule is 
coded in CLIPS format in the system. 
 
IF 
there is a level indicator or a high level alarm 
AND 
there is a vessel 
AND 
there is a control device which is either a control valve or a control pump 
AND 
the control device is connected to the vessel 
AND 
there is a signal connection between the level indicator or alarm to the control device or the vessel 
THEN 
conclude that  the control device will be triggered when the level of the vessel reaches a pre-defined high level. 
 
3.3 The reasoning process 
 
A rule is activated when all the conditions specified are satisfied by the facts contained in the system.  When a 
rule is fired the action(s) specified will be taken. Normally the action is to call a function to write some output in 
the result file in XML format. Part of the output is shown in figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Output in XML format. 
4. Displaying the Cause-Effect Result table 
After the rule-based system in CLIPS engine has generated the results in the XML format a parser is called to 
parse the XML result and convert it into a Comma-Separated Values (CSV) text file. An engineer can open the 
CSV file with Excel, and the cause-effect table will be presented in the format specified in ISO 10418 (ISO, 
2003). 
 
Part of the Cause-Effect table is shown in figure 5. A cross is placed in a cell to indicate the cause and effect link 
between a process component, sensor instrument and control device. Figure 5 shows that process component 
“test1001PU34-PU” has four instrument devices attached to it (“ZEH-59010”, “ZLH-59010”, “ZEL-59010”, 
“ZLL-59010”). If the high level alarm “ZEH-59010” or “ZLH-59010” goes off then the input control valve 
“FCV-59010” will be closed. If the low level alarm “ZEL-59010” or “ZLL-59010” goes off then the input 
control valve “FCV-59010” will be open. 
 
<cause_effect> 
<cause_comment processItemTag='test1001PU34-PU'>Primary-Piping high level</cause_comment> 
<cause instrumentTag='ZEH-59010'>level alarm high</cause> 
<effect controlInstrumentTag='FCV-59010'>close input control device></effect> 
</cause_effect> 
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Figure 5 Part of the result table 
5. Comparison with related work  
The knowledge-based system reported in Drath et al. (2006) is also designed and implemented to automate the 
generation of Cause-Effect Table. Their paper uses an interlock example to illustrate their work. In order to carry 
out a comparison, the authors have produced and extended a P&ID from their example and applied the cause 
effect analysis tool reported here to that plant. The result is shown in figure 6. 
Comparing with the result reported in Drath et al. (2006), the result produced by our system has two additional 
features:  
• The result table provides a comprehensive list of process components and their attached devices. The user 
also has the option of viewing only components that have cause and effect links that apply to them. 
• The table provides more detailed classification of function performed.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Cause-Effect Table in Excel for an extended P&ID based on Drath et al. (2006) 
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6. Conclusion 
Carrying out safety analysis is important to prevent accidents and help in the design of control and protective 
systems for process plants. Control and sensor devices and their related control actions can be presented in a 
SAFT chart to help with the analysis process. A SAFT chart is also called a cause-effect table as it reflects 
information about process events and their corresponding safe guards. 
 
An automated cause-effect analysis system is introduced in this paper. Its components, working principles and 
data processing methods are described. The system consists of an Instrument Checker which prepares the data 
for analysis by identifying all the instruments and their attached process items. A general purpose rule engine is 
used to build the knowledge-based system. The output from the rule engine is converted into cause-effect table 
in Excel and the layout of the table is compatible with ISO 10418 (ISO, 2003). 
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APPENDIX D PAPER 4 
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maintenance and Cause-Effect analysis for assessing safeguards 
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of isolation boundary for safe maintenance and Cause-Effect analysis for assessing safeguards. 
Int. J. Process Systems Engineering, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.29–45. 
 
Abstract: Systematic hazard identification is required before maintenance work commences as unsafe 
maintenance in process plant can cause release of dangerous materials, pipe-work failure and 
deviations from normal operations, etc (Hale, et al., 1998). Cause and effect analysis is also required 
to identify unfavourable safety-related outcome and for the design of protective measures. 
 
With the availability of electronic Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs), two computer-aided 
tools are developed as part of the Smart Plant Process Safety (SPPS) system. One is to help the task of 
identifying hazards related to maintenance work and the other is to carry out cause and effect analysis 
automatically. 
 
This paper highlights the main functions of these two tools and describes how they are developed. It 
also illustrates how the cause effect analysis tool can be used to support the hazard identification 
before carrying out the maintenance work. 
 
Keywords: Process systems engineering; process control engineering; maintenance safety; safe 
isolation; cause and effect analysis; safety analysis function evaluation chart; hazard identification; 
hazard and operability study.  
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1. Introduction 
The safety of hazardous processing plants is of paramount importance. An accident could cause major 
damage to properties and/or injury to people. Well-maintained equipment in the process plant can give 
smooth running of the plant and increase the plant productivity and lifetime. However, the 
maintenance work of a process plant can be dangerous if proper isolation of the equipment items being 
maintained is not carried out beforehand. Therefore, a comprehensive identification of potential 
hazards is necessary before carrying out the actual maintenance work. 
 
Safety analysis of the control design of a process plant is another hazard identification application. 
Safety Analysis Function Evaluation chart (SAFE) is one of the established cause and effect analysis 
techniques stated in ISO 10418 (ISO, 2003). The SAFE chart is also referred to as cause-effect table as 
it provides information about process events and control responses. 
 
Manual generation of a cause-effect table of a process plant is labour intensive, time consuming, 
repetitive and error-prone. With P&IDs available in electronic format there is the potential of 
developing a computer-aided tool that can analyse the P&ID information and produce the cause-effect 
table automatically. 
 
Two novel computer-aided tools are developed as a joint project between Hazid Technologies Ltd. and 
Loughborough University. The first serves two main functions related to isolation for maintenance: 
identifies the isolation boundary, and identifies the potential hazards related to the isolation task. The 
other is a cause-effect analysis tool that automates the generation of cause-effect tables. Both of these 
tools are integrated with Intergraph’s Engineering Enterprise Suite through the SmartPlant Process 
Safety (SPPS) system (Hazid Technology. Ltd, 2008). SPPS is a knowledge-based system that 
automates the process of HAZOP study. The development of SPPS is given in Rushton et al. (1998) 
and McCoy et al. (1999a, 1999b, 1999c). 
 
This paper describes these two tools in detail. Case studies are also used to illustrate the working of 
these systems. Finally, it describes how these two tools can be used in conjunction to help with the 
identification of hazards for the item(s) to be maintained. 
 
2. A Computer Tool to Support Safe Isolation for Maintenance 
It is reported that 30% of accidents are maintenance-related and 50% of them release harmful 
substances (Wallace & Merritt, 2003). A thorough hazard analysis ahead of the actual work is more 
likely to give a successful and safe maintenance implementation.  
 
Although process plant P&IDs are already available electronically for process engineers, little 
attention has been given to the development of computer-aided tool to help with defining an isolation 
boundary for maintenance work and identifying automatically hazards related to the isolation and 
maintenance tasks.  
 
A novel computer-aided tool that considers the safety issues for maintenance work is described in this 
section. Section 2.1 and 2.2 describes the methodology for identifying the isolation boundary and 
demonstrates how the algorithm is tested by applying two case studies.  Section 2.3 illustrates how 
HAZOP analysis is applied to identify hazards after the boundary is identified and selected. The 
details of HAZOP study technique can be found in Crawley et al. (2000) and in Kletz (1999).  Section 
2.4 gives the overall workflow of the tool. 
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2.1 Identify the Isolation Boundary 
 
When equipment items are to be maintained in a process plant, a process engineer has to analyse the 
P&ID of that plant, and identify the valves that must be closed in order to isolate the equipment items 
that are to be maintained. Consider figure1, if pump “P-0101A” is to be maintained then 5 valves, 
“V015”, “V002”, “V014”, “V013” and “V001”, will need to be closed to isolate the pump.  
 
The plant file, as mentioned before, is a text file generated automatically from the P&ID. It describes 
the equipment items in the plant, which includes their connections, flow directions and other attributes. 
It is used as input into the isolation tool. The procedure for identifying an isolation boundary is to trace 
upstream and downstream from the equipment items to be maintained to find the valves that must be 
closed. During tracing, the tool will only look for the first valve that is isolable in each line branching 
out from the equipment items.  
 
When a Pressure Relief Valve (PRV) is met, the algorithm will compare the direction of the trace and 
the opening direction of the PRV, if they are in the same direction, then the tracing procedure will 
carry on and the PRV will be identified as within the boundary but must be isolated, otherwise, the 
PRV will be identified as on the boundary and the tracing procedure at this branching line ends at this 
point. 
 
When searching from the equipment items to be maintained, if the propagation passes through a sheet 
connector onto another P&ID then it will continue on the next P&ID until an isolable valve is found.  
If there is no continuation from the sheet connector, the sheet connector will be treated as being on the 
boundary and the user will be warned that an isolation point has not been found for that particular 
branch. The sheet connector ID such as tag number will be identified in the warning. 
 
When multiple items are to be maintained, the same procedure is applied to all the items. The valves 
that need to be isolated for all the items are combined together and any duplicates removed. 
 
2.2 Case Studies 
 
Two plants, a hydrocarbon separation unit (Lawley, 1974) and a benzene plant (Wells & Seagrave, 
1976), have been used to test the system. When given different maintenance items as input for the two 
plants the tool correctly identifies the isolation boundaries. 
 
Figure 1 shows the output for isolating pump “P-0101A” for the hydrocarbon separation unit. All the 
valves that need to be closed are highlighted in red. The item to be maintained, “P-0101A”, is 
highlighted in bright blue.  
 
Another example is to maintain the liquid-liquid-gas separator in a hydrocarbon separation plant. 
Figure 2 shows a table of equipment items on the boundary with their current states and related notes. 
The tool also displays a table with all the items within the boundary. Figure 3 shows these items 
highlighted in Smart Plant P&ID. This example shows that several different types of equipment items 
are on the boundary. The first type is the “must be closed” valve, such as “V028”, “V025”, “V021”, 
“V022”, “V007”, which are highlighted in Smart Plant P&ID drawing in red.  The second type is 
Pressure Relief Valve (PRV), such as “PRV002PRV”, “PRV001PRV”. The third type is the Off-Page 
-Connector (OPC). The second and third types are highlighted in Smart Plant P&ID drawing in purple.  
The items to be maintained are highlighted in bright blue. 
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2.3 Identifying Hazard Associated with Isolating the Identified Boundary 
 
Once the boundary is identified, a HAZOP analysis has to be carried out to identify the hazards related 
to the isolation procedure. As mentioned, SPPS, a knowledge-based system which automates the 
process of HAZOP studies, is used for this purpose. The SPPS system is developed by Hazid 
Technologies Ltd. and is currently the most advanced commercially available knowledge-based 
HAZOP tool. (Hazid Technology. Ltd, 2008).  
 
After the items on the boundary are identified, the user is asked to review the items and specify the 
order in which they should be closed. Consider the example shown in figure 1, if the first item selected 
to be closed is “V001” then a HAZOP analysis is carried out by SPPS by applying the deviation 'no 
flow' to V001, i.e. the effect of closing the valve. Any hazards identified are reported. If no hazard is 
identified then the tool will go on to consider the deviation 'no flow' for the next boundary item to be 
closed, with “V001” being closed. This process goes on until the closing of all the valves on the 
boundary have been considered. Table 1 illustrates this hazard identification process. The HAZOP 
analysis carried out by SPPS are very quick and the user does not have to wait long for the results. The 
presentation of the results will highlight the differences after each valve has been closed so that the 
engineer can focus on the hazards that might occur due to the closing of the valve. 
 
2.4 The Overall Workflow 
 
Figure 4 shows the overall workflow of the Isolation Tool. It starts with loading the original plant file 
as input. After allowing the user to specify the item(s) to be maintained, the tool will run its algorithm 
to look for the items – including valves, OPCs without continuations, and PRVs – on the isolation 
boundary and then display them. The second stage is to identify the hazards after the boundary is 
defined.  It allows the user to specify the sequence for closing the valves on the boundary. The tool 
then generates a series of input files for SPPS with each valve is closed in each step of the sequence. 
SPPS is then called to do a HAZOP analysis with only “no flow” being considered for each input file. 
The results are then automatically compared and any differences are highlighted to show any hazards 
related to closing any of the valves. 
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3. Automated Cause-Effect Analysis 
Control and sensor devices and their protective functions can be presented in a SAFE chart for the 
purpose of safety analysis. SAFT chart is also called cause-effect Table. 
 
There are existing commercial tools that provide interfaces for filling in cause-effect tables, but they 
do not provide any knowledge-base help. With P&IDs available electronically, automatic generation 
of cause-effect tables is being investigated so as to ease the labour-intensive analysis process. Drath et 
al. (2006) describes a research prototype that generates cause-effect tables automatically by applying a 
rule-base to plants that are described in a standard format called Computer Aided Engineering 
eXchange (CAEX). 
 
This section gives details of another automatic cause-effect analysis system which takes the same 
input as the isolation tool described in the previous section. Section 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 describe the 
components and the reasoning process of the cause-effect system in detail. Two case studies are used 
to illustrate the working of the system. The first is a very small part of a P&ID of a much larger plant 
just to illustrate the working of the system. The second is the interlock system described in Drath et al. 
(2006). Section 3.4 shows the result table. Section 3.5 compares the system and results described by 
Drath et al. (2006) with the current system. 
 
3.1 Components of the Cause-Effect System 
The cause-effect system consists of an Instrument Checker, a general purpose knowledge-based rule 
engine and an output tool that generates the cause-effect table that can be easily displayed in Microsoft 
Excel. Output from Instrument Checker is converted into input for the rule engine. Output from the 
rule engine is converted into cause-effect tables in a format complies with 10418 (ISO 2003). The 
working flow of the overall cause-effect system is shown in figure 5. 
 
3.2 Instrument Checker 
Given a P&ID, the Instrument Checker is a tool that identifies the instrument loops and their 
connections with the process items.  
 
The tool first identifies all the instruments in the process plant. For each instrument, it traces the 
upstream and downstream connections of each branch line until a process item is found. Therefore, 
information about which process items are connected to which instruments is collected. Given a 
process item the Instrument Checker lists which instruments are connected to it. On the other hand, 
given an instrument it will also list which process items are connected it. 
 
Consider the P&ID shown in figure 6, which is a small part taken from a much larger plant. The tool 
identifies the following instruments: 
 
• two high level alarms – ZEH-59010 and ZLH-59010; 
• two low level alarms – ZEL-59010 and ZLL-59010; 
• one control valve – FCV-59010. 
 
The tool then traces upstream and downstream to find the process item(s) that are attached to these 
instruments. The result is shown in figure 7. In this case they are all connected to the same pipe with 
tag “test1001PU34-PU”. The loop number “59010” indicates that they are all in the same instrument 
loop. The responses to the deviations are also shown – “L+” means “high level”, “L-” means “low 
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level”, “L0” means “no level”. Figure 8 shows process item “test1001PU34-PU” is connected to 
instruments “ZEH-59010”, “ZLH-59010”, “ZEL-59010”, and “ZLL-59010”. 
3.3 Rule-Based Expert System 
A rule-based system, which captures expert knowledge, is built and used to analyse the process events 
and the corresponding process responses. CLIPS (C Language Integrated Production System) is 
chosen as the development tool. It is a powerful hybrid tool that supports rule-based, object-oriented 
and procedural programming (Giarratano & Riley 1994; Riley, 2008). A rule-based system in CLIPS 
consists of three basic components: a set of facts, a set of rules and the CLIPS inference engine that 
controls the overall execution by matching the rules against the facts to infer new information. 
3.3.1 Converting information about process and instrumentation items into CLIPS facts 
As the inference engine requires the information about the process and instrumentation items to be in 
CLIPS format, the tool takes the output of Instrument Checker and converts it to the required format. 
For example, ZEH-59010 is a high level alarm and is represented as: 
 
(device high-level-alarm ZEH-59010) 
 
The out flow of pipe test1001PU34-PU is connected to test1001PU34-P_4 and is represented as: 
 
(flow-connection test1001PU34-PU out test1001PU34-P_4) 
 
If there is a flow connection from “A” to “B”, and there is a flow connection from “B” to “C”, then the 
system will automatically infer that “A” and “C” are in the same line and a new fact like the following 
is asserted into the system:  
 
(in-line A to C) 
 
Signal connections are treated in a similar way. 
 
3.3.2 Developing the reasoning rules 
The reasoning rules are extracted from ISO 10418 (ISO, 2003). The following is an example rule. 
 
IF 
there is a level indicator or a high level alarm 
AND 
there is a vessel 
AND 
there is a control valve or a control pump 
AND 
the control device is connected to the vessel 
AND 
there is a signal connection between the level indicator or alarm to the control device and the vessel 
THEN 
conclude that  the control device will be triggered when the level of the vessel reaches a high level. 
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The rule in CLIPS format is shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.3 The reasoning process 
A rule is activated when all the conditions specified are satisfied by the facts contained in the system.  
When a rule is fired the action(s) specified will be taken. Normally the action is to call a function to 
write some output in the result file in XML format. Part of the output is shown below. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
3.4 Generating the Cause-Effect Result Table 
After the rule-based system in CLIPS has generated the results in the XML format, a parser is called to 
parse the XML result and convert it into a Comma-Separated Values (CSV) text file. An engineer can 
open the CSV file with Excel, and the cause-effect table will be presented in the format specified in 
ISO 10418 (ISO, 2003). 
 
Part of the cause-effect table is shown in figure 9. A cross is placed in a cell to indicate the cause and 
effect link between a process component, sensor instrument and control device. Figure 9 shows that 
process component “test1001PU34-PU” has four instrument devices attached to it – “ZEH-59010”, 
“ZLH-59010”, “ZEL-59010” and “ZLL-59010”. If the high level alarm “ZEH-59010” or “ZLH-
59010” goes off then the input control valve “FCV-59010” will be closed. If the low level alarm 
“ZEL-59010” or “ZLL-59010” goes off then the input control valve “FCV-59010” will be opened. 
 
3.5 Comparison with Related Work 
The knowledge-based system reported in Drath et al. (2006) is also designed and implemented to 
automate the generation of Cause-Effect Table. Their paper uses an interlock example to illustrate 
their work. In order to carry out a comparison, the authors have produced and extended a P&ID from 
their example and applied the cause effect analysis tool reported here to that example.  
 
The P&ID is shown in figure 10. “B-1340” and “B-1347” are two level vessels called “Blanketed 
Fixed Roof”; “V-001” and “V-002” are two input control valves for “B-1340”; “V-003” is an output 
control valve for “B-1340” and an input control valve for “B-1347”; “V-004” is an input control valve 
for “B-1347”; “V-005” is an output control valve for “B-1347”. “LIS-201” and “LIS-202” are level 
sensors for “B-1340” and “B-1347” respectively. 
 
(defrule levelVessel-highLevel-close-inputValve   
   (device level-indicator | high-level-alarm ?HLA) 
   (equipment vessel  ?VESSEL-TAG ?VESSEL-NAME) 
   (equipment controlDevice | controlDevicePump ?INPUT-CONTROL-DEVICE-TAG ?INPUT-CONTROL-
DEVICE-NAME)  
   (in-line ?INPUT-CONTROL-DEVICE-TAG to ?VESSEL-TAG)     
   (or(signal-connection ?HLA ?VESSEL-TAG) 
      (signal-connection ?HLA ?INPUT-CONTROL-DEVICE-TAG)) 
=> 
(print-result-levelAlarmHigh ?VESSEL-TAG ?VESSEL-NAME ?HLA ?INPUT-CONTROL-DEVICE-
TAG ?INPUT-CONTROL-DEVICE-NAME))  
<cause_effect> 
<cause_comment processItemTag='test1001PU34-PU'>Primary-Piping high level</cause_comment> 
<cause instrumentTag='ZEH-59010'>level alarm high</cause> 
<effect controlInstrumentTag='FCV-59010'>close input control device></effect> 
</cause_effect> 
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Cause and effect analysis rules that are applicable to this plant can be simply stated: 
 
IF 
the level in a vessel has reached its maximum 
THEN 
close its input device. 
 
IF 
the level in a vessel has reached its minimum 
THEN 
close its output device. 
 
IF 
a valve is closed 
THEN 
stop the in-line control pump to protect the pump. 
 
IF 
a pump is started 
THEN 
ensure the in-line valve is opened to protect the pump. 
 
IF 
an error occurred with a level sensor for a vessel 
THEN 
close the input and output control valves for that vessel. 
 
The result of the analysis is shown in figure 11. Comparing with the result reported in Drath et al. 
(2006), the result reported here has two additional features: 
 
• The result table provides a comprehensive list of process components and their attached devices. 
   The user has the option of viewing only components that have cause and effect links that apply to 
    them. 
 
• The table provides more detailed classification of function performed. For example, “V-003” is an 
   output control valve for “B-1340” and an input control valve for “B-1347”. Therefore, any cause- 
   effect control that applies to “V-003” is appropriately linked to both vessels. 
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4. Applying cause and effect analysis to the item to be maintained 
The above sections have introduced the isolation for maintenance and cause-effect analysis tools in 
some details. This section shows how the two tools can be used together for the purpose of safe 
maintenance. 
 
Take the sample plant shown in figure 6, the aim is to maintain the pipe “test1001PU34-PU”. The 
isolation tool is used to identify the isolation boundary. Figure 12 and 13 show the result. Figure 12 
highlights 9 valves in red color that must be closed in order to maintain this pipe. Figure 13 shows the 
items on the boundary including the OPCs without continuation and items within the isolation 
boundary.  
 
Figure 14 shows the cause effect analysis for maintaining pipe test1001PU34-PU. In this analysis table, 
“test1001PU34-PU_24”, “test1001PU34-PU_31”, “test1001PU34-PU_32”, “test1001PU34-PU_5” 
and “test1001PU34-PU_7” are different parts of pipe “test1001PU34-PU”. If isolating the pipe for 
maintenance causes any of the following alarms to go off then the control valve “FCV-59010” must be 
open: “ZEL-59010”, “ZLL-59010”, “FQ-59010”, “FAL-59010”, “FI-59010”, “PI-59010” or “PAL-
59010”. On the other hand if the high level alarm “ZEH-59010” or “ZLH-59010” goes off then the 
input control valve “FCV-59010” must be closed. 
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5. Conclusion 
Identification of potential hazards that might be caused by maintenance work is a very important task. 
Given a P&ID, engineers have to define the isolation boundary manually. The computer-aided tool 
described in this paper simplifies this task. When the item to be maintained is specified, the tool 
automatically traces upstream and downstream to find the isolable valves and highlight them in 
SmartPlant P&ID. After the isolation boundary is defined, the task of hazard identification is done by 
carrying out a sequence of HAZOP analysis using SPPS to consider the consequences of closing the 
valves. 
  
The casue and effect analysis tool incorporates an Instrument Checker and a rule-based system. Given 
a set of P&IDs the tool can carry out the analysis automatically and produce the corresponding cause-
effect diagrams. There is a potential to expand the reasoning rules to carry out configuration checks 
for process plants. 
 
Both the isolation tool and cause effect analysis tool make use of electronic P&IDs that are 
increasingly being made available by CAD systems thus extending intelligent CAD applications in the 
area of process safety. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The highlighted isolation boundary for maintaining centrifugal pump “P0101A” 
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Figure 2. Items on the isolation boundary for maintaining separator “T0100” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The highlighted isolation boundary for maintaining separator “T-0100” 
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Conditions Actions Result 
“no flow” passing through V001 
(this should be the original 
HAZOP result with only “no 
flow” being considered) 
Doing HAZOP analysis HAZOP result1 
“no flow” passing through V002 + 
V001 closed 
Doing HAZOP analysis HAZOP result2 
............................ ………………….. …………………. 
“no flow” passing through VN + 
VN-1 closed + VN-2 closed …+V001 
closed  
Doing HAZOP analysis HAZOP result n 
 
Table 1. The hazard identification process 
 
               
Figure 4. Workflow of the Isolation Tool 
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Figure 5. Workflow for Cause-Effect Analysis 
 
 
 
Figure 6. A simple instrument loop 
 
 
FCV-59010 
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Figure 7. Instrument List 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Process Item List 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Part of the Cause-Effect Table in Excel 
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Figure 10. P&ID example extended from Drath et al. (2006) 
 
 
Figure 11. Cause-Effect Table in Excel for P&ID example extended from Drath et al. (2006).  
 
 
B-1340 
B-1347 
V-001 V-002 
V-003 V-004 
V-005 
P-001 
P-002 
LIS-201 
LIS-202 
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Figure 12. The highlighted isolation boundary for maintaining primary pipe “test1001PU34-PU” 
 
 
Figure 13. Items on and within the isolation boundary for maintaining primary pipe “test1001PU34-PU” 
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Figure 14. Cause Effect Analysis for the item to be maintained 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Modelling is all about knowledge representation, knowledge organization and knowledge 
application, which deals with the information and behaviour of the object to be modelled, and 
the reasoning strategy that determines how the model is going to be applied. 
The aim of this literature review is to present and analyse the current development and 
technology used in modelling. While focusing on qualitative modelling in hazard 
identification used in HAZard and OPerability (HAZOP) study in the chemical engineering 
domain, it also reviews modelling in other domains which may be relevant. The purpose is to 
adapt good ideas or concepts from other modelling methodology to enhance the modelling 
power used in automation of HAZOP study.  
Inference engine in a conventional expert system uses a set of if-then-else rules in the 
knowledge base to mimic the reasoning strategy that a human expert would use. This 
approach causes a problem that is when encountering new conditions, no rules were set up to 
deal with it because this reasoning does not have a fundamental understanding of the physical 
system and its activities. So a reasoning approach is demanded to build up models that can 
provide representation of the information of the physical system and can simulate the 
behaviours of the physical system as exactly how it works. Two reasoning approaches are 
proposed, they are quantitative and qualitative reasoning. However, quantitative reasoning 
requires precise numerical values for each attribute/variable of the physical system to be 
modelled. This makes the modelling very complex because large volume of unnecessary 
values has to be obtained. To model a physical system easier and effective, a reasoning 
approach which is able to capture the causal structure of the system in a more profound way 
than the conventional expert system but not as rigid as that required in the quantitative 
reasoning is needed. This leads to the development of the qualitative modelling 
(Venkatasubramanian et al. 2003b).     
Research in modelling can provide more accurate and complete understanding of modelling 
strategy, and may lead to innovative development in the modelling field. A review of 
modelling and modelling tools is necessary to get basic understanding of what have been done 
in this field and how they have been achieved. Although quantitative modelling is inevitably 
mentioned, this review is concentrating on qualitative modelling technologies. This is because 
HAZOP analysis is primarily based on qualitative reasoning rather than quantitative reasoning. 
The modelling approach used to automate HAZOP study is essentially qualitative.  
While the review focuses on recent publications, three publications are dated back in the 
1990s (Chung 1993, Palmer & Chung 1997, Vaidhyanathan & Venkatasubramanian 1995). 
This is because the first one describes the Signed Directed Graph (SDG), which is a 
commonly used method of qualitative modelling in automated HAZOP system and describes 
its application in an expert system, QUalitative Effects ENgine (QUEEN). The second one 
gives a definition to qualitative models and describes the basic knowledge and tools creating 
qualitative models in automated HAZOP system and the third describes a prototype HAZOP 
automation system and how models are utilized in the HAZOP analysis engine.  
This literature review is organized thematically. It begins by introducing the background to 
the project, leading to discussion of modelling technology.  
Section 3 describes modelling in computer-aided HAZOP systems. It proposes the modelling 
goal and compares two different modelling approaches. It also describes the knowledge 
representation and knowledge organization in modelling system.  
Computer-aided applications in process plant safety 
 
150 
Section 4 surveys a number of modelling tools. The tools are classified into three categories: 
model definition tools, model building tools and model testing tools. Each category is 
discussed in terms of aim and objectives, requirements and development methodology.  
Section 5 describes model application. Various modelling systems are presented and 
compared in this section. Interesting points from reviewing these applications are highlighted. 
Section 6 concludes the literature review. 
 
2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
2.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND HAZOP STUDY 
Hazard Identification is very important in any industry which has major potential hazards that 
may cause harm to the environment and people when hardware fails or mistakes are made. 
Industries like pharmaceuticals, food, oil & gas and nuclear use a number of established 
methods for hazard identification and analysis. These include “check list”, “index methods”, 
“What if? Analysis”, “Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)”, “Coarse hazard studies”, 
“HAZard and OPerability studies (HAZOP)”, “sneak analysis”, “Failure Modes Effect and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA)”, “Fault and Event tree analysis”, and “human Error analysis” 
(McCoy, 1999a). Within the process industry HAZOP study is widely used and well 
recognized because of its systematic, exploratory and exhaustive nature. It is used for both in 
the design of a new plant and in the revision of existing plants (Bartolozzi et al., 2000). The 
methodology considers each equipment item in a plant against a guide word list (combination 
of keywords like “more or “less”, with variables like “temperature”, “pressure”, “level”), by 
exploring any possible deviations and their effects, such as an increase in pressure or a 
decrease in temperature, that could happen in each equipment item during the operation 
procedure of a process plant. By tracing the propagation of each deviation, the causes and 
consequences are identified. 
2.2 COMPUTER-AIDED HAZOP STUDY 
A process plant could have thousands of equipment items, e.g. an oil refinery. This causes a 
serious workload problem as it is very time consuming and tedious to consider all equipment 
items in a big plant. Typically it requires people from different disciplines to work together in 
many meetings, over several weeks to consider deviations, analyse propagations, identify 
causes and consequences and record the HAZOP study result.  
The motivation behind the development of computer-aided HAZOP study was to automate 
the laborious part of HAZOP study and to capture the expertise in a knowledge base so that 
HAZOP study can be carried out more speedly and effectively. A review of the development 
of computer-aided HAZOP study is given by Rushton et al. (1998) and by McCoy et al. 
(1999a, 1999b, 1999c). HAZID, developed by Hazid Technologies Ltd, is currently the most 
advanced commercially available knowledge-based HAZOP tool available (ref to company 
web site).  
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3 MODELLING IN COMPUTER AIDED HAZOP STUDY  
When a computer system is used to perform a task, it is required that the system designed for 
aid can have all the necessary information to carry out that task and can organize these 
information in an effective way that can help carry out the task successfully in terms of 
accuracy, speed and completeness etc. 
Modelling is one of the many ways to meet the above requirement. 
3.1 MODELLING GOAL 
Although modelling is all about knowledge representation and organization, the objective of 
modelling for various tasks could be very different. When the task is to help identify hazard in 
process industry, the modelling goal in general should be that the model can represent all the 
information required to identify hazard and can organize this information in a way that can 
make the performance of hazard identification analysis easier, more effective and more 
consistent than the performance of the analysis by human experts.  
More specifically, it is said in Nemeth et al. (2005) that the model for HAZOP automation 
should be able to: 
• Describe the consequences of all possible causes and all possible deviations between 
the causes and the consequences. 
• Provide the effect of preventive actions for each entry of a given HAZOP result table. 
So the first question we should answer is what makes a good model?  
• It is no doubt that a good model should represent the information as accurately as 
possible. 
• A good model should include the information as complete as possible. For example, 
the functionality must be considered at the model design stage, in both normal and 
abnormal states (Bartolozzi  et al.,2000). 
• A good model should be able to simulate all the behaviours of the object to be 
modelled. For example, when modelling fault path propagation in a process plant, the 
model should contain the information of propagating deviations with both directions, 
from upstream equipment unit to downstream equipment unit and from downstream 
equipment unit to upstream equipment unit. 
• On the other hand, a good model should be able to ignore or skip the information that 
is irrelevant to fulfil the application objectives of building model (Palmer & Chung 
1997). 
• The size of a good model should be as small as possible.  
• A good model should be as generic as possible. 
• In terms of reusability, a good model should be as independent as possible from the 
environment of its application. So that it can be used widely under various 
circumstances/environment.  
• A good model should be constructed as simply as possible. 
• The maintenance of a good model should be as easy as possible.  
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• The application of a good model in real-time should be as simple as possible. In other 
words, the complexity level of model application must be as low as possible.   
• A good model must have high levels of flexibility and generality that can be applied 
on any objects to be modelled with different configurations. For example, in the case 
of automating HAZOP study, a good model must be able to perform analysis on any 
plant with different states. 
• A computer-aided modelling system must have facilities to validate models built 
(Palmer & Chung, 2000). 
• A good balance among expressive power of the model, complexity of building 
models, and computational cost of driving simulations must be properly maintained 
(McCoy et al., 2006). 
In a nutshell, a good model should make the modelling effort as minimal as possible for fast 
and easy deployment of any application (Venkatasubramanian  et al., 2003a). 
In order to have a good model as described above, let us take a look at the current modelling 
technology. 
3.2 MODELS FOR VARIOUS MODELING GOALS 
For various modelling goals, people have developed many kinds of models. In general, there 
are linear models, non-linear models. For models designed to be applied for specific purpose, 
for example, for HAZOP analysis, they are classified by Bartolozzi et al. (2000) in his Hazard 
Support System (HAST) system as: cause models, HAZOP models, and consequence models 
and even mental models which is very unique and is for the HAZOP study members/analysts 
at the stage of thinking about deviations, main variables that could be used in the plant. In 
HAZID system, we have equipment unit models. In HAZOPExpert system described by 
Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian (1995), there are HAZOP-Digraph (HDG) models. 
Nemeth et al. (2005) talks about process models. 
All of these models are designed for their own specific modelling goal, so there must be 
similarity and difference between models designed for similar objective. We have 
introduction of these models in section 3.4 and section 5 when we discuss model application. 
 
3.3 QUALITATIVE MODELLING AND QUANTITATIVE 
MODELLING 
Current modelling methodology can be broadly classified as qualitative modelling and 
quantitative modelling.  
In the glossary of the Holtzapple and Reece (2003), qualitative modelling is defined as “a 
non-numerical description of a physical system”. In Palmer and Chung (1997), qualitative 
models are defined as abstract representations of a plant that are able to simulate/emulate 
behaviour of the plant by emphasizing a causal explanation. We can have SDG-based 
modelling and state-based modelling used in HAZID system as examples of qualitative 
modelling. 
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Quantitative modelling, on the other hand and for the sake of the simplicity, could be defined 
as “a numerical description of a physical system”. Model of this kind includes “Black-box 
models”, “First-principles models”, and “Frequency response models”. “Black-box models” 
include general “input-output models” and “state-space models” etc. (Venkatasubramanian et 
al., 2003a). 
However, modelling technology used in application does not have to be absolutely qualitative 
or quantitative. Qualitative modelling approach could be slightly or partly quantitative when 
the accurate values of some variables are demanded for some important purpose. For example, 
when operation/action is being modelled, action that is taken “too early” or “too late” will be 
the deviation of action time. But we have to define how early is too early and how late is too 
late. Therefore, an accurate measurement of the action time is demanded.    
On the other hand, it is possible to have qualitative modelling to be added into some part of a 
quantitative modelling when necessary. In the quantitative modelling review by 
Venkatasubramanian et al. (2003a), a method of computing residual is used to capture the 
failure in a system. It examines what the expected behaviour should be and what the real time 
value or actual behaviour is. The value of residual is obtained by the discrepancy between 
these two values. When the value of residual is zero, it means no failure happens in the system. 
But if serious failure happens or underlying system is changed or the real time system is 
completely or partly modified without modifying the modelling system, the value of residual 
will reach to a very critical level. Residual is also named as symptom in Nemeth et al. (2005).  
When designing models for a specific system, which modelling approach is to be dominantly 
used depends on the purpose of the whole system. In the example above, if the modelling 
objective is to tell if there is fault, then a numerical value of residual is needed. On the other 
hand, if the modelling objective is to tell the change of severity of failure, then an increase of 
the residual or decrease of the residual can indicate that the failure becomes serious or 
becomes less serious. 
Let us take a look at the difference between quantitative and qualitative models and the 
advantages of qualitative modelling in application. 
Difference between quantitative and qualitative models: 
 Qualitative models use qualitative function to express the relationship between inputs and 
outputs of each unit of a physical process. Quantitative models, on the other hand, use 
mathematical functional relationships between inputs and outputs of the whole system to 
describe physics process (Venkatasubramanian & Rengaswamy, 2003). 
 Emphasis in qualitative system is how to obtain comprehensible models that are able to 
intuitively explain the system behaviour just as the mental model of a human expert is 
intuitive essentially (Bratko & Šuc, 2003). 
 
Advantages of qualitative modeling can be briefly described as: 
 Behaviours of qualitative models can be induced even if no mathematical models can be 
developed since qualitative models do not require accurate information such as numerical 
values of process variables (Venkatasubramanian & Rengaswamy, 2003). 
 The format of the qualitative model can either be a qualitative causal model or an 
abstraction hierarchy (Venkatasubramanian & Rengaswamy, 2003b). 
Computer-aided applications in process plant safety 
 
154 
 Explanations for physical behaviour in a qualitative model are more causal and intuitive, 
therefore providing better insight into the working mechanism of the physical object to be 
modelled (Bratko & Šuc, 2003). Its highly abstract level makes it possible to represent 
more than one behaviour at a giving variable value because it does not require precise 
value, “more” or “less” or “none” is usually sufficient. On the other hand, quantitative 
models represent only one behaviour at a giving variable value because it requires precise 
numerical value (McCoy, 1999a). 
 Qualitative modelling can detect subtle qualitative dependences and trace its effect.  For 
example, more temperature is more no matter how much more it is, and it will be 
regarded as a deviation which may propagate to cause a significant consequence. 
Quanalitative modelling in this case, may ignore the change of the temperature when the 
change is very little like a noise (Bratko &  Šuc, 2003). Plus, it is easier to check if the 
model can perform the desired behaviour qualitatively than quantitatively (Schaich et al., 
2001). 
However, nothing is perfect. There are three main problems with qualitative model as listed 
below. Disadvantages of qualitative modelling can be briefly described as: 
 It may cause generation of spurious solutions. 
 It may cause generation of ambiguities in knowledge representation. 
 Qualitative method defines static relations only, thus it is not sufficient to explain state 
that changes with time (Bratko & Šuc, 2003). 
These disadvantages can be overcome by combining quantitative modelling with qualitative 
modelling. This is why current modelling applications normally have qualitative models 
dominated while quantitative modelling is also applied whenever necessary. 
    
3.4    MODEL INFORMATION REPRESENTATION 
Modelling includes two parts of work: description of the object being modelled and 
representation of the behaviour of the object being modelled. Some modelling approach 
represents the behaviour by using parameters, variables, key words etc. (Nemeth et al., 2005).  
This is used in the modelling work of HAZOP automation. 
The development of model information representation in HAZOP analysis automation has 
gone through from representing continuously operating plants, which assumes that each 
equipment will keep in a steady state all the time, to representing discrete operation, which 
includes not only the dynamic change of state over the time, but also the event or action 
sequence, time and operator’s action. 
First, in order to represent the information accurately and completely, any models have to be 
built based on fundamental understanding of the physical system to be modelled. Then these 
understanding will be expressed in different way according to the modelling approach used 
(Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003 Part II). 
Petri Net, which is a modelling language used to make mathematical representation in discrete 
distributed system, is explored by McCoy et al. (2006) to arrange action sequence. It is used 
in a hierarchical way in which actions/operations are decomposed into sub-actions in a sub-
net, therefore allowing template to be built for repeatedly needed actions. However, this 
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approach is finally proven not flexible enough to be used when sequence order or more action 
need to be added or equipment unit is modified. 
The new model in McCoy et al. (2006) is enhanced by adding representation of event 
(operation event, fault event, hazard event) and representation of constraint. 
In HAZID system, model information are represented in various slots for each equipment type. 
There are inport slots, outPort slots, unitPort slots (describes internal ports information), 
must_connection slots (not used anymore), comp_connection slots(describes flow 
information). 
There are lots of ways to describe fault propagation, such as functional equations, program 
rules, logical expressions, truth tables, fault trees, event trees, reliability block diagrams, 
influence graphs, SDGs and bond graphs (Palmer & Chung, 2000). Here we discuss the SDGs 
representation of fault path since it is the most widely used one in process plants.  
In HAZID system, fault path propagation information is described by four types of SDG arcs . 
These four types are  
 Deviation to Deviation 
 Fault to Deviation 
 Deviation to Consequence 
 Fault to Consequence. 
These arcs represent a dynamic modelling of the plant behaviours based on qualitative method, 
called Signed Directed Graph (SDG) qualitative method. SDG is network of nodes connected 
by arcs. Nodes are variables such as “flow”, “temperature”, “pressure” or “level” even 
“signal” in system. Arcs are influences between nodes, of one variable on another. The “sign”  
identifies type of influences attached to an arc, negative or positive. For example, “more 
flow” will result in “less pressure” if the sign attached to the arc is negative or “more 
temperature” will result in “more flow” if the sign attached to the arc is positive etc. The 
variable “signal” can only have “No” as its keyword. SDG are described in more detail by 
Chung (1993). 
In old HAZID system, the fault is evaluated by fault frequency (1 to 5) at the level of UML 
rather than the level of model, a frequency table database is one of the further solutions. The 
consequence is evaluated by a set of rules (McCoy 1999c). 
In a system named Hazard Support Tool (HAST) described by Bartolozzi et al. (2000), “cause 
model” of equipment unit is used to contain the propagation information that can trace back to 
the root cause of deviations. It is a use of the principle of fault tree to trace the prime cause of 
failure. Each cause model includes many mini-trees, the trees’ leaf contains the root cause of 
that deviation which is on the top of the tree. The root cause includes any operative faults or 
failures. 
In HAST, fault propagation is represented in “HAZOP model”. HAZOP models are sub-sets 
of cause models, but not contain all the mini-trees of the cause model, instead, it contains only 
the mini trees that associate with output variable deviations and are relevant with the final 
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result of the HAZOP study. Mini trees that are only for deviation propagation are not included 
in HAZOP models. 
A “consequence model” is set up for finding the consequences of each deviation in HAST. 
Therefore, the behaviour of an equipment unit in HAST is represented by three models, which 
are cause model, HAZOP model and consequence model. The connection between 
consequence model and the cause model is the deviation with the effect of the consequence.  
Knowledge representation in HAZOPExpert in Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian 
(1995) is discussed in section 5.3. 
3.4.1 SOLVING AMBIGUITIES OF KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION 
As mentioned earlier, a good model should represent information as accurately as possible. 
Otherwise it will cause serious incorrect application result when the model is applied. In other 
words, a good modelling approach should provide error free models to be used by the 
application system. However, incorrect knowledge representation does happen, knowledge 
representation ambiguity is one of them.  
Here we discuss the knowledge representation ambiguities happened in qualitative model 
built by SDG modelling used in a process plant.-                                    
The primary/root reason is the causal representation of knowledge allowed in the qualitative 
reasoning. Although causal knowledge representation is sufficient enough to modelling the 
behaviour of a physical system, it may cause knowledge representation ambiguities when 
qualitative models are combined to form a system as the multiple causal paths are 
combined/integrated (Palmer & Chung, 2000).  
 In Venkatasubramanian et al. (2003b), it is said that ambiguities of knowledge   
representation can only be completely eliminated by the use of actual quantitative values. 
However, obtaining actual quantitative values for the purpose of solving ambiguities would 
largely reduce the advantage of using qualitative reasoning. Some researchers have proposed 
various ways to solve this problem. 
To solve problem of ambiguities in knowledge representation due to qualitative reasoning, 
quantitative information has to be brought and a worst case outcome strategy is proposed to 
ensure completeness of HAZOP analysis result although it may cause redundant outcome 
instead (Vaidhyanathan & Venkatasubramanian, 1995). 
One way to eliminate ambiguities is by choosing the shortest path when and only when the 
shortest path does have a correct influence (Palmer & Chung, 2000). In Chung (1993), a 
spurious arc path is identified as a cause of knowledge representation ambiguities when two 
nodes are joined by more than one path(s). The ‘spurious paths’ can be generated when one 
path has a positive effect while other(s) have the negative effect. To eliminate it, the effect of 
shorter path or shortest path has been selected because of its “direct influence derived from 
the original mathematical model” (Chung 1993). 
Another way is by adding constraint representation (McCoy et al., 2006). 
In an Equipment Model Builder (EMB) presented in Palmer and Chung (2000), a modular 
method is used to remove ambiguities in qualitative model based on SDG modelling approach. 
These methods identifies the header/divider combinations and recycle loops, then specifies a 
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module for each of them, then substitutes the module for each of them into the plant 
description file before going to HAZOP analysis.   
 
3.5     HOW ARE MODELS ORGANIZED? 
As mentioned before, knowledge organization is an important part of modelling. A good 
modelling structure can help the system to reason effectively and easily. 
In HAZID System, A Unit Model Library (UML) is built and models in the library are 
organized in a hierarchical way that supports the inheritance of features between models. 
Each model has one and only one parent model and this model inherits all the features of its 
parent model while it owns its unique feature(s) that distinguish it from its sibling model(s). 
Each model may be a parent model of other model(s). When a new model is created, it will be 
added into this library as a child of an existing model. This kind of structure is like a family 
tree. By this way, the size of the library can be kept as small as possible and features of each 
model kept clear, and it makes model searching easy and quick. A detail description of UML 
organization is given by McCoy et al. (1999c). 
More discussion in knowledge organization is in section 5. 
3.6  TWO DIFFERENT QUALITATIVE MODELLING APPROACHES 
SDG modelling and state-based modelling are two different qualitative modelling approaches. 
The following table shows their comparison. From table 1(please see the appendix)we can see 
that state-based modelling is an enhanced/augmented modelling approach from SDG 
modelling. It overcomes some shortcomings of SDG modelling by including modelling with 
change of plant state, change of time, operation order and change of operation sequence etc. 
And it can deal with situation when two or more actions have effects on each other by the use 
of flow modelling. 
3.7 SUMMARY 
In this section, we have discussed modelling in computer aided HAZOP study. We have 
proposed the basic elements to make a good model, which the key words could be “accuracy”, 
“completeness”, “conciseness”, “generality”, “independence”, ”simplicity”, “easiness”, 
“flexibility”, “validation” etc. We have also discussed the difference between qualitative 
modelling and quantitative modelling, highlighting the advantage and disadvantage of 
qualitative modelling, therefore, justifying why qualitative reasoning is widely used. We have 
also discussed model information representation and organization, particularly, presented 
some ways that researchers had used to solve ambiguities. We have made comparison 
between two qualitative modelling approaches, their similarity and differences are highlighted 
in table 1 in the appendix 
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4 MODELLING TOOLS IN COMPUTER SYSTEM 
A seven step modelling procedure is proposed by Nemeth et al. (2005) as below: 
 
“(1) Model goal-set definition (modelling problem specification). 
(2) Model conceptualization (identifying controlling factors). 
(3) Modelling data: needs and sources. 
(4) Model building and model analysis. 
(5) Model verification. 
(6) Model solution. 
(7) Model calibration and validation.” 
From these seven steps, we can see that it would be very helpful if we could have computer 
tools designed for model definition, model construction and model verification. Most research 
in modelling technology combine model definition, model building and model verification 
into one model creating tool. This review analyses them in separate sections. 
4.1  MODEL DEFINITION TOOLS 
At current stage, the model definition tools discussed here are for defining the models used 
for HAZOP automation. 
4.1.1 AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
Model definition tool is designed for knowledge acquisition. It is a computer aid for the third 
step of the seven modelling procedure listed above. 28 knowledge acquisition tools have been 
surveyed in Palmer and Chung 1997. The objective of the tool is summarized as:  
 To acquire information necessary to define a model. 
 To identify missing, duplicate or incorrect information. 
 To group components into different entities. 
 To rank information according to their importance level (priority). 
4.1.2 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF MODEL DEFINITION TOOLS  
Target user 
Model definition tools should consider at least two types of user. One is the non-modelling 
Engineering Expert, the other is the Modeller. These two kinds of users might be working in 
different place all over the world. 
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Interface 
The user interface should be online with internet security and authorization check so that both 
the Engineering Expert and the Modeller can access it. 
The interface that is used to enter information should be in a direct and familiar but 
unambiguous way. 
There should be an explanation facility to show the user what has been acquired and how the 
system organize them. In other words, the acquired knowledge representation has to be 
transparent to the user. This is a very important requirement for the long term success of an 
expert system (Vaidhyanathan & Venkatasubramanian, 1995). 
Function and data verification 
The acquired knowledge should be editable, removable by the user with some constrains. For 
example, when defining a model, if the status of that model is locked, this model is not 
allowed to be deleted unless it is unlocked by the user. 
For the definition of a model, there should be different definition cases distinguished by their 
definition time so that the user can trace the history of definition of this model. 
The definition tool should be able to deal with run time conditions. 
The definition should be checked and modified by the Modeller and agreed with both 
Engineering Expert and Modeller before going to be built by the Model Construction Tools. 
There should be an alert message to tell the user of any required information is missing or 
may be incorrect and prevent it finally be entered into the system. 
The tool should be able to prevent, locate and remove any duplicated information. 
 
4.1.3 METHODOLOGY 
There are two main parts for defining a model. One is to define the basic model information 
such as model name, model description, model assumption and how the model is connected 
with other models such as port name, port type if the model is a tank or other equipment item 
with ports. The other part is to define the behaviour of the model. For example, in the HAZOP 
automation, it is required to define fault and deviation propagation to represent how the fault 
would cause consequences within and outside a equipment unit model.    
 
Methods used to meet the above requirement could vary with different modelling applications. 
Here we present general methodology to implement a model definition tool. 
 Internet authority and security technology will be used to restrict the access to this tool 
online to make it only available to authorized users. 
 All users have an attribute as user role to identify if the user is a modeller or a non-
modeller engineer.  
 Before each model is going to be constructed, the modeller and the non-modeller 
engineer in the same organization will sign off the model definition as this model 
definition is agreed by both of them. 
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 Technology such as PHP or ASP can be used as a powerful tool to build up dynamic and 
interactive web pages for the user to enter definition information into the database online. 
 For each model to be defined, the tool will generate a definition case when its behaviour 
changes and identify the change by the definition time of each definition case.  
 By using JavaScript, user can add more information or delete typed or selected 
information without refreshing the whole page. 
 Any missing or duplicated information will be identified before the content is submitted 
to the server. 
 Any incorrect (eg. conflict) information will be prevented at the webpage design stage. 
For example, when selecting deviation symbols from the selection box, if the “B+” is 
selected, then the “B-“ will be removed from the selection list immediately. If “B+” is 
unselected, the “B-“ will be recovered into the selection list immediately to make both 
“B+” and “B-“ available to be selected by the user again. 
 The defined behaviours of each model under different definition times will be retrieved 
from the database to make it editable and removable by the user.  
 Recommended database includes Oracle database or mySQL database while Oracle is 
preferred for commercial purpose. 
 
4.2 MODEL CONSTRUCTION TOOLS 
This is the computer aid for the fourth step of the seven modelling procedure listed above, 
which is also the main task of modelling.  
4.2.1 AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
To construct models that can be utilized by the application. 
4.2.2 REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS  
It is by no means easy to build a model. Difficulty is discussed in Palmer and Chung 1997.  
The difficulty is the building of model library. Two ways were adopted and assessed. One is 
such as the expert system, Qualitative Effects Engine (QUEEN) directly. The other is by  
software developers to write models in a specific format that can be used by application 
engineer to give information to an intermediary and then convert into a format that can be 
used by QUEEN. 
However, some models built by above ways are too specific to be reused or validated. 
Experience gained in constructing lost, errors happen commonly. Subjective knowledge of 
important point preference makes it inconsistent, and hard to update, compare and detect error. 
A graphical tool is a possible solution for above difficulties but again the priority of model 
parts is unknown to the expert/chemical engineer, and the graph is tend to be very large and 
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complex whenever meeting a complex process units with many variables and faults waiting to 
be analysed. 
When a modeller or a non-modelling engineer is constructing models, information of model 
definition has to be converted into the format that could be used in the model construction 
tool by the modeller or the non-modelling engineer‘s mind. It is very likely that some 
information defined would be forgotten. Therefore, it would be very helpful if there is a 
facility to link the model definition with the model construction to help the user recall 
definition information such as assumption of a model etc. 
In current HAZID system, a compositional modelling approach is used to build a model and a 
plant. By breaking down the plant into several levels of component, instances of equipment 
item (unit) can be used to represent each component, and then be connected together by 
connections (McCoy et al., 2006).  
4.2.3 VARIOUS MODEL CREATING TOOLS 
A Equipment Model Builder (EMB) is built by Palmer (2000). This tool takes a plant 
description file supplied by the user using AutoCAD and a plant model library as its input. 
Outputs of the tool are a modified plant description file and a file of unit models occurring 
within the plant. 
 
In AutoHAZID, an early computer-aided HAZOP tool, a Model Generation Tool (MGT) is 
used to create the model by asking questions and get answers, one or more templates will be 
added according to each answer. A number of building blocks are used: chambers, phases and 
ports. The term “chamber” refers to “a distinct region within a unit”. Whatever separates two 
chambers are referred as mechanical interface. Whatever separates two fluid phases are 
referred as phase interface. (vapour-liquid and liquid-liquid). Inlet, outlet, internal port. Phase 
includes gas, vapour and liquid. The MGT is described by McCoy et al. (1999c). 
 
Coloured Petri Nets(CPN) are one of the most useful unifying modelling tools and has been 
used in diagnostic goal driven modelling and simulation of multiscale process systems by 
Nemeth et al. (2005). 
4.3     MODEL TESTING TOOLS  
Model testing can also be named as model verification. Verification is defined by Palmer and 
Chung (2001) as “ensuring that the internal structure of each model is , as far as possible, 
complete, correct and consistent”. The aim of model testing tool is to provide error free 
models to be used by application analysis of existing plant. 
4.3.1   OBJECTIVE OF MODEL TESTING TOOL 
• To present the actual input-output behaviour of the model to the modeller. 
• To test out if there is missing information in order to ensure completeness. 
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• To test out if there is wrong information, the information that is mismatch with 
expectation in order to ensure correctness.. 
• To test out if there is duplicated or redundant/unnecessary information in order to 
ensure conciseness. 
• To test out if there is conflict information in order to ensure consistence or no 
ambiguity. 
• To sever as a first guard/step to achieve complete validation of the model because the 
test is performed before the model is going to be used. 
4.3.2 REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
Target user 
 It is expected that the user of any model testing tool should be a trained user of the model 
construction tool used for building the models under testing. The user is expected to have 
the knowledge of constructing models and is responsible for the development of the 
knowledge base of HAZOP automation system for his organization.  
 It would be helpful if the user is also a process engineer. 
 
The Interface 
 It is required that the interface for initiating tests on models must be integrated with the 
interface of model construction tool for the convenience of use as the test tool will be 
used most frequently by the user who builds the model and as the user may go back to 
model construction tool to modify the model after reading the test result and then go to 
the testing tool to test the revised model again. This iterative procedure may repeat until 
the model behaves exactly as the modeller expected. 
 
 The interface should provide feedback on progress of any model tests. 
 
Function 
 Model should either be tested individually or in a group to allow multiple model tests. 
 There should be a facility to select which model or models to be tested. 
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 There should be a facility to allow the user to apply different conditions or combination 
of different conditions on the tests of the same model. 
 The test result for each model at any different testing time should be stored and be 
accessed. 
 There should be a facility to compare the intended model behaviour with the actual model 
behaviour as a result of test so that any missing or extra or wrong information can be 
identified and highlighted. 
 There should be a facility to record the test status of each model tested through time. This 
facility should allow the user to sign off a model test result as acceptable (for example, 
the model can perform satisfactory behaviours as expected by the modeller) or as not yet 
acceptable with comments from the user. 
 The test result should be a report in a format that can be exported to external applications 
such as MS Excel. 
4.3.3 METHODOLOGY  
By the use of a so called iterative refinement approach that the user/process engineer 
continues to check the correctness of the model by checking if the test result is matching with 
the expected result. If not, the user will go back to modify the model , then test and check 
again until the two sets (testing result and expected result) match. 
Methods used to meet the above requirement could vary with different modelling applications. 
Here we present general methodology to implement a model test tool. 
 For each model to be tested at each time, the tool will generate a test file to be analysed 
by the inference engine of the application system in the same way that a file generated 
from a true P&ID would be analysed.  
 This test file will consist of a single instance of the model to be tested and the information 
of how this model is connected with other models. For example, when testing a model in 
UML, a plant file will be generated and it consists of an instance of that model, with each 
of its external ports connected to an Off-Page-Connector (OPC) instance so that the 
model under test can be connected to deviations caused by faults in the OPCs and can 
also communicate any deviations caused by faults in the test model to consequences in 
the OPCs. 
 The intended behaviour (entered by the user with the model construction tool) of each 
model under different testing conditions will be retrieved from the database to make the 
comparison between actual and expected results.  
 The connection with database will be the same way as the model construction tool. 
Recommended database includes Oracle database or mySQL database while Oracle is 
preferred for commercial purpose. 
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4.4 SUMMARY 
In this section, we have analysed model definition tools, model construction tools and model 
testing tools in terms of their aim and objectives, target users, interfaces, data and function 
and methodologies etc. Some model construction tools are briefly introduced. The most 
interesting questions we have to answer are: How to make a model 
definition/construction/testing tool as effectively as possible to help with the model 
definition/construction/testing procedure? Is it worth or possible to integrate all these three 
tools into one? Or is it better to make them separate while provide some facilities to link them 
together? Further reading and research is needed to answer these questions. 
 
5 MODEL APPLICATION 
After above discussion about model and modelling, let us take a look at the model application.  
 
As mentioned early, computerized support systems have been considered to perform the 
HAZOP analysis for HAZOP experts. Several systems have been proposed by different 
research groups around the world. 
 
A prototype expert system named HAZOPExpert is proposed by Vaidhyanathan and 
Venkatasubramanian (1995). HAZID and CHECKOP are developed by Hazid Technologies 
Ltd. and Loughborough University. Hazard Support Tool (HAST) is developed by Bartolozzi 
et al. (2000) in Palermo University. Let us take a look at each of them. 
 
5.1 HAZID AND CHECKOP 
As mentioned earlier, HAZID system is a result of development of HAZOP automation by 
Hazid Technologies .Ltd and Loughborough University. It is now developed into a state-of-
the-art knowledge-based Hazid Identification system. It is a successful application of 
qualitative modelling approach based on SDG. 
CHECKOP is a prototype developed also by Loughborough University to be used in batch 
plants. It also uses qualitative modelling, but it enhances the model representation in order to 
be applied in batch plants. Table 2 (please see the appendix) shows the comparison of these 
two applications. From this table, we can see:  
 The modelling approach used is different. Modelling in HAZID is based on SDG while 
modelling in CHECKOP is based on state. 
 The way of defining a model in CHECKOP is enhanced by adding the knowledge 
representation of intangible information such as state change, operation/action and 
event/action sequence, time and assumptions associated with each step of operation. 
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 Because of the different modelling purpose, the deviation guidewords are different. 
 HAZID can be purely performed based on qualitative models while CHECKOP has to 
combine qualitative models with quantitative reasoning by assigning some accurate 
numerical value to its variable. For example, we have to define “how late is too late” and 
“how early is too early” when defining wrong actions.    
 Today’s HAZID has integrated a model testing bed to verify the model before the model 
is utilized. In other words, HAZID can provide error free models to the HAZID analysis 
engine. CHECKOP did not consider this by the time it was developed.  
 CHECKOP will need to generate as much as possible useful keyword/deviation of an 
operation instruction. 
It is worthwhile to integrate HAZID with CHECKOP so that HAZID can benefit from the 
idea in CHECKOP to check out “startup” and “shutdown” procedures in process plants and 
CHECKOP can benefit from HAZID‘s simulation efficiency and its model verification 
facility.       
 
5.2 HAZID, CHECKOP AND HAST 
Hazard Support Tool (HAST) is a knowledge-based system to support HAZOP automation by 
Bartolozzi et al. (2000) in Palermo University. 
HAST is originally an automation of the HAZOP analysis of continuous plant, it is then 
extended to carry out auto HAZOP analysis of batch or semi-continuous plant. 
HAST also uses qualitative modelling in automatic HAZOP analysis, but in a different way. 
Table 3 (please see the appendix) shows the comparison between HAST with HAZID and 
CHECKOP. It can be seen: 
 Building up a model library maybe a good way to store all the models since HAZID, 
CHECKOP and HAST all have it. 
 Characteristic inheritance between models as a family tree produces a high level of 
generality, applicability and succinctness (the size of model library is kept small by this 
way) for HAZID, CHECKOP and HAST, which fulfils two of the modelling goals we 
proposed in section 3.1. UML in HAZID further fulfils this modelling goal by the use of 
template (McCoy et al., 1999c). 
 Models built based on basic equipment units make them independent with the 
environment of application, which fulfils model reusability.  
 The use of template is a good way of making model creating simply as many features 
could be imported from templates rather than creating these features for a particular 
model. Further more, it is also a good way of making maintenance easy as modifying a 
feature of many models could be achieved by modifying the feature in their template  
(McCoy et al., 1999c). 
 The decomposition approach allowed by HAZID, CHECKOP and HAST produces a low 
level of complexity of model application. A suggestion is made by McCoy et al. (2006) to 
further decompose the unit model into smaller basic unit in order to cope with devices 
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such as level transmitter, breaking down it into a float gauge component and a transducer 
component and the connections between them.   
 The consideration of functionality at the design stage in HAST in both normal and 
abnormal states is a good way to represent modelling information as complete as possible. 
This is why it can be used in both continuous plant and batch plant.  
 Modelling fault path propagation using SDG arcs to connect fault, deviations and 
consequences is simpler and more intuitionistic than that using mini fault trees since it 
can not present direct connection between cause model, HAZOP model and consequence 
model to show a complete fault path. 
 
5.3 HAZOPEXPERT AND ITS HDG MODEL 
HAZOPExpert is an expert system designed to automate HAZOP analysis by Vaidhyanathan 
and Venkatasubramanian etc. in Purdue University in 1994 and further improved in 1995. 
Reviewing this system is because that it helps understand better how people design and build 
up models used by inference engine and what is behind that engine. 
The old HAZOP automation system is in fact very similar to today’s HAZID system although 
it uses a so called HDG model (HAZOP-Digraph Model) instead of SDG model to modelling 
the equipment units and their process variables and their behaviours. Both SDG and HDG are 
extended to cover nodes of abnormal cause and nodes of adverse consequences. Both are 
defined for each process unit model of a plant. 
Both HDG and SDG are used to propagate process variable deviations and to find abnormal 
cause and adverse consequences. They all have conditional arcs in which conditions are 
attached to some SDG or HDG arcs to deal with conditional propagation causal relationship. 
For example, the increasing flow rate at inlet port of a tank will result in the increase of 
temperature of the fluid in the tank only if the temperature of the fluid at the inlet port is 
higher than the temperature of the fluid in the tank. On the other hand, the increasing flow rate 
at inlet port of a tank will result in the decrease of temperature of the fluid in the tank only if 
the temperature of the fluid at the inlet port is lower than the temperature of the fluid in the 
tank. 
 
Table 4 (please see the appendix) shows the comparison between HAZOPExpert and HAZID. 
Some points gained from HAZOPExpert are interesting: 
 Can the feature of graphic representation of model in HAZOPExpert be considered in 
current HAZID system? 
 The SDG modelling which connects all the units by mini SDG arc simplifies the fault 
path propagation and makes it easier to be understood than HDG modelling. 
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5.4 SUMMARY 
In this section, we have discussed four applications used for HAZOP automation, HAZID, 
CHECKOP, HAST and HAZOPExpert. A common feature of above systems is that they are 
all knowledge-based systems, and they all build up models to represent equipment units and 
simulate their behaviours. The most interesting point is that models built and used in these 
systems are all qualitative models since conventional HAZOP analysis is performed 
qualitatively. However, when these systems are extended to deal with batch plants for 
example, they all have to combine qualitative modelling with quantitative modelling in some 
extent although conventional HAZOP analysis of batch plant is also performed qualitatively. 
Another common feature is that they all develop their models in a context-independent 
manner so that their models can be used in wide variety of application. In addition, they all 
encounter ambiguity of knowledge representation, which is inherent in qualitative causal 
reasoning (Vaidhyanathan & Venkatasubramanian, 1995). 
 
However, the way of model defining, model constructing, model verifying, model 
organization, model utilization is very different from each other in these systems. 
HAZID and CHECKOP use SDG arcs to connect fault, deviations and consequences. HAST 
finds out the root cause by mini fault trees and finds out consequences by consequences tree. 
HAZOPExpert uses HDG model to represent equipment items and their behaviours. 
 
HAZID establishes a fault path connected by SDG arcs to directly describe how a fault would 
cause consequence through deviations happen along the path. It is easier to understand than 
fault tree or HDG model.  
 
6 CONCLUSION 
This literature review has reviewed modelling and modelling tools used in computer-aided 
system. We have proposed the features that a good model should have. We have also 
discussed qualitative and quantitative modelling approaches. Modelling tools are discussed. 
Several modelling applications used in HAZOP automation are examined.  
For modelling applications in HAZOP analysis automation, the core problems to solve for any 
applications are  
 How to find the abnormal cause and root cause of a fault path. 
 How to find the adverse consequences of a fault path. 
 How to propagate the deviations between the cause and consequences. 
The solution for above lies at the design stage of modelling. The inference engine for any 
application will reason in the way these models are designed by retrieving information from 
attributes of the models and relationship between models.  So one point is that to design a 
good model, it is worth to consider how the inference engine is going to interact with that 
model to achieve the desired result. 
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It is interesting and worthwhile to investigate if there are any better methods for transforming 
quantitative data into qualitative data and if qualitative modelling language could be 
expressed more explicitly. It is possible to discover hidden variables by study deeply the 
principles of the existing variables. It is also possible to increase the model generality and 
decrease the size of models by studying deeply the model organization.   
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8 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
CPN:   Coloured Petri Nets (CPN). 
 
FMS:   Fluid Model System, which is a system that performs fault path validation by using                   
 
            predicates and functions. 
 
HAST: Hazard Support Tool built by Bartolozzi et al. (2000) in Palermo University. 
 
HAZID: A knowledge based HAZOP automation system by HAZID Technologies .Ltd 
 
              and Loughborough University. 
 
HAZOPExpert: A prototype computer aided HAZOP automation system by                                             
 
                         Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian in 1995. 
 
HAZOP: hazard and operability (HAZOP) study used to identify hazards. 
 
HDG: HAZOP-Digraph Model used in HAZOPExpert. 
 
OPC: Off-Page-Connector. 
 
MDT: Model Definition Tool. 
 
MTB: Model Test Bed. 
 
SDG: Signed Directed Graph. 
 
UML: Unit Model Library used in HAZID system. 
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9. APPENDIX 
 
Table 1. Comparison between SDG modelling and state-based modelling 
 
Table 2. Comparison between HAZID and CHECKOP 
 
Table 3. Comparison between HAZID, CHECKOP and HAST 
 
Table 4 Comparison between HAZOPExpert and HAZID 
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Comparison between SDG modelling and state-based modelling 
SDG-based modelling   State-based modelling 
Used in continuously operating plants. Used in discrete operating plants, can also be used 
in continuously operating plants. 
Dealing with normal behavioural modes which 
assume the model is in good and healthy 
condition. 
Support reasoning about “common mode failures” 
which would happen when for example, power 
supply is failed. 
Assume no change with the state.  Consider time change, state change, action 
sequence and change of sequence.  
deviation guidewords are “more, less, no etc” and 
parameters/variables are “flow”, “temperature”, 
“vapour” etc, which is not related to operations.  
deviation guidewords are “no, early, late” and 
parameter is “action” and “termination”, which 
are related to operations.  
Assumption is all the same. Assumption is different for each step of operation. 
 Models behaves in similar way as in SDG unless 
a failure mode happens. 
 Use “action-synergy” (considering effect caused 
by incorporation of action1 and action2 or more 
actions)  approach to flow modelling and 
modelling the effects. 
Application includes: fault tree synthesis, HAZOP 
emulation, and fault diagnosis ( Palmer & Chung, 
2000). 
HAZOP emulation in Batch plants. 
 
Table 1. Comparison between SDG modelling and state-based modelling 
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Comparison between HAZID and CHECKOP 
HAZID/conventional auto HAZOP tool for 
process plant 
CHECKOP/ prototype for batch plant 
Mature commercial product. A prototype. 
Used in continuously operating plants. Used in batch plants or discrete operating plants. 
Use SDG-based modelling. Use State-based modelling. 
 Flow modelling. 
Representation information in the model includes 
only the tangible equipment information and fault 
path propagation information when fault or 
deviation happen in flow, temperature, vapour etc.   
Representation information in the model includes 
not only the tangible equipment information, but 
the intangible information such as state change, 
operation/action and event/action sequence, time 
and assumptions associated with each step of 
operation. 
Reads plant description file (PL file). Reads not only plant description file but also 
operation instructions file. 
PL file is used to build internal representation of 
the plant equipment, but not include the state 
because it assumes the state won’t change. The 
state given is its normal state. 
PL file is used to build internal representation of 
the plant equipment, including state because it 
considers the change of state. The first state given 
is “idle” state, in which valves are all closed, 
pumps are all off-line. 
No operation instructions file. operation instructions file is used to create a list of 
actions. 
Use deviation guidewords to drive the engine to 
stimulate/generate fault path, guidewords are 
“more, less, no etc” and parameters/variables are 
“flow”, “temperature”, “vapour” etc. 
Also use deviation guidewords to drive the engine 
but the guidewords is “No, early, late” and 
parameter is “action” and “termination”, which 
are related to operations. 
One output report is given in the format of tabular 
to summary of the cause, deviations and 
consequence etc and without suggested actions. 
The suggested actions are provided by the user at 
HMeeting, which is a PHP presentation of HAZID 
results. 
One output report is given in the format of tabular 
to summary of the deviations/keyword, 
operation/action and consequence etc and without 
suggested actions because it is telling the effects 
of wrong action (no, too early, too late) 
Another output report (simulation trace report)is 
given which is to tell the changes of state as it is 
simulated by deviations. 
      
Table 2. Comparison between HAZID and CHECKOP 
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Comparison between HAZID, CHECKOP and HAST 
 
Comparison point CHECKOP and HAZID HAST 
Model organization Has model library to contain 
qualitative models of equipment 
units of process plants. 
Has model library to contain 
qualitative models of equipment 
units of process plants. However, 
the models in the library include 
models designed for performing 
HAZOP analysis of the batch plants. 
Model Independence Models are totally independent 
with the environment that models 
are going to be applied. 
Models are totally independent with 
the environment that models are 
going to be applied. 
Plant decomposition  
 
Plant is split into very elementary 
units such as valves, pumps etc. 
Plant is split into very elementary 
units such as valves, pumps as well 
as procedure phases etc. 
Model feature inheritance 
and implement  tools 
Each model inherits features from 
its parent model. Implemented by 
MBuilder. 
Each model inherits features from 
its parent model. A taxonomy editor 
is used to implement this inherence 
feature. 
 
Modelling Fault path 
propagation  
Using mini SDG arcs to connect 
deviations, faults and 
consequences together. 
Using mini fault trees to trace out 
root cause. 
Model building tools Models are created by MBuilder. Models are created by a unit editor. 
Model classification Models are classified as “Unit 
Model” only. 
Models are classified as “cause 
model”, “HAZOP model”, and 
“consequence model”. Particularly, 
it has a distinctive “mental model” 
for the HAZOP study 
members/analysts at the stage to 
think about deviations, main 
variables that could be used in the 
plant.  
Models of the same equipment unit 
for batch plant HAZOP analysis is 
differentiated by its phase. There are 
common phase models and specific 
phase models. 
P&ID SmartPlant to create P&ID. A plant editor  to create P&ID. 
 
Model verification Model testing/ model verification 
is carried out by Model testing tool 
before the model is being 
analyzed/utilized. Once going to 
the analysis process, the user can 
just wait for the HAZOP study 
Do not verify the model before it is 
utilized and the HAZOP analysis is 
performed interactively for the user 
to test and confirm/sign off the 
result. 
 A literature review on modelling and modelling tools for HAZOP  
 
  
175 
output. That means the user does 
not interact with the system during 
the analysis.  
Suggested actions No suggested actions are provided 
in the output of either HAZID or 
CHECKOP. HAZID complements 
this by allowing users to type their 
suggested actions at HMeeting, 
which is a php presentation of 
HAZID results. 
No suggested actions are provided 
in the output. Users have to insert 
recommendations by themselves. 
However, it provides a facility to 
automatically insert available 
monitoring and protection devices 
by retrieving their information from 
the database to the HAZOP result.  
application HAZID is currently used only in 
continuously operating plants. 
CHECKOP is used in batch plants.  
It can be used to do autoHAZOP on 
both process plants and batch plants. 
Reducing output volume Use a consequence evaluation 
system to reduce volume of 
output. . 
Consider this in the HAZOP models 
by excluding any intermediate mini 
trees that only necessary to 
propagate the deviation. 
Use of template Use template to build models. Does not use template to build 
models. 
Reducing time and efforts Time and effort is reduced by: 
Efficiency of the HAZID analysis , 
no interactive action during the 
analysis, the check/test of the 
model is performed before the 
analysis. 
Time and effort is reduced by : 
• part of the validation of 
output is performed by 
HAST. 
• auto suggested information 
from the system by existing 
preventive and/or 
mitigatory interventions. 
 
 
Table 3. Comparison between HAZID, CHECKOP and HAST 
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Comparison between HAZOPExpert and HAZID 
HAZOPExpert HAZID 
Models are called HDG model (HAZOP-Digraph 
Model). 
Models are called unit model based on SDG. 
It has a model library to contain all models. It has a model library to contain all models. 
Models in the library are organized in a class 
hierarchy using the object-oriented framework of 
G2 . ( Not sure if there is similar way of feature 
inheritance in the framework of G2 as that in 
HAZID). 
Feature inheritance between models.  
What kind of knowledge it represents: 
Generic knowledge represented by generic cause 
and effect models. 
Process specific knowledge, such as normal 
physical state of the material, and whether the 
material is corrosive, 
flammable, volatile or toxic. 
 
HAZID SDG model represents generic knowledge 
of equipment item and the fault, deviation 
propagation information within and outside that 
model unit. 
The process specific knowledge like the properties 
of material is supplied by external software 
through Fluid Model System (FMS), which is a 
system that performs fault path validation by 
using predicates and functions. (McCoy et al., 
1999 d) 
The plant state is assumed to be steady state. The plant state is assumed to be steady state. 
It has a Graphical representation of models since 
it uses the real-time expert system shell G2 to do 
the reasoning work. The graphic tool is provided 
by this shell. 
Does not have the feature of model graphic 
representation. 
Pipe is also defined as a connection-class.  Does not have pipe-type models, because it 
requires that a unit must at least have a chamber to 
create a model for it (McCoy et al., 1999 c). 
HAZOPExpert has a process-materials-cause 
procedure attached to HDG arcs to identify root 
cause of fault like “Leak in the tank or tank 
rupture or breakage due to presence of a corrosive 
process material”. 
HAZID applies the runtime condition queries 
(RTCs) attached to SDG arcs, faults and 
consequences to check on the properties of the 
process materials using predictions and functions 
defined in the “Fluid Model System” as described 
in McCoy et al. (1999 d). 
Table 4 Comparison between HAZOPExpert and HAZID 
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APPENDIX F A DEVIATION LIST 
This deviation list is generated based on Crawley et al. (2000), “HAZOP: Guide to best practice _ Guidelines to best practice 
for the process and chemical industries”. 
 
Parameters Guidewords Meaningful Deviations 
Boil up (2) More  Boil+ (more boil up) 
 Less Boil- (less boil up) 
   
Communication (6) None Comm0 (none communication) 
 Part of  CommP (part of communication is 
achieved) 
 More of Comm+ (more communication) 
 Less of Comm- (less communication) 
 Other  CommO (Substitute communication) 
 As well as CommA (additional communication) 
   
Composition (4) Part of  CompP (Part of composition is 
achieved) 
 As well as  CompA (additional composition) 
 More Comp+ (more composition) 
 Less Comp- (less composition) 
   
Contamination (1) More  Cont+ (more contamination) 
   
Conversion (2) Higher Conv+ (higher conversion) 
 Lower Conv- (lower conversion) 
   
Flow (6) More F+ (more flow) 
 Less F- (less flow) 
 No F0 (no flow) 
 Reverse FR (reverse flow) 
 Elsewhere FE (flow goes elsewhere where it 
should not be) 
 As well as  FA (flow is an additional activity which 
should not be) 
   
Gas (1) More G+ (more gas) 
   
Heat transfer (2) More HT+ (more heat transfer) 
 Less HT- (less heat transfer) 
   
Lever (3) Higher L+ (high level) 
 Lower L- (low level) 
 None L0 (none level) 
   
Liquid (1) More Liq+ (more liquid) 
   
Maintain (3) More Main+ (more maintain) 
 Less Main- (less maintain) 
 No Main0 (no maintain) 
   
MixingQuality (3) Worse  M- (worse mixing) 
 Better M+ (better mixing) 
 None M0 (none mixing) 
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Operate (1) No O0 (no operation) 
   
Phase (3) Other PO (substitute phase) 
 Reverse PR (reverse phase) 
 As well as PA (additional phase) 
   
Pressure (3) Higher P+ (high pressure) 
 Lower P- (low pressure) 
 Reverse PR (reverse pressure) 
   
Reaction (7) Higher (rate of) R+ (higher rate of reaction) 
 Lower (rate of) R- (lower rate of reaction) 
 None R0 (none reaction) 
 Reverse RR (reverse reaction) 
 As well as RA (additional reaction) 
 Other than RO (substitute reaction) 
 Part of RP(part of reaction is achieved) 
   
Signal (1) No SN (no signal) 
   
Speed (2) faster S+ (faster speed) 
 slower S- (slower speed) 
   
Temperature (2) Higher T+ (high temperature) 
 Lower T- (low temperature) 
   
Time (2) Too early The operation timing is too early 
 Too late The operation timing is too late 
   
Vapour (1) More  Vap+ (more vapour) 
   
Viscosity (2) More  Vis + (more viscosity) 
 Less Vis + (less viscosity) 
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APPENDIX G EXPLANATION OF NOTATIONS 
 
‘P ‘ means ‘Pump’, eg., ‘P-0101A’ means ‘ a pump with the tag as P-0101A’; 
 
‘V’ means ‘valve’,  eg., ‘V001’ means ‘a valve with the tag as V001’; 
 
‘PI’ means ‘Pressure Indicator’, eg., ‘PI100’ means ‘a pressure indicator with the tag as 
PI100’; 
 
‘PRV’ means ‘Pressure Relief Valve’, eg., ‘PRV001PRV’ means ‘a pressure relief valve with 
the tag as PRV001PRV’; 
 
‘ZEL’ and ‘ZLL’ mean ‘low level alarm, eg., ‘ZEL-59010’ means ‘a low level alarm with the 
tag as ZEL-59010’; 
 
‘ZEH’ and ‘ZLH’ mean ‘high level alarm, eg., ‘ZEH-59010’ means ‘a high level alarm with 
the tag as ZEH-59010’; 
 
‘FCV’ means ‘Control Valve’, eg., ‘FCV-59010’ means ‘a control valve with the tag as FCV-
59010’; 
 
 
